From Local to National Communities: The Transformation of Demographic Regimes in Western Europe, 1870–1960

SUSAN COTTS WATKINS

THE VIEW THAT INDIVIDUAL CHOICE IS FUNDAMENTAL to modern reproductive behavior has been largely unchallenged, either in theory or in the practice of demographic research. E. A. Wrigley has argued that the key change from traditional to modern fertility patterns was a shift in the locus of the social control of fertility, from a system of control "through social institution and custom to one in which the private choice of individual couples played a major part in governing the fertility rate" (Wrigley, 1978: 148). A major theorist of the fertility transition, Frank Notestein, wrote: "Another and equally valid way of describing the transition in human fertility is in terms of the change from a situation in which the controlling factors, both positive and negative, are mainly institutional, to a situation in which the controlling factors lie mainly in the area of rational choice by the couples involved" (Notestein, 1983 [1964]: 351). These theoretical statements fit comfortably with the sociological traditions exemplified by Durkheim and Weber; they are also similar in spirit to the Whiggish histories of the Western European family that emphasize the progressive loosening of the bonds that constrained individuals in the past (e.g., Stone, 1977). The focus on individuals is also evident among neoclassical economists, who have provided elegant models and testable hypotheses that have disciplined demographic research. In addition to the theoretical focus on individuals, the modes of empirical research that dominated after the 1940s have been highly individualistic, in part due to the development of surveys, statistical tools of analysis, and high-speed computing that permit quantitatively precise statements about large, representative samples of individuals (Coleman, 1986: 1316).

In contrast, "others"—kin, friends, and neighbors—have usually been offstage in theories of modern demographic behavior; when they are brought

onto center stage, it is almost invariably in discussions about traditional societies or about the early stage of their transformation. Notable among those who have written of the role of "others" in traditional societies are Norman Ryder, who emphasized the familial intergenerational contract (Ryder, 1983); John Caldwell, who called attention to the influence of mothers-in-law (Caldwell, 1980); and Ron Lesthaeghe, who pointed to the regulation over the right to reproduce exercised by ruling groups in traditional societies (Lesthaeghe, 1980). More distant "others" appear in recent multi-level analyses of fertility change in developing countries (see, e.g., Smith, 1989; Entwisle and Mason, 1985; Casterline, 1981), where community influences are represented by aggregations of the characteristics of individuals in the community, or in discussions of the local context of demographic change (McNicoll, 1984). Perhaps the largest role for "others" in recent demographic research has been in analyses that emphasize the role of diffusion in accounting for the pace and pervasiveness of the fertility decline (Knodel and van de Walle, 1986; Watkins, 1987).

In this article, I propose that certain characteristics of demographic change in Western Europe between 1870 and 1960 suggest the need to pay more attention to "others" in attempts to account for demographic behavior. By "others," I mean the members of the community with whom individuals interact on a day-to-day basis, as well as the members of what Benedict Anderson (1983) has called "imagined communities." Put simply, I assume that in the end it is individuals who act in the privacy of their bedroom; I propose, however, that even when the couple is literally alone in the bedroom, the echoes of conversations with kin and neighbors influence their actions. Moreover, the demographic as well as the linguistic patterns suggest that while in the past these conversations were likely to have been largely with members of the local community, in the present the relevant community is largely national.

The article begins with the most solid part of the story, a summary of key changes in demographic behavior. Since the details are given elsewhere (Watkins, Forthcoming) the description will be brisk. It focuses not on changes in levels (e.g., the decline in marital fertility) but rather on changes in variation in marital fertility and nuptiality between 1870 and 1960. In 1870, before the large-scale declines in marital fertility had begun in most areas of Western Europe, demographic behavior varied greatly within countries: provinces (counties, cantons, départements) within the same country were quite different from one another, suggesting the importance of local communities. After the fertility transition began (i.e., after 1870, in most countries) within-country demographic variation in both marital fertility and proportions married increased, but by 1960 within-country variation was less than it had been in 1870. This reduction in within-country variation suggests the importance of the national community for modern demographic

behavior. I then speculate on the role that parallel changes in social structures—particularly the integration of national markets and the expansion of the role of the state, which Charles Tilly (1981) has called the two master-processes of the modern era—as well as nation-building might have played in accounting for this greater demographic uniformity.

It is important to emphasize at the outset that at issue here is not why marital fertility fell or why the proportions married increased: these remain important questions, but they are not addressed here. The attempt here is to describe the decline in within-country demographic diversity, and to elucidate the role of "others" by examining some of the mechanisms by which this change occurred. In this respect, the approach is compatible with discussions of diffusion as a mechanism for demographic change.

The conclusions are necessarily tentative. The data used here are aggregated, and the personal interactions that are the essence of communities are difficult to observe and record systematically even at present. Thus, much of the argument is frankly speculative, although it is supported by parallel changes and by qualitative evidence from historians and anthropologists. Finally, no attempt is made to place weights on the role of the individual versus the role of "others." Both are assumed to be important. Since, however, there has been no lack of attention to the role of individuals, here the spotlight is focused on their neighbors, on the communities in which their lives are embedded.

Western Europe in 1870

We begin with an analysis in which communities are defined spatially. There are two levels of aggregation, the country and the province. The countries are the 15 countries of Western Europe. Provinces are départements in France, counties in England, cantons in Switzerland, and so on.[1] The demographic measures are the indexes of marital fertility (I_g) and nuptiality (I_m) developed by Ansley Coale for the Princeton European Fertility Project, and were calculated by collaborators on that project.[2] They distinguish between the two crucial components of the total fertility performance of a population where most births are from marital unions—proportions married and marital fertility. While these indexes have drawbacks, they have the advantage that they can be calculated for all provinces of Western Europe over this period. They thus permit a comparative analysis over a long period of time—usually from around 1870 to 1960.[3]

Around 1870, the maximum marital fertility (an I_g of 1.05), found in the Flemish arrondissement of Dendermonde in Belgium, was higher than the Hutterite standard of 1.0. The lowest marital fertility (an I_g of .35), in the French département of Eure, is close to the average level for all of Western Europe in 1960. There was also considerable diversity in marriage patterns.

In the southern province of Caceres in Spain, over two-thirds of the women of reproductive age were married, while in the Swedish *lan* of Stockholm and in Sutherland, in the Scottish Highlands, fewer than one-third were married.

When only provinces within the same country are compared, diversity was often less, though still substantial. The midspread is used for this comparison: sometimes called the interquartile range, it is the difference between the highest and the lowest value for individual provinces when one-quarter of the provinces with the highest values and one-quarter of the provinces with the lowest values of the index in question are omitted from the calculation. There was less diversity in proportions married (I_m) in each country than there was across all Western European provinces: the midspread in each country was smaller than that for all provinces. With respect to marital fertility (I_g), the midspreads for Belgium, France, Germany, Finland, and Switzerland were all larger than the midspread for all Western European provinces. The midspreads of the other countries were smaller than the midspread for all provinces.[4]

Although the rankings are not identical on both indexes, the countries of the British Isles (England and Wales, Scotland, Ireland) and of Scandinavia were among the most homogeneous, and Belgium, France, Germany, and Switzerland among the most heterogeneous.[5] Differences in marital fertility almost as great as those between any two Western European provinces were found in a single country, Belgium, where (if marriage and illegitimacy were the same in these arrondissements) the results would be equivalent to a difference of nearly five children per couple. Diversity in Belgium was extreme, but it was approximated in France and in countries contiguous to France.

Differences across countries in the degree of demographic diversity are not accounted for by the quality of the data or by the varying number of provinces in each country. Size does matter—larger countries were generally more diverse than smaller countries—but size alone does not account for demographic diversity: England, for example, is more homogeneous than would be expected based on its size, and France less.[6] Nor do differences in demographic diversity appear to be due to differences in the degree of economic development. The analyses of the Princeton European Fertility Project showed only weak correlations at the provincial level between crude measures of economic circumstances (e.g., the proportion of the population classified as urban or agricultural) before the onset of the fertility transition (Watkins, 1986).

Finally, the degree of demographic diversity around 1870 does not seem to be affected by earlier fertility decline or earlier increases in nuptiality in some provinces than in others. During a time of change, diversity is expected to increase, as some provinces adopt the new behavior before others. Thus, it is possible that the diversity evident in 1870 is merely the result of

departure from an earlier, more uniform, situation. Only in France, however, had a large number of provinces begun the fertility transition by 1870. In the other countries, the midspread is not affected by the fertility decline occurring in a handful of provinces. This statement is based on identifying those provinces with an early decline as those with an I_g below .6 or with a 10 percent decline in I_g before 1870. In most countries, either no provinces or only one or two provinces meet these criteria.[7] Since the midspread of I_g excludes the quarter of the provinces with the lowest marital fertility, it is thus not affected by early fertility decline in a few provinces.[8] Only in France are there so many provinces with an early decline in marital fertility (accompanied, in this case, by a roughly parallel rise in nuptiality) that the midspread is affected.[9]

The association between demographic diversity and linguistic diversity is striking. While most Western European countries in the nineteenth century had groups that did not speak the official language (or languages), the demographically most diverse countries were, by and large, multilingual—that is, countries in which substantial proportions of the population did not speak the same language.[10] Belgium was bilingual (Flemish and French); the provincial populations of Switzerland spoke French, German, Italian, or Romansch. In mid–nineteenth century France, French was at best a second language for a substantial portion of the population, and some local dialects were unintelligible to those who spoke Parisian French (Levasseur, 1889; Weber, 1976). In contrast, while most other countries had some who spoke only a minority language, English was the dominant language in all the English counties, and each of the Scandinavian countries was largely monolingual.[11] Italy is a puzzle. It is far more homogeneous with respect to both marital fertility and nuptiality than one might expect in view of the deep differences in dialect.[12]

It is obvious that these measures describe only demographic outcomes, not intentions. It may be that wishes were more similar than outcomes. In developing countries today, desired fertility is more similar across individuals than is their achieved fertility (Cleland, 1985), and wishes may have been more uniform than outcomes in the past as well—especially given the local variability in infant and child mortality. Even had that been the case, however, the differences in outcomes between extremely different provinces affected other aspects of people's lives: a family with nine births over the couple's reproductive lifetime surely functioned at least somewhat differently than a family with three or four.

