Immigration and Ethnic Change in Low-Fertility Countries: A Third Demographic Transition

David Coleman

This article proposes that a third demographic transition is underway in Europe and the United States. The ancestry of some national populations is being radically and permanently altered by high levels of immigration of persons from remote geographic origins or with distinctive ethnic and racial ancestry, in combination with persistent sub-replacement fertility and accelerated levels of emigration of the domestic population. The estimates and projections on which these statements are based relate to seven European countries with a 2005 total population of 183 million—about half the population of Western Europe. Most of the other Western European countries, however, share the same essential features of low fertility and high immigration.

This proposition resolves itself into two claims. The first has two components: (i) in some industrial countries a rapid change is already apparent in the composition of the population according to national or ethnic origin, arising from the direct and indirect effects of immigration in the last few decades, and (ii) projections based on plausible assumptions imply, within the conventional time scale of projections, a substantial alteration of the composition of that population which if continued in the longer term would lead to the displacement of the original population into a minority position. This first claim is relatively easy to demonstrate in empirical terms, given explicit and defensible assumptions.

The second claim is that such a process, were it to continue and materialize in its demographic aspect over such a short historical period would warrant the label of “transition.” Ultimate acceptance of such a label would depend on whether the transformation proved to be permanent and general and thereby would bear comparison with the familiar first and second demographic transitions.
Earlier demographic transitions

The first demographic transition described the reduction of birth and death rates from traditionally high levels to the low levels now nearly universal in industrial societies. Whatever the arguments about its causation, few now question its irreversibility, its significance as a measure of the transformation—and improvement—of personal and societal well-being, and its unprecedented consequences for population growth, size, and eventual aging. Even so, the transition’s end-point is still far from clear, and the expected stabilization of population and convergence in birth and death rates have yet to emerge (Vallin 2004). Its far from complete state in the countries of the “South” is one of the driving forces behind the migration processes discussed here.

The second demographic transition, following hard on the heels of the first, describes and explains the revolution in living arrangements and sexual behavior, and in the setting for childbearing, now transforming the lives of many inhabitants of Western societies and, it is argued, eventually in developed societies elsewhere (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2004). Its novelty and its prediction of progress toward a fairly universal manifestation are questioned by only a minority (e.g., Cliquet 1991; Coleman 2004). Other analysts have made more radical criticisms of the assumptions of any “sequence” of transitions (Harbison and Robinson 2002), but for the purpose of this article we will accept the establishment view. Its significance here lies less in its demographic aspects (the author does not accept, for example, that the second demographic transition has much to do with low fertility) than with the change in values supposedly behind it: the rise of tolerant views and weakened national feeling that have enabled elites, at least, to view with equanimity ethnic changes arising from migration that hitherto would have been opposed.

Neither transition concept considers migration explicitly, or any consequent changes in the composition of populations, although van de Kaa (1999) assumes an increase in immigration to be a natural indirect consequence of the low fertility of the recipient countries. On the other side of that equation, emigration tends to be highest at the peak of population growth in the middle of the transition, as with Europe in the nineteenth century and the developing world today (Ortega 2005).

The processes described and projected here, resulting from low fertility combined with high immigration, are significant because they are changing the composition of national populations and thereby the culture, physical appearance, social experiences, and self-perceived identity of the inhabitants of European nations. Vital rates, population growth, and living arrangements, the focus of the first two demographic transitions, are also affected, as is the age structure. But they are not the center of attention in this article. If current trends continue, the majority population of indigenous origin of many, possibly of most, European countries would give way to equivalence, or even
numerical inferiority, relative to populations of recent immigrant or mixed origin. That would be an ultimate “replacement migration” of a kind not previously seen over large geographic areas without invasion or force.

The first part of this article reviews some demographic evidence for these propositions. The second part considers whether the projected changes in population composition actually matter. The third part, confined to an appendix, presents in detail the projections of the foreign-born population made in six European countries (all that are known to the author), few of which are available in English. A second appendix describes preliminary projections of the ethnic minority population of Britain.

**Theoretical background**

Until relatively recently little attention had been paid to the effects of migration on the composition of populations. Interest was focused on the effects of immigration on stable population structure and size. For example, it was found that any constant level of migration into a population with below-replacement fertility and constant mortality always leads to a stationary population (i.e., one neither growing nor declining in numbers) as long as immigrant fertility eventually converges to that of the aboriginal population. That conclusion has some relevance to this discussion (i) because all the populations under consideration (except that of the United States) have below-replacement fertility and (ii) because the immigrant numbers serve to top up total numbers as the aboriginal population diminishes and eventually disappears. The size of the final stationary population depends upon the size of the net migration (Pollard 1973). For example, given the eventual adoption by all groups of the sub-replacement US vital rates of 1977, a net annual immigration of 840,000 persons would eventually sustain a stationary population of 226 million, of entirely immigrant origin, irrespective of the original population size (Espenshade, Bouvier, and Arthur 1982).

