



Marianne et les Lapins: L'Obsession Demographique.

Review Author[s]:
Nathan Keyfitz

Population and Development Review, Volume 19, Issue 2 (Jun., 1993), 365-374.

Stable URL:

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0098-7921%28199306%2919%3A2%3C365%3A%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3>

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html>. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

Population and Development Review is published by Population Council. Please contact the publisher for further permissions regarding the use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at <http://www.jstor.org/journals/popcouncil.html>.

Population and Development Review
©1993 Population Council

JSTOR and the JSTOR logo are trademarks of JSTOR, and are Registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. For more information on JSTOR contact jstor-info@umich.edu.

©2002 JSTOR

HERVÉ LE BRAS

Marianne et les lapins: l'obsession démographique. With a new Epilogue.

Paris: Olivier Orban, 1992. 284 p.

The "Marianne" of the title of Hervé Le Bras's impassioned discourse on the French obsession with its population is the sacred symbol of republican France; "les lapins"—the rabbits—are, one surmises, her present-day sisters from whose abundant reproduction pronatalists in France expect prevention of a feared depopulation of the nation. That fear is groundless, the book argues chapter after irate chapter. French-style pronatalism and the ideology that supports it Le Bras sees as not only deeply misguided (since based on faulty analysis) but emanating from a virtual conspiracy of government policy leaders, large segments of the popular press, and, last but not least, demographers and assorted social scientists, most of them ensconced in that citadel of official demography in France, INED.¹ His book, the first edition of which appeared in 1991, is a no-holds-barred attack against that perceived conspiracy, written in the inimitable if not invariably admirable pamphleteering tradition of French intellectual debates. The context of the debate within which this book appeared is a necessary backdrop to consideration of the work itself.

The 8:00 morning news of Friday, 4 May 1990 on radio station Europe 1 included an interview with Le Bras, a senior researcher at INED and the editor of its journal *Population* from 1979 to 1989.² He declared to a national audience that if the French population appeared to be in decline it was INED's inappropriate indicators that made it so. In his picturesque metaphor of the way that INED interpreted its statistics, France was a low-pressure basin surrounded by expanding high-pressure populations; invasion by foreigners was threatened as population, like water, sought its own level. Thus, he argued, had INED's falsehoods accentuated the fear of foreigners. There was no basis for that, he said; the French population is increasing, and will continue to do so.

That *démarche*, with its implication that INED had a sinister political purpose in using inappropriate numbers, elicited a response later in the day from the Director of INED and Le Bras's immediate chief, Gérard Calot, in the form of a communiqué to Agence France Presse. French statistics are public, integrally published, and freely discussed, and

il est *a priori* bien peu vraisemblable que quiconque ait pu, longuement et délibérément, 'mentir' à leur propos.*

* It is on the face of it hardly likely that anyone could over a long period and deliberately "tell lies" with them.

A controversy that up to then had been largely contained within INED was now in the public domain.³ The press was delighted to have this diversion. Reporting it, *Libération* declared, "On nous a raconté des craques pendant des années."* Le Bras fed the fires in an evening debate on 7 May again on Europe 1, with Henri de Lesquen, Chairman of the Club de l'Horloge. On 11 May *L'Express* published a somewhat milder article, and *Le Monde* weighed in on 17 May. "Démographes en Colère," headlined *Le Nouvel Observateur* of 31 May. *Le Figaro* was skeptical; on the front page of its magazine section it headed an article:

Un démographe croit pouvoir affirmer, contrairement à tous ses confrères, que le taux de natalité est en hausse en France. Il est contredit par tous les spécialistes.†

Le Bras, encouraged by the attention pro and con he was attracting, used stronger language in an article, "Les mensonges du natalisme,"‡ and was not only echoed but surpassed on the same page by Elisabeth Badinter writing on "Les ambiguïtés de l'INED." Badinter asserted that INED had been infiltrated, no less, by the extreme right Front National. This slander aroused the scholars of INED as nothing else could. They met and issued a statement expressing shock at such fabrication; of more than 50 researchers only one was known to sympathize with the Front National, and he was among the least significant. INED had been founded by General de Gaulle when he reestablished democracy after the liberation; among other insults, Badinter had sullied INED's name by associating it with Pétain.