Western Europe in 1960

While the fertility decline and the rise in proportions married are an important part of demographic change over the last century in Western Europe, they are not the changes of interest here. Again, our focus is on variation, not on

level. The changes in demographic diversity during this period can best be summarized by imagining a demographic map of Western Europe in 1870, and another one in 1960. If we were to color in the provinces on the 1870 map according to their levels of marital fertility and marriage, we would see that national boundaries would be rather faint; there was so much diversity within countries that it mattered relatively little whether a province was in one country or another.

After 1870 demographic diversity increased temporarily, as some provinces adopted new patterns of demographic behavior—lower marital fertility and higher proportions married—sooner than others. Subsequently, however, diversity decreased. An equivalent demographic map for 1960 would show national boundaries to be more deeply etched. As will be shown, country location accounted statistically for some of the provincial-level variation in demographic behavior in 1870, but far more so in 1960. Differences among countries diminished as well, but the reduction of diversity within countries was greater than the reduction of diversity among countries.

The relative effects of between-country and within-country diversity can be evaluated by separating the variation across all of the provinces of Western Europe into two components, one due to differences across countries and one due to differences within countries. This is done in Table 1. The analysis of variance begins with a calculation of the overall mean of all 430

TABLE 1 Analysis of variance of marital fertility (I_g) and proportions married (I_m), by country, separately for 1870, 1900, 1930, 1960

	1870	1900	1930	1960
Marital fertility (I_g)				
R^2*	.57	.57	.64	.68
Sum of squares				
Between-country	4.25	5.37	5.52	3.09
Within-country	3.26	3.99	3.16	1.45
Total	7.51	9.36	8.68	4.54
Marriage (I_m)				
R^2	.59	.67	.76	.75
Sum of squares				
Between-country	1.95	2.37	2.76	1.67
Within-country	1.36	1.17	.89	.56
Total	3.31	3.54	3.65	2.23

NOTES: Germany is omitted from this analysis because of boundary changes between 1930 and 1960. There are 14 countries and 430 provinces at each date and for each index.

* R^2 shows the proportion of total variation (the total sum of squares) accounted for by country location (the between-country sum of squares). For further discussion of the statistical procedure, see text.

provinces, and then calculates the difference between each province and that mean; the sum of these deviations (squared) is referred to as the total sum of squares. In a sense, the total sum of squares tells us how well, or how badly, we can predict the values for individual provinces when we predict that each one will be equal to the overall mean. Table 1 shows that there is less variation around the overall mean in 1960 than there was in 1870 (the total sum of squares is smaller in 1960 than in 1870).

We can now ask whether we would do better if we predicted that each province would be equal to the mean for the country in which that province is located, rather than equal to the mean for all Western European provinces: that is, does knowing country location for a particular province help us to predict its demographic behavior? To answer this query, we split the total sum of squares into two components, the "within-country sum of squares" and the "between-country sum of squares." The within-country sum of squares (also known as the "error sum of squares") is the sum of the squared deviations of each province from its country's mean (there are 14 countries—Germany is excluded because of boundary changes). It is the variation in province values that remains after we have done our best to predict the provincial values from the country mean. The between-country sum of squares (also known as the "explained sum of squares") is the amount of the original variation that is "explained" by the fact that the countries differ in their mean values.

The R^2 summarizes the analysis. It is the ratio of the "explained" sum of squares to the total sum of squares, or the proportion of the original variation that is explained by adopting the notion that countries have different means. If there is no difference in means among countries, then R^2 will be zero, or close to it; if, however, province values cluster closely around their country mean and these country means do differ, then R^2 will be close to one—we will get very close to the province value by predicting that it equals the mean for the country in which it is located.

As shown in Table 1, the total amount of variation across all Western European provinces (the total sum of squares) first increased and then decreased to less than its 1870 value for both marital fertility (I_g) and marriage (I_m). The between-country sum of squares increased after 1870; for a while, the countries became more different from one another. In 1960, however, the countries were more similar to one another than at any previous date in this analysis. The within-country sum of squares shows what happened to variation within countries. For marital fertility, this increased temporarily, but by 1960 the variation was less than it had been in 1870. For nuptiality, the within-country sum of squares decreased steadily. For both marital fertility and nuptiality, the between-country sum of squares and the within-country sum of squares declined, but the decline within countries was greater than that between countries. As a result, the proportion of the (lesser) total

variation accounted for by country location (the R^2) was greater in 1960 than in 1870.

That country boundaries matter for demographic behavior is a statement about statistical aggregates, not about any particular group of provinces or any particular border. A comparison of the demography of the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine with its French neighbors and its German neighbors shows the hardening of a particular demographic boundary.[13] In the 1860s Alsace-Lorraine was a part of France, as it had been on and off in the past, but its culture was German. The standard written language was Hochdeutsch, and the languages spoken at home were Germanic dialects (Stephens, 1976: 341). The levels of marital fertility and marriage in the three provinces of Alsace-Lorraine (Haut-Rhin, Bas-Rhin, and Moselle) were more like their German neighbors (Pfalz and Trier) than like the contiguous French départements (Haute-Saône, Vosges, and Meurthe).[14] If national boundaries had followed demographic boundaries, Alsace-Lorraine would have been included in Germany, not France. Alsace-Lorraine became part of Germany in 1871, and was later returned to France at the end of World War I. In 1960 the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine were less distinctive than they had been earlier. In part this was due to an increased similarity between French and German demographic behavior. In addition, the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine became more like the other provinces of France.[15] By 1960, Alsace-Lorraine was demographically French. The Alsatian dialect remained the most widespread means of communication, but children went to French schools and learned French. By the 1960s only the elderly and children under age six remained dialectical monolingualists (Tabouret-Keller, 1968).[16]

Now let us look more closely at variation within each country. The comparison between 1870 and 1960 can be summarized by a simple ratio of the midspread in 1960 to the midspread in 1870. If the ratio is greater than 1, variation was greater at the later date than at the earlier, and if the ratio is less than 1, variation has diminished. The results can be best appreciated by showing these ratios graphically for each country in the three subdivisions of Western Europe: Northwest Europe, Scandinavia, and the Mediterranean (see Figure 1).[17]

In most countries, variation was less in 1960 than in 1870.[18] There are 28 comparisons (14 countries × two indexes): variation is less in 1960 than in 1870 in 19 of the comparisons, more in eight, and the same in Switzerland (for I_g). The provinces that were unusual in 1960 (displaying particularly high marital fertility or particularly low nuptiality) are usually geographically contiguous to each other, but distant from the nation's capital geographically and socially. These provinces were also often either at the borders of the country or in mountainous regions, and they were often provinces that previously had spoken a language that differed from that of the majority.[19]

Most of the exceptions are in the Mediterranean countries, where the fertility transition occurred later than in the rest of Western Europe. Among

FIGURE 1 Ratio of the midspread (interquartile range) in the provincial indexes of marital fertility (I_g) and the index of proportions married (I_m) for 1960 to the corresponding measure in 1870: Selected countries in Western Europe



the Mediterranean countries, Italy—where variation was surprisingly little in 1870—is again quite unusual. The midspread in 1960 is five times larger for marital fertility (I_g) and more than three times larger for nuptiality (I_m) than it was in 1870. Although the Mediterranean countries appear as exceptions in 1960, in both Italy and Portugal variation in fertility diminished substantially after 1960; were data available to calculate the midspread for

the same provinces in 1980, it is likely that the ratio of the midspread in 1980 to that in 1870 would be less than 1 in these countries. In other words, the differences evident in 1960 may largely be due to the later timing of the fertility transition in the Mediterranean countries.[20] In the Scandinavian countries it is Norway that is the most unusual, with greater diversity in both marital fertility and nuptiality in 1960 than in 1870.

Variation has diminished in most of the countries of Northwest Europe, in most cases by 25 to 50 percent. The exceptions are Ireland (which for the purposes of the present analysis is taken to include both the counties of Eire and of Northern Ireland), where variation in marital fertility was slightly greater in 1960, and Belgium, where variation in nuptiality was slightly greater in 1960.