The relevant conclusion here is that any population with sub-replacement fertility that maintains a constant or a growing population size through immigration will acquire a population of predominantly, eventually entirely, immigrant origin (except for descent-lines in mixed unions). And in any population with average fertility below replacement, any one minority population with a higher growth rate must in the long run become numerically dominant (Steinmann and Jäger 2000). The original population is transformed either way, whether the growing new populations retain a strict separation of identity or become mixed. The ultimate outcome of replacement is unaffected by whether the immigrant populations adopt domestic low fertility rates quickly, slowly, or not at all (Coale 1986). It may be objected that these theoretical formulations are irrelevant because the conclusions apply “in the long term” and this article discusses a shorter time scale. That objection does not
affect the predicted outcome, however. Simulations using a range of more or less plausible numbers bring all this closer to home, showing, for example, substantial effects of large-scale immigration on the population composition of the then EU-12 and selected European cities and the Netherlands before 2050 (Lesthaeghe, Page, and Surkyn 1988; Kuijsten 1995).

The United Nations presented a comprehensive set of illustrations of the effects of migration on several countries using the same methodology in 2000. It showed the possibility of very large growth in the immigrant-origin population from 2000 to 2050 on the assumption of various levels of immigration sufficient to preserve overall population size, population of workforce age, and age structure in low-fertility populations (UN 2000). For example, average net immigration of 1.4 million persons per year to the European Union (EU-15) would preserve the working-age population at the 1995 level up to 2050. The figure of 1.4 million is close to the actual average net immigration since 2000. If continued, on simple assumptions that would produce a population of 108 million post-1995 immigrants and their children by 2050, 26 percent of the projected EU total population in that year. That figure, which does not include the existing immigrant-origin population in 1995, is approximately in line with the average projected for the national projections discussed here.

**Persistent low fertility and high immigration:**
The prerequisites for a third transition

**Low fertility**

The demographic situation in most industrial countries today meets the basic prerequisites for the outcomes discussed above. Period fertility rates in all countries except the United States are below replacement level and have been for some decades in Western Europe, more recently in Southern and Eastern Europe and in the Far East, and in the countries of European origin abroad. Completed fertility, reflecting the reproductive behavior of women who began bearing children 15–20 years ago, has fallen below replacement level in almost all of those countries (Frejka and Sardon 2004). In Western Europe, however, period fertility has remained steady since the early 1980s despite continual rises in mean age at childbearing. In France, Netherlands, and Denmark, period total fertility has risen.

In response to survey questions, women in most European countries still claim that their ideal family size is at least two children. That generalization, hitherto robust and universal, has been undermined by recent downward trends in the preferences of women in Germany and Austria (Goldstein, Lutz, and Testa 2003) and, even more, of men in those countries. In the United States, on the other hand, both ideals and practice remain robust (Hagewen and Morgan 2005). Some calculations that attempt to “correct”
for the delay in childbearing and its supposed eventual recuperation suggest that the outcome of current trends is likely to be closer to, or even at, replacement level (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998; Kohler and Ortega 2002; Philipov and Kohler 2001). There is little agreement about the best way to make this correction, or even whether it has any meaning (van Imhoff 2001; Kohler and Philipov 2001; Sobotka 2003). The level of recuperation needed to re-establish replacement fertility among current younger cohorts in the reasonably near future would require implausible increases in older-age fertility (Lesthaeghe 2001; Frejka and Sardon 2004). Official projections are unanimous in expecting that average family size in the future will not exceed 1.85 or 1.9 (UN 2004; Eurostat 2005). Most demographers (although not this author) therefore believe that sub-replacement fertility is here to stay (e.g., Lesthaeghe and Willems 1999).

**High immigration**

Immigration to Western Europe and the United States has increased greatly since the 1950s and persists at high levels (see Figure 1). Annual net immigration to the EU-15 countries, although variable, has exceeded 1 million in recent years. Gross inflows to the EU-15, and net inflows to the United States, are not easy to estimate (Mulder, Guzman, and Brittingham 2002). But if both series could be expressed in gross terms, they would probably be similar in proportion to population size, at least for legal entry. Gross inflow to Western Europe in 2001, based only on the 12 countries that reported flow data to SOPEMI (OECD 2004), was 1.60 million, compared with 1.06 million to the United States. As a result, by around 2000 over 10 percent of the populations of some Western European countries had been born abroad, and in the case of Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, and Switzerland, a greater proportion than in the United States (12.3 percent in 2000). Those proportions continually increase. In the developed world, only parts of Eastern Europe, and Japan and Korea, have modest migration inflows.