The temperature stayed high for months. In July 1990 we read an article under the heading "Naissances: la désinformation. . . . Pourquoi (pour qui) l'INED a-t-il menti?"§ To this reader that article looked actionable, but perhaps not much more than the rest of the debate.

Le Bras had in effect asked the public to arbitrate a dispute between himself and his chief, Calot. Both men are graduates of the Ecole Polytechnique, the greatest of the *grandes écoles* founded by Napoleon. Each admits that the other is brilliant at the same time as he condemns his behavior and questions his judgment.

The Scientific Council of INED discussed the matter at length, issuing a statement on 21 June that ended with the words:

Le Conseil scientifique déplore que ce qui aurait pu n'être qu'une controverse technique ait dégénéré, parce qu'ont été utilisés des arguments non scientifiques, alors que rien n'empêchait leur auteur d'ouvrir un débat par les voies normales de la production scientifique.^{||}

* "They have been telling us whoppers for years." *Libération*, 5–6 May 1990.

† A demographer [Le Bras] thinks he can say, in opposition to all his colleagues, that the birth rate in France is rising. He is contradicted by all the specialists.

‡ "The lies of natalism." *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 17 May 1990.

§ "Births: Disinformation . . . Why (for whom) has INED lied?" *Science et Vie*, No. 874, July 1990, p. 30.

|| The Scientific Council finds deplorable that what might have been a technical controversy has degenerated as this one has, due to the use of unscientific arguments. Nothing prevented their author from initiating a debate through the usual channels of scientific communication.

The next day the Administrative Council of INED, at its higher level, formally expressed agreement with this advisory statement, remarking that the Council

souhaite vivement que cesse la polémique dans les médias.*

What the authorities wanted above all was to lower the temperature; they demanded an end to the open warfare conducted in the media. But all peacemaking efforts were in vain; there was not even a momentary ceasefire.

Director Calot on the advice of his officers informed Le Bras by letter that he was no longer a member of the Editorial Board of *Population*. The January–February 1990 and all subsequent issues list Patrick Festy as Editor-in-Chief.

Saying that “les liens entre les deux hommes sont sérieusement détériorés”[†] was an understatement. Equally understated was Minister Hubert Curien’s evaluation of the situation as a whole: “C’est pas normal.” Along the same line was his comment when the affair came up before the National Assembly: “Qu’on s’étripe devant les médias me paraît un peu exagéré.”[‡]

The two councils and Le Bras’s colleagues isolated him within INED, but he was not isolated from the outside world. He was sought after for articles and interviews by *Libération*, by *Paris Match*, and numerous other magazines and newspapers. He received favorable messages from some well-known demographers and social scientists abroad, among them the Cambridge demographer and historian Peter Laslett. André Langaney of the Musée de l’Homme published a statement in his defense—“Réponse aux offusqués de l’INED.”[§] On the other side the equally distinguished historian Jacques Dupâquier countered with evidence of incipient population decline: the French age distribution shows more people aged 20 to 40 than under 20. Le Bras was invited to give seminars and to teach in American and other universities.

Calot under attack was correct and restrained. He refused to give interviews to the press, and responded with technical arguments in professional journals. His reply included an extended and well-presented article⁴ in *Population*, using mathematics inaccessible to the public and to all but the most knowledgeable demographers. Disregarding the debate in the media, Calot sought only the judgment of his demographic peers; among his presentations at scientific conferences was one at the Denver meeting of the Population Association of America in 1992.

In the end it was the nonprofessionals who were decisive. The dispute reached a high political level; the responsible Ministers⁵ invited the opinion of top demographers, only to rule against them.

Two years after the flareup, in September 1992, Gérard Calot resigned the Directorship of INED. Jacques Magaud, also a *polytechnicien* with a mathematics and economics background, professor of demography at the University of Lyons II, became INED’s fourth director since its founding in 1945.

* asks an immediate end to these polemics in the media.