Up to now attention has been focused on demographic differentials among groups defined by geographic location. While a similar analysis of demographic diversity among social groups (e.g., by occupation) would also be of interest, the fertility decline had often begun among some of these groups by the time that comprehensive data classified by social characteristics are first available, creating a bias toward a finding of reduced diversity.[21] A set of comparative fertility surveys done in Western Europe in the mid-1970s, however, permits us to examine fertility differentials between groups defined by urban–rural residence, religion, education, occupation, and income. These are seen in Table 2. The differences in terms of the average number of live births per married woman are rarely more than half a child. Thus, for example, while differences exist between women who live in cities and those who live in rural areas, or between Catholics and Protestants, they are very small.[22]

"Large" and "small" are obviously matters of degree. A difference of one child per married woman is a small absolute difference, but a large difference relative to the average when the average is low. Yet a one-child difference may seem so large precisely because it is unusual to have three (or more) children in modern times.[23] In the nineteenth century, the difference between couples that had seven children and those that had four may have been perceived as smaller than the difference between two and three children appears today.[24]

Declines in infant and child mortality may be part of the story. We do not, after all, know how many children couples wanted in the past, only how many they had. Yet while it is likely that mortality declines are part of the story, it is unlikely that these alone account for the decline in heterogeneity in marital fertility, and even less likely for nuptiality. As Quételet remarked, "one does not . . . consider whether to die in the same way as one considers whether to marry" (Quételet, 1848: 66). For six countries, variation in nuptiality and infant mortality were compared both around 1870 and again in 1960. In all, diversity in infant mortality was much less in 1960 than it had been earlier. But despite the assumption that the desire to keep

TABLE 2 Average number of live births per married woman (standardized by duration of marriage), by type of current residence, religion, wife's education, husband's occupation, and husband's income: Selected countries in Western Europe, around 1975

	Residence		Religion		Wife's education		Husband's occupation		Husband's income	
Country	R	U	C	NR	E	PS	Agr.	NM	VL	VH
Northwest Europe										
Belgium (Flemish)	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.5	1.8	1.9	2.2	1.8	1.7	2.0
France	2.2	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.5	1.7	2.0	1.8	2.2	1.8
Great Britain	—	—	2.1	1.7	2.2	1.7	2.0	1.7	—	—
Scandinavia										
Denmark	2.2	1.9	—	—	2.2	1.9	—	—	2.2	1.9
Finland	2.1	1.7	—	—	2.0	1.6	2.1	1.8	1.6	1.8
Norway	2.2	1.9	—	—	2.4	1.9	2.3	1.9	1.9	2.0
Mediterranean										
Italy	2.0	1.9	2.0	1.5	2.5	1.5	2.3	1.9	—	—
Spain	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.4	2.6	2.4	—	—

NOTES: Great Britain includes England, Wales, and Scotland. Fertility is the average number of live births per married woman. In all countries except Denmark these are currently married (once-married) women. Because the women were of different marital durations, fertility was standardized by duration of marriage. For details of the study and its analysis, see Jones (1982) and Berent, Jones, and Siddiqui (1982). Residence, religion, and education are characteristics of the wife. Residence is current residence; the two categories are Rural and Urban. The two categories presented for religion are Catholic or No Religion. For Education the category "E" includes both those who have not completed elementary school and those who have completed only elementary school, except in France, Italy, and Spain where the category includes only those who have not completed elementary school; "PS" means some postsecondary education. Under Husband's occupation, "Agr." indicates agricultural workers, and "NM" indicates nonmanual workers outside of agriculture. Husband's income is either "VL" (very low) or "VH" (very high); these are the bottom and top quintiles of the income distribution for each national sample, respectively.
SOURCE: Jones (1982: Tables 2 and 4).

children alive was more uniform than the desired age of marriage, and despite modern state interventions to diminish discrepancies between areas of high and low mortality, marriage in 1960 was more uniform than infant mortality in England and Wales, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Sweden (while in the other two countries examined, France and Denmark, the reverse was true).[25]

The strongest support for viewing the reduction in demographic diversity within countries as a consequence of increased social integration within national boundaries comes from an examination of parallel changes in linguistic diversity. Language and demographic behavior would seem, a priori, to be related. Differences in language or dialect are typically assumed by social scientists to be accompanied by other cultural differences (e.g., Geertz, 1971). Those who share the same geographic space and the same language or dialect tend to interact most frequently; neighbors reward the well-behaved and disapprove of those who stray, and they also provide

models for behavior and conversational opportunities to consider alternatives.

Personal networks depend on a shared language. Thus, if members of a local community speak a language different from those outside the community, they are less likely to be influenced by patterns and norms emanating from other local communities or from the center. The reduction in demographic differentials among inhabitants of provinces is usually matched by a reduction in linguistic diversity. Language statistics gathered and analyzed by Lieberson, Dalto, and Marsden (1981), by country, show that in most Western European countries mother-tongue diversity declined.[26] By 1960 few individuals were unable to speak and read the official language (or languages) (Stephens, 1976; Trudgill, 1983). Because both the demographic and the linguistic data are aggregated, it is not possible to link demographic differences with linguistic differences at the level of the individual. But there is reason to believe that at the level of the province the relationship holds. In Western Europe, linguistic differences were related to differences in the timing of the fertility decline (Coale, 1973; Anderson, 1986); in Belgium, the timing of the fertility transition was quite different in matched villages on either side of the linguistic border (Lesthaeghe, 1977). In France, where both linguistic and demographic diversity diminished considerably between 1870 and 1960, the départements that remained demographically distinctive in 1960 were usually those that had been linguistically distinctive a century earlier.[27] Brittany, whose départements retained high fertility and low nuptiality until the very end of the nineteenth century, appears to have persisted longest in maintaining its own language. But by 1927 only the aged were monolingual in Breton, while the children were monolingual in French (Dauzat, 1927). Although the reduction in provincial variation in nuptiality in Switzerland shows that a common language is not a sine qua non for a sense of identification with compatriots, it is reasonable to expect that social integration is more easily achieved when the population does speak the same language.

What had happened? The autobiography of a Breton suggests an answer. Returning from his first weeks at school taught in French, just after World War I, the author complained to his parents.

> "But you, my own parents, never speak French. Nobody in town or in the country speaks French, except for poor Madam Poirier."
>
> "We don't need to," said my parents, "but *you* will need to. . . . *You* will need to speak French all the time."
>
> "But what happened?"
>
> "It's the world that has changed, from one generation to another." (Hélias, 1978: 145)

Hélias's grandfather put it more pithily. "With French, you can go everywhere. With only Breton, you're tied to a short rope, like a cow to a post. You have to graze around your tether, and the meadow grass is never plentiful" (Ibid.: 135).

Local communities and national communities

Within-country demographic diversity around 1870 suggests the importance of local communities for demographic behavior. This can be examined further by considering the main determinants of demographic behavior around 1870, before the onset of decline in marital fertility and before the widespread increases in the proportion married, and by sketching out ways in which the local community might have influenced these determinants. In the absence of deliberate attempts either to space births or to stop childbearing once the desired number of children has been reached, differences in marital fertility among provinces can be accounted for fairly well by differences in breastfeeding. Studies in developing countries based on surveys that record both contraceptive use and the duration of breastfeeding show that, among women who do not use contraception, much of the observed variation in marital fertility can be attributed to lactation (Casterline et al., 1984). While direct evidence of the proximate determinants of marital fertility is not available for historical populations, the conclusion that breastfeeding accounts for much of the variation in marital fertility is compatible with evidence from English parish registers between 1600 and 1799 and from German village genealogies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; in Germany, information on local practices of breastfeeding from surveys in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries substantiates these inferences (Wilson, 1986; Knodel, 1988).

Patterns of breastfeeding varied widely from one community to another. An examination of regional variations in breastfeeding in Germany shows that in some areas of the south women rarely breastfed, giving their infants pap instead; in other provinces, between 85 percent and 100 percent of the women nursed their children (Kintner, 1985; see also Knodel and van de Walle, 1967 and Knodel, 1988). In southern Bavaria exceptions to the practice of never breastfeeding "were subject to severe social sanctions, including ridicule from neighbors and threats from husbands," suggesting the mobilization of village opinion (Kintner, 1985: 168). Customs of extended breastfeeding or never breastfeeding seem to have been longstanding. In 14 German villages studied by John Knodel, those villages where breastfeeding was most common among women married at the end of the eighteenth century were also those where it was most common among women married at the end of the nineteenth century (Knodel, 1988: 324).

Whatever the reasons for variations in breastfeeding across communities, the communities themselves seem relatively homogeneous in this respect. Although there is little direct evidence about variations across social groups in breastfeeding customs, variations in infant mortality serve as indirect evidence. Knodel's study found that village customs of breastfeeding account well for village differences in infant mortality. In these locations, there was little difference in infant mortality among occupational groups. Knodel concludes: "The fact that all social strata within a village appeared to have shared a more or less common risk of child loss emphasizes the probable role of local or regional infant-feeding customs, common to all classes, as a key determinant of infant mortality," and thus of marital fertility (Ibid.: 447).

What of variation in patterns of marriage? The distinctive Western European marriage pattern—relatively late age of female marriage and a relatively high proportion of spinsters—has been associated with nuclear family households, a tolerance for unmarried women (Watkins, 1984), and a close correspondence of spouses' ages (Laslett, 1972). These were found throughout Western Europe and were apparently quite longstanding (Hajnal, 1982). Within this broad Western European pattern, however, there were regional variations (the distinctive marriage pattern of the Mediterranean countries—see Smith, 1981) as well as sharp local differences.

Only rarely is there evidence of local community control at its most extreme form, as in some areas in nineteenth century Germany, where marriage was forbidden if the couple were judged not to have sufficient resources to support their new household and thus would be a burden to the community (Knodel, 1967). Since the ability to set up a new household at marriage depended on economic resources, presumably economic circumstances were important in the timing of marriage everywhere. Because markets were largely local or regional, incomes and prices differed considerably from one part of a country to another, leading to considerable variation across communities in the age of marriage. Additional local variation probably arose from substantial flexibility in the interpretation of the rule linking marriage to economic circumstances. What satisfied the prerequisites for a new household seems more likely to have been defined by the community than by the individuals themselves. This is supported by evidence that within local communities differences by husband's occupation in the age of marriage of women were surprisingly small (Knodel, 1988; Kertzer and Hogan, 1989).

In addition, most young people married acquaintances, which meant that the marriage market would be circumscribed by their movements. Although for the upper classes the relevant community extended beyond the village and the province, parish registers show that for ordinary people the marriage market was far more local. The marriage market may have coincided roughly with the economic market. As William Skinner has argued for China

(Skinner, 1985), there is probably a relation between markets and marriage: news of nubile young women could have been exchanged along with grain, introductions made, courtships begun.

This brief discussion of the determinants of demographic behavior in late nineteenth century Western Europe supports paying attention to the role of the community, particularly the local community, in understanding pretransition variations in demographic behavior. This is not to say that individual decisions, based on individual circumstances, were not relevant. But it seems likely that relatives, friends, and neighbors had a say.

New mothers would have learned how to feed their children from their own mothers and from their neighbors, both through observation and from conversation. The historical record provides glimpses of the circumstances of these conversations. Martine Segalen, in her account of peasant life in France in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, cites a work on Brittany that says:

> "The wash-house is one of the principal places of gossip in our region. Women of all ages meet there, and soaping and beating their linen often seems only a secondary activity, so enthusiastically do they exchange scandal, and tell each other of the loves, marriages, births, and other major events of the district." (Segalen, 1983: 138–139)

The picture of women washing and gossiping together is not peculiar to Brittany or to France, and it is at least plausible that among the topics women discussed as they washed was how to feed a new infant, and that the scandal they exchanged would have included stories of women who did not do it correctly.

More direct evidence comes from the accounts of *Spinnstuben*, gathering places for work and sociability that were common across Western Europe. Sometimes mixed-sex and sometimes single-sex, they were "one of the places around which the sexual culture of youth concentrated" (Medick, 1984: 323). Here the women talked about everyday problems of the household economy, and "the censuring and settling of village conflicts were in the forefront" (Ibid.: 334). A contemporary observer (from a publication of 1799) wrote that women "talked intimately of one's babies, of a cousin, of a neighbor, of flax, spinning; of geese, ducks, chickens, and eggs . . ." (Ibid.). Men, in their own gathering places, would also gossip, if presumably about somewhat different topics.

The kinds of interactions that appear to have played a role in constraining demographic behavior in the past can be characterized as gossip, which I have come to think is a useful way of summarizing some of the influences of "others" on individuals. Gossip has often been scorned as idle and malicious talk, particularly associated with women. Gossip is certainly

a form of social control: some behaviors are condemned, others praised. But the "best kind of women's gossip" provides narrative, explanation, and judgment: in the stories of others, the talker narrates a sequence of events that implies an explanation, and talker and listeners alike speculate on the meaning of the events, reach a common point of view, and reassure themselves of what they share (Spacks, 1986).

Both men and women gossip, but it is likely that the gossip of women is more relevant for understanding demographic behavior. First, the measures used to describe demographic change usually are based on the fertility and marriage of women. Second, births and marriages are often well recorded, but what preceded them was not. Thus, it is necessary to imagine conversational interactions, and it is easier for me to imagine women, rather than men, talking about childbirth and marriage. I do, however, assume that sometimes men talked of these things among themselves, and that there were some mixed-sex conversations on these topics.

In the sort of conversational interactions that permit the development of interpretational schemes, both the relations among the gossipers and the stories they told are relevant. People were more likely to participate in "the best kind of gossip" with those like themselves, whose comments could be expected to be relevant for their own behavior. While the stories that provoked these conversations need not have been local—one can gossip about anybody—it is likely that those who were "like us" would be the most common topics of gossip, rather than those who by language or dress would be considered "foreigners," exotic people whose stories would be irrelevant to one's own behavior. In the nineteenth century both the storytellers and their subjects would have largely been members of the local community.

Even in the nineteenth century, personal networks linked communities within a larger demographic area. Marriage and migration were probably important in creating such links. Husband and wife were usually born in the same province, but they were often from different villages; marriage would have created a path between villages, as the outmarrying spouse returned to visit friends or relatives. Migrants, both temporary and permanent, maintained links with their community of origin (Garden, 1970; Poussou, 1983; Moch, 1983). The heterogeneity of provincial demographic behavior in the nineteenth century, however, suggests that the paths which connected communities became more attenuated as distance increased.

There is reason to believe that between 1870 and 1960 the scale of these interactions expanded. In other words, networks were more likely to reach into other provinces within the same country, and models from the outside were more likely to be brought in. In addition, and importantly, those who entered the province, or those whom one met when one left the province, were more likely to be experienced as "like us," as members of the same community, thus increasing the likelihood of conversations about intimate matters.

As noted earlier, the integration of national markets played a role. A connection between market integration and demographic diversity is suggested by a comparison of England and France in the nineteenth century. England, which had a rather unified national market by the eighteenth century, was relatively demographically homogeneous, while France, where national market integration occurred later, was relatively demographically diverse. As local and regional markets became unified, the evening out of incomes and prices across the provinces within a country would have made the circumstances in which residents lived more similar. To the degree that decisions about fertility and marriage were influenced by incomes and prices, this would have resulted in more homogeneous demographic behavior across geographic areas within the same country. In addition, however, the expansion of markets from local or regional to national extended personal networks. Long-distance migration increased considerably; presumably as a consequence, there was also an increase in the proportion of marriages in which one spouse was born in another province. In the département of Loir-et-Cher, for example, 12.8 percent of the marriages between 1870 and 1877 involved one spouse from Loir-et-Cher and one from another département; in 1946–54, 28.2 percent of marriages fell in this category (Sutter, 1958; Sutter and Tabah, 1955). As in the earlier period, links with the local community were often maintained by those who left. Virtually everyone in the French village of Chanzeaux now has relatives, close friends, neighbors, and landlords who are emigrants, and it is through them that the village gains "intimate and personal contact with the 'New France', which in many other respects has bypassed the small villages" (Wylie, 1966: 183).

More speculatively, the distribution of goods across all of the national territory would have meant that people in one part of the country could eat the same foods and wear the same clothes as those in another. Consider, for example, Michael Miller's (1981) history of the Bon Marché, the large French department store, between 1869 and 1920. It disseminated advertisements and pictures that showed people in the provinces what a proper bourgeois family (i.e., the Parisian upper-middle class) looked like—how they furnished their house, what their well-cared-for children wore. To advertise its winter season in 1894, 1,500,000 catalogues were mailed out, of which 740,000 went to the provinces and 260,000 abroad (Miller, 1981: 61–62). The Bon Marché had a thriving mail-order business, as did other department stores. The department store "made the culture of consumption a national one"; through the Bon Marché, Paris and the countryside became more alike (Ibid.: 165). The result would have been that when one encountered someone from another province within the same country he or she would appear, at least outwardly, to be more like oneself than would have been the case earlier in the nineteenth century. This in turn would have facilitated interaction: people are more likely to feel that they have something in common with those who dress the same, to gossip with them, and to take their interpretations seriously.

Market integration was both national and international in the period before 1870. International market integration continued to increase after 1870, aided considerably by reductions in transportation costs, but it seems to have been overbalanced by state-driven moves toward national economic autarky (Pollard, 1981). Beginning in the late nineteenth century, national economies were defined by tariff walls, the removal of internal customs barriers, and other policies and programs, such as the payment of national subsidies. After World War I, most states ruthlessly followed their own interests in regulating both immigration and emigration (Bade, 1980: 376). Somewhat paradoxically, pan-European events played a role in defining national economies. During the Great Depression, international flows of both labor and capital were severely restricted. The two world wars vastly enhanced the grip of the nation-states over their own economies. There would almost certainly have been more national market integration even without war, but there was certainly more yet as a result of the mobilization of the civilian economy in wartime.

The functions of the state expanded enormously, increasing what Braudel has called its " 'diabolical' power of penetration" (Braudel, 1984: 51). In the nineteenth century, the state became more extensive and more intrusive than it had been earlier. Governments rarely implemented policies explicitly intended to affect either fertility or marriage (Fascist Italy and Germany are obvious exceptions, as are the pronatalist policies of France). The most direct link between state expansion and demographic behavior is through the expansion of social rights. If, as has been argued, children were valuable as a source of social security, then the implementation of welfare programs would have decreased their value in this respect. The last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth saw the "collectivization of providence": responsibility for welfare became collective, compulsory, and nationwide (de Swaan, 1988).[28] Just as market integration rendered the circumstances in which provincial populations lived more similar by evening out incomes and prices, national welfare programs would have made the costs and benefits of children more similar across provinces within the same country. But these and other national programs also encouraged a sense of identification with others in the same state.

By 1960, welfare programs in all the countries of Western Europe were similar in their broad outlines. But it is likely that these programs were perceived by citizens as national programs, social rights that belonged to them as citizens of a particular country rather than as a pan-European right. During the Great Depression expanded welfare schemes further increased people's perceptions that not only their prosperity but their survival was directly linked to national policies, thus enhancing the consciousness of interdependence within the national community and enlarging the distance between communities across national borders (Pollard, 1981: 74).

Mass identification with a nation-state almost certainly grew in the nineteenth century. Nation-building includes the insistence by the state that everyone be able to communicate in the official language (or languages) and the deliberate cultivation or even the invention of national traditions, such as coronation rituals and anthems. Nation-building can also be seen as an unanticipated consequence of war. During the two world wars, the group that was living and dying together was seen to be the nation, thus heightening intergroup solidarity (Simmel, 1955). The creation by the state of the home front as an integral part of the war effort brought Western governments closer to their people (Smith, 1981). In peacetime the enemies of the nation were international (e.g., the Catholic Church and international socialism) and subnational (e.g., users of dialect and regional patriots) (Hobsbawm, 1987; Grew, 1984).