[†] The relations between the two men have seriously deteriorated. *Le Point*, 28 May 1990, p. 108.

[‡] “It’s not normal,” and “It seems to me that disembowelling each other in the media is going a bit too far.”

[§] “Reply to the offended people in INED.” *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 7–13 June 1990.

To this point I have said little about the substance of the debate. What issue of technical demography could possibly have raised such a storm? What new development attracted such vigorous comment from across the political spectrum? What new scandal had reporters uncovered? Nothing more than whether the current level and trend in natality is better obtained from cohort or from period data. As Jacques Vallin patiently explained,⁶ the idea of cohort fertility originated in France between the world wars with Pierre Depoid; in the 1950s Louis Henry had given it his blessing (*lettres de noblesse*), and INED has been publishing cohort fertility measures ever since. Roland Pressat provided a formal statement⁷ for the Scientific Council of the Institut, in which he showed the time series of cohort and period rates; the French period rates have stabilized at 1.8 children per woman in (synthetic) completed families, while the cohort rates seem headed for decline from their present level of 2.1.

The standard reference for all this in the United States is a 1964 paper by Norman Ryder.⁸ By 1990, after Depoid, Henry, Ryder, and probably others, measuring cohort fertility was hardly a novelty. Demographers have recently been refreshed on that issue by an assessment, by Máire Ní Bhrolcháin, published as the lead article in the December 1992 issue of this *Review*. According to Le Bras, INED had placed excessive emphasis on the period rate. That was what occasioned the storm in the media.

At least on the surface. Lower down is the question of France's pronatalist policies—children's allowances, generous leave to mothers, and assorted benefits favoring large families. Some of INED's scholars, including Alfred Sauvy, its founding director, could indeed be called pronatalist; and INED's initial constitution, promulgated by President de Gaulle in 1945, includes a pronatalist phrase, dropped in the 1986 revision.

But so is the whole of France permeated by concern with population replacement. In the words of an English observer, "This is a nation historically obsessed with its birth rate,"⁹ while Guy Herzlich discusses the issues in *Le Monde* under the heading "L'obsession démographique. La baisse de la natalité préoccupe davantage les Français que leurs voisins européens."* No one has tried to hide this, or has thought of it as a blemish in the national character. It was France that formally brought Europe's failure to replace itself before a special meeting on demography of the Social Ministers of the Twelve on 29 September 1989.¹⁰ As Le Bras himself says in the first chapter of *Marianne et les lapins*, when the public is polled "ils se déclarent massivement en faveur d'une telle politique"[†] (p. 14).

Nos voisins se moquent gentiment de notre obsession préférée qu'ils mettent sur le compte de nos malheurs historiques.[‡] (p. 17)

And at least on this point Le Bras is indubitably right. François Mitterrand stated that, because of existing tendencies, "la population est à terme condamnée à

* "The demographic obsession. The fall in the birth rate preoccupies the French more than their European neighbors." 17 May 1990.

† They [the French] declare themselves massively in favor of such [i.e. pronatalist] policy.

‡ Our neighbors gently make fun of our favorite obsession, which they put down to our historic misfortunes.

disparaître,”* and Jacques Chirac remarked “dans vingt ou trente ans notre pays sera vide.”† Jean Fourastié speaks of “suicide collectif.” These are emphatic words, coming from men who rate better than average on devotion to freedom and democracy. They are mentioned on the cover of *Marianne et les lapins*, but much more within the text is made of Pétain and similar types.

Sauvy and Calot were never members of the Club de l’Horloge, the pronatalism of whose members is repeatedly spoken of by Le Bras. They did address the Club on one occasion shortly after its founding, in 1975, before its somewhat dubious politics came to be known, and their remarks were published by the Club. But Calot was in the practice of lecturing on French demography to a variety of groups, once to the Socialist Club in a session chaired by Jacques Delors. And the most drastic pronatalist statement that Le Bras can quote from Sauvy himself is the assertion, in a book published in 1979 (p. 87), that

L’évolution de la population française laisse craindre une diminution du nombre.‡

Again and again throughout the book it is the INED that Sauvy founded that is charged with the offense of favoring a higher birth rate, when in fact its promotion of births was more restrained than that of leading French citizens.