Education was particularly important in nation-building. It is not only the higher levels of education that are relevant for demographic behavior, but also the fact that students attended either state schools or schools subject to considerable state regulation. Schools deliberately sought to inculcate civic loyalty and insisted on at least a minimum common curriculum (e.g., national history). Modern societies extol individualism, but they also produce standardized behavior, and they do this largely through the educational system (Meyer, 1986). Schools also facilitate interaction, by providing a common set of myths and symbols as well as a common store of knowledge upon which strangers can draw. Particularly significant is the insistence by all but the officially multilingual states that students be taught in the national language. Indeed, Ernest Gellner has argued that maintenance of the "cultural/linguistic medium" became the central role of education (Gellner, 1983: 63–64).

Market integration, state expansion, and nation-building are obviously interwoven, separable only for analytic purposes. Nor are they an exhaustive list of influences associated with the growth of a national community. Sports, for example, also united people. In the United Kingdom, "the topic of the day's matches would provide common ground for conversation between virtually any two male workers in England or Scotland, and a few score celebrated players provided a point of common reference for all" (Hobsbawm, 1983: 288–289). Increased literacy made provincial boundaries increasingly porous. The newspapers (and later radio and television) brought in topics for gossip from outside the local community, and permitted metaphorical conversations with a more distant audience through advice columns in which issues such as childcare were discussed, or those that dealt with readers' inquiries. The role of newspapers in the creation of a national community has been elucidated by Benedict Anderson (1983), who emphasizes the interactions of capitalism, printing, and the growth of standard vernacular languages in the formation of what he calls "imagined communities." One

of Anderson's central images is that of a newspaper: a newspaper is a one-day best seller, out-of-date tomorrow, read in privacy.

> Yet each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion. . . . What more vivid figure for the secular, historically-clocked, imagined community can be envisioned? (Anderson, 1983: 39)

It is important to note, however, that the effective influence of even the national newspapers stops at the frontiers of the language in which they are written; in most countries in Western Europe this increasingly coincided with the nation-state. Thus, Gabriel Tarde concluded that even though nations have increasingly intermingled and imitated one another, the demarcation among nationalities became deeper. This resulted, he said, because newspapers made the exchange of ideas between people speaking the same language even more rapid than the exchange of merchandise and ideas among distant people.

> While between neighboring or distant peoples the exchange of merchandise, ideas, all kinds of items multiplied, the exchange of ideas, in particular, between people speaking the same language progressed even more rapidly, thanks to newspapers. Therefore, even though the *absolute* difference between nations diminished, their relative and conscious differences grew. (Tarde, 1969 [1898]: 306)

The idea of national communities can be made more concrete by considering the empirical work of geographers on "mental maps" (Gould and White, 1986). One of the tests of people's knowledge of geography is to ask them to list, within a limited time, all the place names they can think of: this list is their mental map. Young children typically know nearby locations, the capital city, and perhaps a favorite resort area or a place recently in the headlines. Older children have more places on their mental maps until, as school-leavers, their mental maps are rather complete. Such an experiment was conducted around 1970 in two villages on either side of the border between Norway and Sweden. The villages were separated by no more than a few kilometers, and in addition the dialects spoken were similar. As expected, the older children knew more place names than the younger children, but the Norwegian children's mental maps showed a marked preferential bias to places in Norway, while those of the Swedish children showed a bias to locations in Sweden. The territorial boundary acted much like linguistic boundaries.

Roger Thabault's (1971) account of the commune of Mazières from the mid-nineteenth to the early twentieth century provides a historical anal-

ogy to the filling out of mental maps. In 1872 few inhabitants of Mazières had been born outside the commune or neighboring communes (p. 47). Most showed little interest in events beyond the local—even the wars of the Second Empire and the Revolution of 1848 seem hardly to have penetrated (pp. 48 and 106).

In subsequent decades, horizons widened. Part of the explanation lies in migration. Places became known not because people found them on maps, but because they had been there, or knew someone who had.

> Nearly everyone who had relatives living at a distance (and they were many) allowed themselves to be tempted by the demon of adventure and would arrange to go and visit them—*en famille*—at least once in their life if they were old, more often if they were young. . . . Neighbours, too, became interested in these distant places where, after all, people lived just as they did at Mazières. . . . [O]ne knew—dimly as yet—that wherever French was spoken, a peasant born and bred in Mazières-en-Gâtine could fit in and live his life. (Ibid.: 164–165)

We might expect that as more of the commune's inhabitants traveled, had friends or relatives who traveled, and read about distant places in the newspapers, their mental maps would have become filled in. But as in the villages of Norway and Sweden, it is likely that the maps were filled in largely with places in France.

The exceptions to the general pattern of increasing demographic homogeneity suggest the importance of higher levels of social integration in accounting for diminished demographic diversity within countries. In the case of Belgium, Ireland, and to some degree Norway, there is reason to believe that a sense of national community was less than in the other countries of Northwest Europe and Scandinavia.[29] Analyses of Ireland and Belgium point to the importance of political divisions for demographic behavior.[30] In Switzerland, where religious and linguistic differences are contained by a common political culture, demographic diversity diminished.[31]

The macro-level changes described above can be summarized by comparing a move made by a French peasant in the sixteenth century with a trip made by a villager in the middle of the twentieth century. In 1527 Martin Guerre's father, Sanxi Guerre, moved from the French Basque country, near the Spanish border, to a village in the Foix, also in southern France (Davis, 1983). The move took three weeks, on foot. For Sanxi Guerre, the Foix was a new world: he found changes in language, names, and dress; different household arrangements; a more active market in land and less identification between a family and its land; greater use of the written word; and distinctive courtship customs (Ibid.: 6–18). The difference in language was probably quite meaningful, for in the Foix a visitor from the French Basque country would have been marked off by his language as an outsider.

In the early 1960s, Laurence Wylie accompanied a friend from Chanzeaux, a village in one of the most traditional parts of France, to visit his city cousins in Paris. Initially the country cousin seemed subdued, the city cousins condescending. As the conversation between the cousins developed, however, it gradually became obvious that the country cousin was as well informed as the city cousins on politics, farm policy, social security, and the Common Market. Wylie concludes the story by observing, "As all this became clear, the country-mouse, city-mouse situation faded. These three men were much more on a level than they had thought" (Wylie, 1966: 342). Had they discussed when they intended to marry and how many children they wanted, the conversation would probably have reinforced the view that the cousins belonged to the same national community. Their ability to converse as equals was predicated on speaking the same language. It was also due in part to citizenship in the same state, one that provided them with a common education; to participation in a national economic market and national welfare systems; and to a press that kept them informed about national issues.

Conclusions

This article began by describing briefly the formation of national demographic regimes in Western Europe. I proposed that what we know about the determinants of demographic behavior in the past suggests an important role for the community. When we compare this past with the modern era, we see that despite a rhetoric that assumes a model of individual decisionmaking, the greater similarity of demographic behavior across provinces (and probably across social groups as well) in 1960 than in 1870 leads to the conclusion that "others"—kin, friends, and neighbors—influence demographic behavior in the present as well. What has shifted is the locus of that community: from largely local to largely national. The increasing importance of national communities is also shown in the decline in linguistic diversity: the move from local languages to a national language (or languages, in some cases) accompanied the decline in demographic diversity.

The reduction in within-country demographic diversity was paralleled by a trio of macro-level changes: the integration of national markets, the expansion of state functions, and nation-building. It might seem that these processes would have little to do with such private behaviors as marriage and childbearing. But state expansion, market integration, and nation-building increasingly drew local communities into national networks. Where these processes were derailed—for example, in Belgium and Ireland—it is notable that there was some increase in demographic diversity between 1870 and 1960.

If prices and incomes are important determinants of demographic behavior, then the greater homogeneity in prices and incomes that follows

from the integration of national markets and the development of state welfare programs would result in greater demographic homogeneity. The second interpretation emphasizes the ways in which market integration, state expansion, and nation-building knit together local personal networks into larger national networks. If couples take into account what other couples are doing—if, for example, they are influenced by the demographic behavior of their friends, neighbors, and acquaintances—then the expansion of the geographic extent of social networks from local to national means that the relevant "others" became not only the members of their local community but also the members of the national community. In both these interpretations the sources of change—markets, states, and nation-building—are the same, but the mechanisms by which they affect demographic behavior are different. Evaluating these two accounts would be daunting, ideally requiring not only individual as well as aggregate data but also comparable measures of market integration, state expansion and nation-building for many countries over a long period of time. In the absence of such a rigorous test, here I have chosen to focus on the role of markets, states, and nation-building in creating national communities. In Western Europe diversity declined in marriage as well as in marital fertility. While we have been accustomed to considering the effect of income and prices on marital fertility, the emphasis on communities is more intuitively appealing as a way of accounting for the decline in diversity in both marital fertility and marriage. In addition, there has been no lack of research within the income-and-prices framework, whereas much less research effort has been directed to the role of communities in shaping demographic behavior. Thus, attention was focused on the ways in which the relations of individuals with "others" might have altered their patterns of childbearing and marriage.

I have sketched out what the links between markets, states, and nation-building and demographic behavior might have looked like on the ground, and in doing so have emphasized the level of interaction, and, in particular, conversational interaction among women—what I have called the best kind of women's gossip. This kind of gossip provides what, Giddens (1979) has termed "interpretive schemes" that permit the evaluation of new behavior. It has been argued that people cannot verbalize the social rules guiding their behavior; gossip provides an arena in which social rules can be given a highly contextual and situational formulation. The decline in marital fertility and the increase in nuptiality between 1870 and 1960 suggest that what was desirable or acceptable, and what was undesirable or unacceptable, changed a great deal over time; it was, I think, through gossip that people tentatively tested the possibility of change by talking with "others" about "others," and assessing the reaction of their friends.

Both the gossipers and the stories they tell are important. In particular, people would be far more likely to talk about sex and marriage with those

they consider like-minded. In addition, the stories told—about an imprudent marriage, for example, or about a woman who had too few or too many children—would be seen as more relevant for one's own behavior if they concerned people "like us," rather than exotic strangers. One consequence of market integration, state formation, and nation-building is that increasingly people had actual conversations with those in other parts of the country, as well as metaphorical conversations, for example, through advice columns in the press. Moreover, those with whom they talked could be seen as "like us," members of the same community by virtue of their common language, common education, common dress, and so on.

A conclusion that just as provinces, demographically, became nations, so individuals, demographically, became citizens is hard to reconcile with the otherwise persuasive conclusions of historians of the family and sociologists who have emphasized the relentless march of individualism and its corrosive effect on family and community bonds. The evidence that some kinds of social control weakened is impressive (see, e.g., Lesthaeghe's discussions of secularization—Lesthaeghe, 1983; Lesthaeghe and Meekers, 1986), as is evidence that people claim to be tolerant of the childbearing and marriage decisions of others (Thornton, 1989; Bellah et al., 1985). On the other hand, we rarely examine the influence of "others" on demographic behavior. In surveys, women are asked how many children they expect to have. They are sometimes asked about their spouse, but not about the influence of their parents, siblings, friends, or neighbors on the decision. Indeed, it would probably be somewhat embarrassing to respond that these "others" did have an influence—reproduction is assumed to be an intensely private decision for the individual or the couple.

Although we live in societies that rhetorically value individual diversity, and ones in which improvements in contraceptive technology and a relaxation in views about the relation of sex, marriage, and childbirth have allowed much more diversity in behavior across communities than in the nineteenth century, we have witnessed an unintended consequence of market integration, state formation, and nation-building—a greater demographic uniformity. While the data that showed the increasing importance of national boundaries for demographic behavior obviously do not describe individuals, the story told about provinces is more consistent with increasing similarity in demographic behavior among individuals than it is with increasing diversity. To be sure, there is individual diversity in the present, but the question is whether it is more or less than in the past. The analysis presented here suggests that were information on individuals available for the past as well as the present, individual diversity would be seen to have declined as well.

It is far easier to accept the idea of social pressure on reproductive decisionmaking in developing countries today or in Europe in the past than to credit its force in Western Europe today. The more limited range of variation

across provinces within a country in 1960 than in 1870, however, is more consistent with a shift from social control by a smaller group to social control by a larger group than it is with a shift from social control to individual control. The change has been in the boundaries of the community that exercises this control. Given the higher levels of economic and political integration that are predicted for Europe after 1992, the boundaries of the community can be expected to change again; in the future, national boundaries may be less deeply etched on the demographic map of Western Europe.

Notes

1 Although demographic diversity would probably be even greater were smaller units (such as villages or parishes) included in the analysis, where it is possible to calculate the indexes used here or other measures of nuptiality or fertility for smaller units, these smaller units are more similar to one another when they are in the same province than when they are in different provinces.

2 The indexes are based on the information most widely available: vital registration of births by the marital status of the mother, and census distributions of women by marital status (single, married, widowed, and divorced). They are described more fully in Coale and Treadway (1986). The Princeton European Fertility Project gave considerable attention to correcting these indexes; a full discussion of the sources of the data and the corrections made to it appears in Appendix C of Coale and Treadway (1986).

The measure of marital fertility, I_g, is defined as $B_L/\Sigma M(i)f(i)$, where B_L is the number of births to married women, $M(i)$ the number of currently married women in the population at age (i), and $f(i)$ the age-specific fertility rates of Hutterite women. The fertility of a group is thus standardized by the fertility of the Hutterites, an unusually prolific North American community known to practice no contraception. If a population had the same fertility as the Hutterites, it would have an I_g of 1.00. (If all Hutterite women married young and remained married through their reproductive years, they would bear slightly over 12 children.)

The index of marriage, I_m, is defined as $\Sigma M(i)f(i)/\Sigma W(i)f(i)$, where $W(i)$ is the total number of women at age (i) in the population. I_m is thus a fertility-weighted measure of the proportion married. An I_m of .33 means that approximately one-third of the women of reproductive age are married. Both indexes can in principle take on values between 0 and 1 (although I_g will be greater than 1 if fertility exceeds that of the Hutterites).

3 In most countries, the data required to calculate the indexes are available at the level of the province starting around 1870. In a few countries the indexes cannot be calculated until 1880 or 1890. The analysis ends in 1960 because the increase in cohabitation after that date made designation of marital status less consistent than it had been earlier; cohabitation, an increase in divorce, and a reduction in remarriage rates were accompanied by increases in the proportion of births occurring to couples who were not formally married (Coale and Treadway, 1986: 77–79). In addition, several countries did not publish the requisite tabulations in the census to calculate the demographic indexes for 1970 and 1980. Because of boundary changes, the number of provinces varies slightly over time. Unless otherwise noted, only those provinces for which data are available for each of the years 1870, 1900, 1930, and 1960 were included in this analysis. Germany is included in the comparisons across countries around 1870, but is excluded from comparisons by country between 1870 and 1960 because boundary changes substantially affected the number of provinces at these dates. Eastern Europe is omitted entirely, because of the major boundary changes following World War I.

4 Although the distribution of provincial values on the two indexes is frequently rather even in most provinces, occasionally one or

two provinces—usually large cities—have extreme values; thus the more robust midspread is preferable to the standard deviation. The values for the midspread (calculated from provincial values around 1870) for marital fertility (I_g) and for proportions married (I_m) are as follows:

	Midspread of	
Provinces of	I_g	I_m
Belgium	.233	.054
Denmark	.064	.043
England and Wales	.036	.052
France	.185	.110
Germany	.158	.070
Finland	.153	.063
Ireland	.031	.069
Italy	.049	.029
Netherlands	.111	.051
Norway	.047	.024
Portugal	.065	.089
Scotland	.047	.063
Spain	.076	.100
Sweden	.107	.086
Switzerland	.143	.075
All provinces	.121	.114

5 England and Wales are treated together, as are Eire and the six counties of Northern Ireland. For the Princeton European Fertility Project, the indexes were calculated for "North Wales" and "South Wales" for 1871, rather than for the individual counties. Omitting these from the analysis does not change the results. Cormac Ó'Gráda has argued that the European Fertility Project underestimated marital fertility in Ireland (Ó'Gráda, 1988). Comparing his estimates for 1881 with those based on the Project's, the midspread would be larger than those shown here. The midspread for Ireland is still, however, one of the smallest in Western Europe.

6 Scatterplots show a positive relation between the geographic size of the country (its area) and the within-country midspread for both marital fertility (I_g) and nuptiality (I_m), but the correlation is weak.

7 Belgium has five provinces and Spain six that show early fertility decline; however, since Belgium has 41 provinces and Spain 48, these low-fertility provinces are excluded from the calculation of the midspread.

8 In addition, an analysis that compares diversity among countries at the first date for which figures are available (as early as 1831 in France) shows only slightly less diversity than in 1870. We would be even more confident that the diversity among provinces was not due to recent change in fertility and marriage if earlier periods could be examined. Analyses of parish registers for England, France, and Germany for the eighteenth century do not permit a precise comparison because the parishes are much smaller than the provinces, and the demographic measures that have been calculated are different. My analysis of age at first marriage and marital fertility rates at ages 30–34 using the figures reported for parishes in Flinn (1981: app. table 1, app. table 7) shows that England was demographically homogeneous in the eighteenth century, whereas France and Germany were far more diverse, results that are consistent with those based on provinces in 1870.

9 France appears to have been quite demographically diverse before the onset of the fertility transition. David Weir has calculated I_g for a sample of 40 villages for the period 1740–90; the midspread (.157) is virtually identical with the midspread of French départements in 1831 (.159) (the village data are reported in Weir, 1983: 189, Table 46). Similarly, the variation in nuptiality (as measured by the proportion remaining unmarried at age 50) was about the same for cohorts born in 1756 (before the beginning of the transition in France) as for cohorts born 1796–1801 (after the beginning of the transition) (Watkins, 1980). Despite efforts by the church and state in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to create a more uniform popular culture, it has been argued that "[t]he second quarter of the nineteenth century was . . . marked by the existence of solid microcultures within the rural world" (Muchembled, 1985: 308).

10 By multilingual, I mean that there was more than one national language, or that some people were monolingual in a language other than the national language (or languages). I stretch the term language to include

dialects that were incomprehensible to outsiders.

11 In Wales in 1871 about a quarter of the population was monolingual in Welsh (Verdery, 1976), but as noted earlier (note 5), excluding Wales from the analysis changes the measures only negligibly.