In one sentence, as Le Bras says, the debate is not about *natalité* but about *natalisme*—not about the birth rate but about promoting births. Thus among the accusations with which Le Bras confronts Calot is planning the detail of family allowances. I personally cannot hold this against Calot, having myself helped in planning the detail of family allowances in Canada back in the 1940s.

But the real debate is at an even deeper level, one that has little to do with demography or with policy regarding births. From the start—so says Le Bras—INED was associated with the reactionary forces of France. The pronatalism that it favored was also favored by *Le Figaro*, the leading moderate right newspaper of liberal Catholic tendency, by the Club de l’Horloge, by the Front National of Jean-Marie Le Pen, by the Alexis Carrel Foundation of Pétain’s Vichy.

Not much has been recorded about the transition from the research activities of wartime France to those after the liberation. But now a detailed account of this unpopular subject, well over 500 pages in length, has been written by Alain Drouard.¹¹ It is true that several of the scholars of INED did come from the Alexis Carrel Foundation, but neither Sauvy nor Calot had ever been part of it. (Calot was ten years old when the Foundation was disbanded.) And it has to be remembered that several other research institutions had a similar origin in the Foundation, and that indeed the majority of French scholars and writers, from Sartre on down, lived and worked under the German occupation.

In an epilogue to *Marianne et les lapins*, written a year after its first appearance, Le Bras comments that the Drouard study was published by INED because it was “soucieux d’effacer de sa généalogie la pétainiste Fondation pour l’étude des

* The population in due course is condemned to extinction (quoted on p. 71).

† In twenty or thirty years our country will be empty (quoted on p. 71).

‡ The evolution of the French population allows us to fear a diminution of its numbers.

problèmes humains"* (p. 251). The epilogue deals with the debate as it continued after the original publication. For instance (p. 264):

Le Pen s'est explicitement prononcé pour le natalisme et pour un salaire de la mère de famille nombreuse, qui constituent, comme par hasard, deux éléments défendus par le directeur de l'Ined.†

Pronatalism is associated with the distaste for immigration that one finds today in France. Opposition to immigration is the central plank in the platform of Le Pen's Front National, suspected of fascist tendencies though now making itself look respectable, but some degree of opposition is found across the entire political spectrum, with the possible exception of the Greens. A few years ago *Figaro-Magazine* carried an article, "Serons-nous français dans trente ans?"‡ in an issue with a cover illustration showing Marianne—the personification of republican France—as the familiar beautiful woman with red cap and white flowing robes, but wearing a chador, the Muslim headdress.

For 200 years Frenchmen have rallied to republicanism, and that means not only Marianne, plus the tricolor in place of the fleur-de-lys, plus a secular state with an elected president instead of a monarch, but the entire rational inheritance of the Enlightenment, democracy and freedom, *liberté, égalité, fraternité*, all rolled into one. *Figaro* seemed on to a sure thing in the symbol of Marianne's desecration applied in defense of the Republic against the tide of North African immigrants, allowed to come in to replace the French babies who were not being born.

But Le Bras is no less skilled than the right opposition to the Socialists in making use of national symbols. If for the conservative press the best republican traditions are threatened by immigrants when births are lacking, for Le Bras the threat to republican freedom and openness comes from a quite opposite direction: not from the low birth rate as such (supposing that it is low), but from the arousal of concern about the low birth rate. It was the officials of INED, providing statistical weaponry to the right, who were the threat to rationalism, to democracy, to what in the United States would be called liberalism. The association of INED with pronatalism, and on that ground alone with religious fundamentalism, hence with Vichy, hence with fascism, was argued by Le Bras in the course of the media debate, and the themes are elaborated at length in his book. Never did he concede that the nationalists might be equally patriotic republicans; for him Marianne is the symbol of the left.