12 The lack of correspondence between linguistic and demographic diversity in Italy calls attention to several important caveats. First, the number of countries in our analysis is small. If the countries were a sample, we would be concerned about sample variability in such a small group. Second, while the correspondence between linguistic and demographic diversity has been singled out, there are other dimensions along which societies are integrated or divided, such as religion, politics, and economics. Sometimes these coincided with linguistic divisions, as in Belgium, but sometimes they did not, as in Switzerland.

13 A more comprehensive analysis (not shown) of provinces on either side of a national boundary and contiguous to that boundary is bedeviled by small numbers: it does indicate, however, that while differences in 1870 across the boundary usually were much greater than differences among provinces on the same side of the boundary, by 1960 variation across a particular boundary had usually increased relative to variation on either side of the boundary.

14 The indexes for the French départements were measured in 1861, and for the German administrative areas in 1867. Two other German administrative areas border on Alsace-Lorraine (Karlsruhe and Freiburg), but no data are available for these in 1867. In general, more French women than German women were married, and marital fertility was higher in Germany than in France. The average level of marriage (I_m) in the three provinces of Alsace-Lorraine was .42, in the three neighboring French départements .50, and in the two neighboring German administrative areas .47. Marital fertility (I_g) averaged .72 in Alsace-Lorraine, .49 in the French neighbors, and .78 in the German neighbors. All three of the neighboring French provinces had a level of marital fertility which shows that the fertility transition had begun (I_g below .6), while none of the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine or its German neighbors had marital fertility below .6.

15 Marital fertility in Moselle was still relatively high, but in Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin it was relatively low.

16 The linguistic situation is complicated now by the fact that German is heard in Alsace-Lorraine on German television (Tabouret-Keller, 1968).

17 The countries have been grouped into the three subdivisions shown in Figure 1. The subdivisions are not entirely neat: Finland is not usually considered part of Scandinavia; Portugal is not usually considered a Mediterranean country, while southern France might be considered "Mediterranean."

18 We might expect that the measure of diversity (the midspread) is related to the level (as measured, e.g., by the median of the provincial values) and that we could thus account for at least some of the decline in the midspread simply by noting that the median has fallen. This, however, is obviously not the case for nuptiality, where the median has risen. For marital fertility, the relation between midspread and median is not close, since in the early stages of the fertility decline the midspread increased as the level fell. Other measures of diversity that take the changes in level into account (e.g., the coefficient of variation and midspread of the logit) give much the same results. Changes in the age distribution affect the magnitude of the changes slightly, but not their direction; standardizing the age distribution would make the decline in variation appear even larger.

19 In Scotland, for example, counties with relatively high levels of marital fertility in 1960 are to be found predominantly in a band of counties in the far northwest, including the Highland counties and the islands off the coast. These are the areas where Gaelic was widespread in the nineteenth century, and where the few that continued to speak Gaelic in 1961 were largely located.

20 In Portugal, the midspread for I_g decreased from .223 in 1960 to .187 in 1970. It was not possible to calculate the indexes for 1970 for Italy or Spain (cross-tabulations of women by age and marital status for provinces were not published). A fertility survey taken

in Italy in 1979–80, however, shows that diversity in the median number of children by province had declined by 50 percent between 1961 and 1981 (data from the Istituto di Ricerche, 1985; see also Caselli, Egidi, and Wilmoth, 1987). Excluding the Mediterranean countries in an analysis of variance similar to that shown earlier in Table 1 increases the importance of country boundaries for marital fertility, but not for nuptiality.

21 The aristocracies, and presumably the more broadly defined upper classes as well, were among the forerunners of the fertility transition (Livi-Bacci, 1986), and in many countries may have begun the transition prior to the first date for which the indexes can be calculated. Since at that first date class variation is likely to have been large, a comparison of variation then with variation in the modern period would surely show a decline in variation. The same is true for rural/urban comparisons, since declines in urban marital fertility generally preceded rural declines (Sharlin, 1986).

22 Even when smaller and potentially more extreme categories are chosen, the differentials are still rather modest. In France, for example, the difference in the average number of children per married woman between those who express strong and weak religious feeling is .48 (about half a child), between those living in a village and those in a city is .42, and between women who are currently working and those who worked only before marriage or never is .70 (Jones, 1982).

23 A recent Honda advertisement illustrates the point nicely. The headline says, "Not All Families Have 1.8 Children." The ad goes on to say, in effect, that "We know that some of you have large families, so we've designed a car for you." The car is pictured, and next to it are three children—a child of about three, and twins in strollers. Honda's advertising company seems to believe that these days three children is a large family; by showing the younger two as twins, it also implies that actually choosing three children is unlikely.

24 A similar point is made by John Meyer (1986), who notes that individualism is so much a part and parcel of modern markets and states that whenever it appears to be threatened by evidence of standardization or homogeneity, the professional elites of individualism (intellectuals, theologians, lawyers, and psychologists) probe for new (and smaller) behavioral differences.

25 Because levels of infant mortality are so low in 1960, this analysis used the logit of the midspread.

26 For only two of the countries in this analysis does the first date for which they present language data precede 1910, and for all the last date is 1960.

27 An exploratory analysis of France which compared the effect of income (départemental-level per capita income) and language, and included as well the expansion of the state bureaucracy and migration, showed that both income and language were important in accounting for demographic variation around 1870. Around 1960, however, although variation in income had diminished, income was no longer important in the equation, while language (the proportion speaking a non-French language in the nineteenth century) retained its significance.

28 In France, for example, public assistance had been supported almost entirely from local funds, but during the Third Republic (1870–1940) these responsibilities were increasingly interpreted as national obligations (Weiss, 1983).

29 Ireland was divided by partition, Belgium has seen the rise of Flemish and Walloon political parties, and in Norway linguistic debates have been highly divisive both politically and socially. These three countries' economic, political, and linguistic developments are discussed at length in Watkins (forthcoming).

30 In Ireland, the differences between Northern Ireland and Eire in both marital fertility (I_g) and nuptiality (I_m) were not statistically significant before partition (1920), but became so afterward. In Belgium, the differences between Flanders and Wallonia were statistically significant at every date between 1880 and 1961; they decreased over time for marital fertility, but increased for nuptiality.

31 Notably, there are more bilinguals in Switzerland than in Belgium. In Belgium in 1930, 80.5 percent of the population was monolingual in either French or Flemish; in 1947, year of the most recent language census,

76.0 percent were monolingual in either French or Flemish. The proportion speaking both languages (the bilinguals) rose, from 6 percent in 1866 to 12.9 percent in 1930 and to 15.6 percent in 1947 (Belgium, 1964: 160). Estimates are less certain for Switzerland, which, while it has unusually good language statistics in other respects, does not have statistics for bilingualism. In a survey taken in 1972, about 60 percent of the population of Switzerland claimed to be able to speak a language other than their own mother-tongue (McRae, 1983: 69).

References

Anderson, Barbara. 1986. "Regional and cultural factors in the decline of marital fertility in Western Europe," in Coale and Watkins (1986), pp. 293–313.

Anderson, Benedict. 1983. *Imagined Communities.* London: Verso.

Ascoli, G. 1910. "Italian language," in *The Encyclopedia Brittanica,* 11th edition, Vol. XIV. New York: Encyclopedia Brittanica Co., pp. 888–897.

Bade, Klaus J. 1980. "German emigration to the United States and continental immigration to Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries," *Central European History* 13, no. 4: 348–377.

Belgium. 1964. *Annuaire statistique de la Belgique.* Brussels: Institut National de Statistique.

Bellah, Robert N., Richard Madsen, William Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton. 1985. *Habits of the Heart.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Berent, Jerzy, Elise F. Jones, and M. Khalid Siddiqui. 1982. "Basic characteristics, sample designs and questionnaires," in *Comparative Studies: ECE Analyses of WFS Surveys in Europe and USA,* No. 18. Geneva: Population Activities Unit, UN Economic Commission for Europe.

Braudel, Fernand. 1984. *The Perspective of the World.* New York: Harper and Row.

Caldwell, John C. 1980. "Mass education as a determinant of the timing of fertility decline," *Population and Development Review* 6, no. 2: 225–255.

Caselli, Graziella, Viviana Egidi, and John Wilmoth. 1987. "Fertility, development, and female activity: The evolution of territorial differences in Italy," paper presented at the European Population Conference, Jyväskylä, Finland, 11–16 June.

Casterline, John B. 1981. *Community Effects on Fertility Intentions: The Effect of Aggregate Levels of Contraceptive Use on Individual Intentions to Use.* London: World Fertility Survey.

———, Susheela B. Singh, John Cleland, and Hazel Ashurst. 1984. "The proximate determinants of fertility," *WFS Comparative Studies,* No. 39. Voorburg, Netherlands: International Statistical Institute.

Cleland, John. 1985. "Marital fertility decline in developing countries: Theories and the evidence," in John Cleland and John Hobcraft (eds.), *Reproductive Change in Developing Countries.* London: Oxford University Press, pp. 223–249.

Coale, Ansley J. 1973. "The demographic transition reconsidered," in *International Population Conference, Liège, 1973,* Vol. 1. Liège: International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, pp. 53–72.

———, and Susan Cotts Watkins. (eds.). 1986. *The Decline of Fertility in Europe.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

———, and Roy Treadway. 1986. "A summary of the changing distribution of overall fertility, marital fertility, and the proportion married in the provinces of Europe," in Coale and Watkins (1986), pp. 31–181.

Coleman, James S. 1986. "Social theory, social research, and a theory of action," *American Journal of Sociology* 91, no. 6: 1309–1335.

Dauzat, Albert. 1927. *Les patois.* Paris: Librairie Delagrave.

Davis, Natalie. 1983. *The Return of Martin Guerre.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

de Swaan, Abram. 1988. *In Care of the State: Health Care, Education and Welfare in Europe and the USA in the Modern Era.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Entwisle, Barbara, and William M. Mason. 1985. "Multilevel effects of socioeconomic development and family planning programs on children ever born," *American Journal of Sociology* 91, no. 3: 616–649.

Flinn, Michael. 1981. *The European Demographic System, 1500–1820.* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Garden, Maurice. 1970. *Lyon et les Lyonnais au XVIIIe siècle.* Paris: Les Belles-Lettres.

Geertz, Clifford. 1971. "The integrative revolution: Primordial sentiments and civil politics in the new states," in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds.), *Political Development and Social Change,* 2nd ed. New York: John Wiley, pp. 655–669.

Gellner, Ernest A. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Giddens, Anthony. 1979. *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Gould, Peter, and Rodney White. 1986. *Mental Maps.* Boston: Allen and Unwin.

Grew, Raymond. 1984. "The nineteenth century European state," in Charles Bright and Susan Harding (eds.), *State-Making and Social Movements.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 83–120.

Hajnal, John. 1982. "Two kinds of preindustrial household formation system," *Population and Development Review* 8, no. 3: 449–494.

Hélias, Pierre-Jakez. 1978. *The Horse of Pride.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Hobsbawm, Eric. 1983. "Mass-producing traditions: Europe 1870–1914," in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Traditions.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 263–307.

———. 1987. *The Age of Empire, 1875–1914.* New York: Pantheon.

Istituto di Ricerche Sulla Popolazione. 1985. "The Italian population: An overview," paper presented at the XXth Congress of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, Florence, Italy. Consiglio Nacionale delle Ricerche.

Jones, Elise F. 1982. "Socio-economic differentials in achieved fertility," in *Comparative Studies: ECE Analyses of WFS Surveys in Europe and USA,* No. 21. Geneva: Population Activities Unit, UN Economic Commission for Europe.

Kertzer, David I., and Dennis P. Hogan. 1989. *Family, Political Economy, and Demographic Change: The Transformation of Life in Casalecchio, Italy, 1861–1921.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Kintner, Hallie. 1985. "Trends and regional differences in breastfeeding in Germany from 1871 to 1937," *Journal of Family History* 10, no. 2: 163–182.

Knodel, John. 1967. "Law, marriage and illegitimacy in 19th century Germany," *Population Studies* 20, no. 3: 279–294.

——— 1988. *Demographic Behavior in the Past.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

———, and Etienne van de Walle. 1967. "Breast feeding, fertility and infant mortality: An analysis of some early German data," *Population Studies* 21, no. 2: 109–131.

———, and Etienne van de Walle. 1986. "Lessons from the past: Policy implications of historical fertility studies," in Coale and Watkins (1986), pp. 390–419.

Laslett, Peter. 1972. "Introduction: The history of the family," in Peter Laslett and Richard Wall (eds.), *Household and Family in Past Time.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–89.

Lesthaeghe, Ron. 1977. *The Decline of Belgian Fertility, 1800–1970.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

———. 1980. "On the social control of human reproduction," *Population and Development Review* 6, no. 4: 527–548.

———. 1983. "A century of demographic and cultural change in Western Europe: An exploration of underlying dimensions," *Population and Development Review* 9, no. 3: 411–435.

———, and Dominique Meekers. 1986. "Value changes and the dimensions of familism in the European Community," *European Journal of Population* 2, no. 3/4: 225–268.

Levasseur, E. 1889. *La population française.* Paris: Arthur Rousseau.

Lieberson, Stanley, Guy Dalto, and Mary Ellen Marsden. 1981. "The course of mother-tongue diversity in nations," in Stanley Lieberson (ed.), *Language Diversity and Language Contact.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, pp. 48–82.

Livi-Bacci, Massimo. 1986. "Social group forerunners of fertility control in Europe," in Coale and Watkins (1986), pp. 182–200.

McNicoll, Geoffrey. 1984. "Notes on the local context of demographic change," in *Fertility and Family,* United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (Proceedings of the Expert Group on Fertility and Family, New Delhi, 5–11 January 1983). New York, pp. 411–425.

McRae, Kenneth D. 1983. *Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Switzerland.* Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press.

Medick, Hans. 1984. "Village spinning bees: Sexual culture and free time among rural youth in early modern Germany," in Hans Medick and David Warren Sabean (eds.), *Interest and Emotion: Essays on the Study of Family and Kinship.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 317–339.

Meyer, John W. 1986. "Myths of socialization and personality," in Morton Sosna et al., *Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, pp. 208–221.

Miller, Michael B. 1981. *The Bon Marché: Bourgeois Culture and the Department Store, 1869–1920.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Moch, Leslie. 1983. *Paths to the City.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.

Muchembled, Robert. 1985. *Popular Culture and Elite Culture in France 1400–1750.* Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press.

Notestein, Frank W. 1983 [1964]. "Frank Notestein on population growth and economic development," *Population and Development Review* 9, no. 2: 345–360.

Ó'Gráda, Cormac Ó. 1988. *Ireland Before and After the Famine.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Pollard, Sidney. 1981. *The Integration of the European Economy Since 1845.* London: George Allen & Unwin.

Poussou, Jean-Pierre. 1983. *Bordeaux et le sud-ouest au XVIIIe siècle: croissance économique et attraction urbaine.* Paris: Editions de L'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales.

Quételet, Lambert Adolphe Jacques. 1848. *Du système social et des lois qui le régissent.* Paris: Guillaumin et Cie.

Ryder, Norman B. 1983. "Fertility and family structure," in *Population Bulletin of the United Nations,* No. 15: 15–34.

Segalen, Martine. 1983. *Love and Power in the Peasant Family.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Sharlin, Allan. 1986. "Urban–rural differences in fertility in Europe during the demographic transition," in Coale and Watkins (1986), pp. 234–260.

Simmel, Georg. 1955. *Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations.* New York: The Free Press.

Skinner, G. William. 1985. "Rural marketing in China: Revival and reappraisal," in Stewart Plattner (ed.), *Markets and Marketing.* Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, pp. 7–47.

Smith, Anthony D. 1981. "War and ethnicity: The role of warfare in the formation of self-images and cohesion of ethnic communities," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 4, no. 4: 375–397.

Smith, Herbert. 1989. "Integrating theory and research on the institutional determinants of fertility," *Demography* 26, no. 2: 171–183.

Smith, Richard M. 1981. "The people of Tuscany and their families," *Journal of Family History* 6, no. 1: 107–128.

Spacks, Patricia Meyer. 1986. *Gossip.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Stephens, Meic. 1976. *Linguistic Minorities in Western Europe.* Llandysul, Dyfed, Wales: Gomer Press.

Stone, Lawrence. 1977. *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England, 1500–1800.* New York: Harper and Row.

Sutter, Jean. 1958. "Evolution de la distance séparant le domicile des futurs époux (Loir-et-Cher 1870–1954; Finistère 1911–1953)," *Population* 13, no. 2: 227–258.

———, and Léon Tabah. 1955. "L'évolution des isolats de deux départements français: Loir-et-Cher, Finistère," *Population,* 10, no. 4: 645–674.

Tabouret-Keller, A. 1968. "Sociological factors of language maintenance and language shift: A methodological approach based on European and African examples," in Joshua Fishman, Charles Ferguson, and Jyotundia das Gupta (eds.), *Language Problems of Developing Countries.* New York: John Wiley, pp. 107–118.

Tarde, Gabriel. 1969 [1898]. *On Communication and Social Structure.* Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Thabault, Roger. 1971. *Education and Change in a Village Community: Mazières-en-Gâtine 1848–1914.* New York: Schocken Books.

Thornton, Arland. 1989. "Changing attitudes towards family issues in the United States," *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 51, no. 4: 873–893.

Tilly, Charles. 1981. *As Sociology Meets History.* New York: Academic Press.

Trudgill, Peter. 1983. *Sociolinguistics: An Introduction to Language and Society.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Verdery, Katherine. 1976. "Ethnicity and local systems: The religious organization of Welshness," in C. A. Smith (ed.), *Regional Analysis,* Vol. 2. New York: Academic Press, pp. 191–225.

Watkins, Susan Cotts. 1980. "Variation and persistence in nuptiality: Age-patterns of marriage in Europe, 1870–1960," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Princeton University.

———. 1984. "Spinsters," *Journal of Family History* (Winter): 310–325.

———. 1986. "Conclusions," in Coale and Watkins (1986), pp. 420–450.

———. 1987. "The fertility transition: Europe and the Third World compared," *Sociological Forum* 2, no. 4: 645–673.

———. Forthcoming. *From Provinces into Nations: The Demographic Integration of Western Europe, 1870–1960.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Weber, Eugen. 1976. *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Weir, David. 1983. "Fertility transition in rural France, 1740–1829," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University.

Weiss, John. 1983. "Origins of the French welfare state: Poor relief in the Third Republic, 1871–1914," *French Historical Studies* 13, no. 1: 47–78.

Wilson, Chris. 1986. "The proximate determinants of marital fertility in England, 1600–1799," in Lloyd Bonfield, Richard Smith, and Keith Wrightson (eds.), *The World We Have Gained.* New York: Basil Blackwell, pp. 203–230.

Wrigley, E. A. 1978. "Fertility strategy for the individual and the group," in Charles Tilly (ed.), *Historical Studies of Changing Fertility.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, pp. 135–154.

Wylie, Laurence. 1966. *Chanzeaux: A Village in Anjou.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.