INED's case on its side contained nothing that would stir the blood. INED reports both period and cohort indicators; the cohort data are available for the study of cohort effects, for instance the effect on fertility of declining age at childbearing from the mid-1940s to the mid-1970s and its rise since. But the last complete cohort is unavoidably 20 years out of date, and anyone who tries to peer into the future needs to look at the current cross-section. Next year's level is more sharply indicated by

* anxious to cover up its ancestry in the Petainist Foundation for the Study of Human Problems.

† Le Pen [leader of the extreme right Front National] has explicitly favored natalism and a salary for mothers of large families, which constitute, it so happens, two elements supported by the Director of INED.

‡ Will we be still French thirty years from now?

the fact that this year's synthetic total family size is 1.8, than by the fact that the latest cohort to complete its fertility had an average of 2.1 children.

The distinction between cohorts and periods is a genuine demographic question, even though not a new one, and it was with this question that Le Bras started his attack and with which the press struggled in 1990. It is also the key demographic issue discussed in the book. Le Bras charges that INED's practice of giving disproportionate emphasis to period measures—especially the total fertility rate, which had remained in the neighborhood of 1.8 since the mid-1970s—was motivated by the wish to provide the strongest possible support for sounding the alarm about French demographic prospects. Yet all French cohorts born after the early 1920s that have completed their fertility did so at or above the replacement level of 2.1. As demographers know, measuring and interpreting fertility trends is a tricky business, and especially so when fertility is generally low, hence period indexes are highly sensitive to changes in the timing of births over the reproductive age span. In the eyes of Le Bras, INED's insistence on period measures and neglect of cohort indexes were proof that political advocacy rather than impartial analysis shaped the Institute's public pronouncements and reports—perhaps the gravest accusation that can be leveled against a scientific institution and its professional staff.

When, however, INED suddenly seemed to have changed horses, highlighting the cohort index (in a bulletin written by Calot, comparing French and Swedish fertility trends),¹² that, too, Le Bras saw as proof of the same bias. In the light of period indicators, Sweden—a country whose government has long professed indifference to the birth rate as such, emphasizing profamily policies instead—has just experienced a notable rise of fertility: to a level of two children per woman if measured by the total fertility rate. Conceding this fact, Le Bras says, would have damaged the ideological props supporting French pronatalist policies. Thus it was important to show that France was still ahead of Sweden, and for that purpose cohort fertility measures—that, with completed fertility estimated at 2.1, still gave France an edge—had to be trotted out.

The switch created a predictable confusion among those uninitiated to the complexities of interpreting demographic indexes. A reporter misreading INED's statement wrote that the average French family size had just gone up from 1.8 to 2.1 children; INED got the blame for this gross misreading. Le Bras was quick to see the debating advantage offered by Calot's choosing the index that put France in the lead. To him that was conservative nationalism maneuvering to protect wrong-headed policies.

That this could open a "second front" against the enemy (his military phrasing expressed the sense that a war was going on) was exciting to Le Bras:

En vingt ans de recherche, je tenais pour la première fois entre mes mains une monumentale erreur des natalistes. . . . Le second front risquait de leur être plus défavorable encore que le premier. . . . [L]a bête est sortie du bois. . . . [I] faut attendre le bon moment pour tirer. . . .* (p. 27)

* After twenty years of research, I had my hands on a monumental error of the natalists. The second front could be even more unfavorable to them than the first. . . . The beast has come out of the woods. . . . One has to await the right moment to fire.

Le Bras's polemic is cleverly built on suggestions and associations. For example, he associates pronatalism with names like Corrado Gini, "rector of the University of Rome under fascism" (p. 128). How deep that makes Gini's fascism, and how far he thereby contaminates pronatalism and how far that in turn contaminates INED, is not easy to say. Such argument may not impress scholars, but scholars are too few to matter in this context.

Going deeper, Le Bras asks why the French are more pronatalist than other peoples. They are so because the State is stronger in France. Children are nothing but "enfants de la patrie," left temporarily in the hands of their parents. The State is

le père authentique de chaque enfant français, comme Dieu de Jésus; les pères de famille ne sont que des Joseph.* (p. 13)

Overlooking the doubtful metaphor, one sees little reason why the dominance of the State—if that is the fact—should cause individual French citizens to be pronatalist. *Marianne et les lapins* is rich in such colorful material.

Those who pick up this book may not learn much new demography, but they will learn a good deal about effective debating—debate before a mass audience, that is. A demographer will soon tire of the innuendo, and ask where is the demography in this way of treating the birth rate.

Certainly this reviewer has much trouble with the style of argumentation of the book. For instance, consider the criticism of INED and of demography in general arising simply because both Calot and Le Bras are graduates of the Ecole Polytechnique, an engineering school:

De même qu'on trouvait un corps d'ingénieurs des ponts, d'ingénieurs des mines . . . on trouvait aussi des ingénieurs de la population, chargés de veiller sur son bon entretien et son renouvellement.† (p. 113)

He might have added that Sauvy himself and Bourgeois-Pichat (his immediate successor at the head of INED) as well were graduates of the same engineering school. Nonetheless the thread connecting INED with social engineering, now everywhere in disrepute, would seem tenuous.

Yet Le Bras in his time has done original work in demography. He has written imaginatively¹³ on the seemingly eternal division of France between North and South, more fundamental than the division between social classes so much emphasized in the writing of others. I found fascinating his maps showing distribution over the Hexagon (that is, France) of various characteristics, with clear lines of cleavage falling along the boundaries of the prerevolutionary provinces, now for two centuries in disuse and crosscut by the Departments. My enthusiasm was expressed in a review of the book when it first appeared.¹⁴ I am truly sorry that I cannot be equally enthusiastic about the present book.

Le Monde suggested that a quarrel between the generations underlay the dis-

* the real father of every French child, as God is of Jesus; the fathers of the family are nothing but Josephs.

† In the same way that we find a corps of bridge engineers, mining engineers . . . we find also engineers of population, charged with watching over its maintenance and its replacement.

pute.¹⁵ Le Bras's colleagues in their formal statement spoke darkly of a more purposeful but hardly more praiseworthy purpose: "Ambitions personnelles . . . la volonté d'opérer une recomposition du potentiel de recherche en démographie, avec en préalable un démantèlement de l'INED."* Who knows what momentary frenzy seized Le Bras in May 1990, which he has been trying to justify ever since.

Leaving aside his technical achievements, Le Bras is still no lightweight. And forgetting his curious animus against the institution with which he was long affiliated, one thinks of his activity in the international peace movement, his part in Pugwash conferences, his encouragement of Soviet dissidents, his exposure of astrologers, all as part of a lifelong effort on behalf of peace and of science. His initiation of the present debate and the manner of his participation in it cannot but have diminished him.

Calot emerges from this ruinous debate as well as anyone in that situation could hope, particularly in his consistency and his professionalism. He did not seek a pretext to open a "second front," and he refused with dignity to appeal to the public on an issue that is beyond their reach. One thing stands out in the testimony of colleagues: over 20 years Calot has guarded the independence and scientific authority of INED, and left to the researchers of the Institute

leur liberté de pensée et d'expression, y compris quand se déchaînaient les passions.^{†16}

Calot cultivated relations with demographers abroad, and as far back as 1984 established a regular joint seminar with Soviet demographers. And especially important in view of the accusations of this book, in recent years,

quand la xénophobie envahit le champ politique, il s'opposa fermement à toute discrimination fondée sur la nationalité, le lieu de naissance ou tout autre critère ethnique.^{‡17}

Has this been a fair review of *Marianne et les lapins*? I have spared no effort to make it even-handed. Is it complete? I cannot claim that much for it. Chapter headings ominously hint at themes far beyond what I have been able to cover: The Bunker, The Blitzkrieg, The Whoppers, French Identity, The Arab Invasion. Political aspects far outside demography per se are suggested that I do not pretend to understand or assess.

But out of my ignorance I will make a prediction. Calot will go on to a responsible post in France or abroad. INED will recover its shine and its researchers will continue to do important work in our field; the uprising will gradually be forgotten. American demographers will become more aware of Europe, and INED's output will come closer to attracting the attention it deserves from them. Le Bras, who is only now passing 50 years of age, has many further years of creativeness in him. He has accepted appointment as head of the distinguished Laboratoire de Démographie Historique, founded by Jacques Dupâquier.

* Personal ambition . . . the wish to work a rearrangement of research resources in demography, preliminary to a dismantling of INED.

† their freedom of thought and expression, even when passions are unleashed.

‡ when xenophobia invaded the field of politics, he took a firm stand against discrimination based on nationality, place of birth, or any other ethnic criterion.

The world of science will not miss whatever further thoughts Le Bras may have on natalism and on the supposedly reactionary character of his colleagues in INED.

*International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
Laxenburg, Austria*

NATHAN KEYFITZ

Notes

The reviewer acknowledges help in the form of factual material regarding INED from Gérard Calot, Patrick Festy, Peter Laslett, Hervé Le Bras, Henri Leridon, Roland Pressat, and Jacques Vallin. If I got the facts wrong the blame is on me, and certainly no one but myself is responsible for unprofessional value judgments or implications that may have crept into my phrasing.

1 Institut National des Etudes Démographiques, France's and, many observers would say, the world's premier center of population study.

2 Curiously in his book (pp. 58–59) Le Bras places the broadcast on 5 May.

3 Though there had been some warnings. Thus *Paris Match* of 28 December 1989 had published an interview with Le Bras, under the heading "Hervé Le Bras, un démographe plutôt optimiste" [Hervé Le Bras, a demographer who is rather an optimist].

4 Gérard Calot, "Relations entre indicateurs démographiques longitudinaux et transversaux" (Relationships between cohort and period demographic indicators), *Population* 47, no. 5 (September–October 1992): 1189–1240.

5 INED reports to two ministers, the Minister of Research and Technology, and the Minister of Social Affairs and Integration.

6 Jacques Vallin, "Le faux procès de l'INED" (The specious indictment of INED), *La Recherche*, No. 224, September 1990, p. 1112.

7 Roland Pressat, "L'INED, a-t-il masqué l'évolution de la fécondité en France?" (Has INED concealed the true trend of French fertility?), Typescript, June 1990.

8 Norman B. Ryder, "The process of demographic translation," *Demography* 1, no. 1 (1964): 74–87.

9 Sarah Lambert, "Out of France," *The Independent*, 7 July 1990.

10 As reported in *Libération*, 6 October 1989, under the lengthy title, "2025, ou la grande peur du berceau vide; alors que les Douze, poussés par les traditionnels cris d'angoisse des Français se penchent pour la première fois sur les problèmes démographiques, un rapport prévoit une baisse de la population pour le siècle prochain" (2025, or the great fear of the empty cradle; while the Twelve, pushed by the traditional cries of anguish of the French, turn their attention for the first time to demographic problems, a report forecasts a fall in population for the century to come).

11 Alain Drouard, *Une inconnue des sciences sociales: la Fondation Alexis Carrel* (An unknown institution in the social sciences: The Alexis Carrel Foundation). Paris: INED and Editions de la Maison de l'Homme, 1992.

12 Gérard Calot, "Fécondité du moment, fécondité des générations: comparaisons franco-suédoises" (Period fertility and cohort fertility: Comparisons between France and Sweden), *Population et Sociétés*, No. 245, April 1990.

13 Hervé Le Bras and Emmanuel Todd, *L'invention de la France: Atlas anthropologique et politique*. [The Invention of France: Anthropological and Political Atlas]. Paris: Hachette, 1981.

14 Nathan Keyfitz, review of *L'invention de la France* (cited in note 13), in *American Journal of Sociology* 88, no. 4 (1983): 803–805.

15 Guy Herzlich, "L'obsession démographique. La baisse de la natalité préoccupe davantage les Français que leurs voisins Européens" (The demographic obsession. The fall in the birth rate preoccupies the French more than their European neighbors), *Le Monde*, 17 May 1990.

16 Michel Louis Lévy, "Gérard Calot quitte la Direction de l'INED" (Gérard Calot departs from the directorship of INED), *Population et Sociétés*, No. 271 (September 1992): 4.

17 Ibid.