Accordingly, migration has become the driving force behind demographic change in many European countries, both directly and indirectly through the natural increase of populations of immigrant origin (Coleman 2003; Héran 2004; OECD 2004; Salt 2005). In some cases (Germany, Italy) immigration prevents or moderates decline; in others, it has re-started considerable population growth (Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Britain (see, e.g., Haug, Compton, and Courbage 2002; Poulain and Perrin 2002: 85–86; Nilsson 2004: 117; GAD 2005).

In some European countries around 2000, almost two-thirds of immigrants were from non-European countries (66 percent in Britain, 62 percent in the Netherlands, 59 percent in France). In others such as Belgium and Sweden, those proportions are reversed (see Dumont and Lemaitre 2005). In Europe and the United States, the natural increase of non-Euro-
pean foreign-origin populations is often greater than that of the indigenous population, thanks to a more youthful age structure, higher age-specific fertility rates, and transient distortions in family building arising from the migration process itself (Thompson 1982; Toulemon 2004). Some selected examples of fertility trends are given in Figure 2. In the early 2000s 18 percent of births in England and Wales and in France and 23 percent in the United States were to immigrant women, indicating the shape of things to come. However, some immigrant groups have lower, not higher, age-specific birth rates compared with the national average.

The growth of foreign-origin populations

From the seventeenth century until well into the post–World War II period, most European countries except France have been countries of emigration. Since the 1950s, by contrast, most have experienced substantial inflows including, for the first time on a large scale, inflows from non-European countries. As intra-European migration has moderated, the dynamic has passed more to non-European inflows, their rapid growth made salient by novel distinctive differences in appearance, culture, language, and religion. In Britain, for example, nonwhite ethnic minority populations, irre-
spective of nationality or birthplace, were estimated to number about 50,000 in 1951. They numbered 1.3 million at the census of 1971, 3.0 million in 1991, and 4.5 million in 2001: an average annual growth rate of 4.1 percent. Some components grew even faster: the population of African origin has doubled every ten years, from 108,000 in 1981 to 480,000 in 2001—an annual growth rate of 7.5 percent. In the Netherlands, the foreign-origin population grew on average by 2.7 percent per year between 1995 and 2003. This growth has made an important contribution to overall population growth and has expanded the ethnic and racial diversity of populations that hitherto considered themselves to be relatively homogeneous—ancient regional differences apart.

Nondemographic definition and categorization complicate the estimation of the current size and structure of populations of foreign origin in European countries, and of their projection into the future. Most European countries routinely define foreign-origin populations on the criterion of citizenship (nationality) and define births of foreign origin by the citizenship of the mother. Those are the data provided by Eurostat, the OECD, and the Council of Europe. In some countries, children of foreign citizens are not automatically citizens of the country of their birth.

In many countries, high annual levels of naturalization have made data based upon citizenship meaningless as indicators of foreign stock in all but
a legal sense. Annual naturalizations have often exceeded the annual inflow of immigrants. That phenomenon has substantially diminished statistically, but not in reality, the numbers of people of foreign origin in Belgium, France, Netherlands, Sweden, and elsewhere. In those countries, citizenship data understate the stock of foreign-origin population and its rate of increase by one-half or more. For a more representative picture, some European countries are adopting statistical definitions of foreign-origin population that include both immigrants and the second immigrant generation ("descendants," "foreign background") by linkage with the birthplace or citizenship of parents through population registers. For example, in the Netherlands any person with one or both parents born abroad is defined as "foreign origin." All others, including persons with third-generation foreign ancestry, are assumed to be Dutch (Alders 2001a). This exclusion of most of the third and subsequent generations leads to a progressive underestimate, and under-projection, of the population of foreign origin compared with more enduring ethnic or racial criteria. On that basis, the foreign-origin population was estimated to be 3.04 million out of the 16 million total population in the Netherlands in 2003 (19 percent), compared with the 700,000 persons of foreign citizenship (4 percent). This foreign-origin population has increased rapidly, unlike the foreign citizen population, which has declined since 1995 (see Figure 3).

FIGURE 3 Foreign-origin population and its various subgroups, Netherlands 1956–2003 (millions)

SOURCES: Central Bureau of Statistics «http://statline.cbs.nl/». For definitions see text.
Ethnic classifications

Where the cultural characteristics of immigrants and their self-identity endure over generations, an ethnic classification may give a more truthful picture of demographic and other consequences of the migration process, as long as identity and the official categories are stable and inter-ethnic unions are not too common. Where ethnic identification is self-ascribed, individuals are free to change their minds. The amount of such change does not seem to be substantial between censuses (Platt, Simpson, and Akinwale 2005) unless specific inducements are at work. Inter-generational change may be greater. The use of ethnic criteria may itself reinforce perceptions of difference, of course. Such ethnic classifications are widely used in English-speaking countries, both for new immigrants from outside Europe and for old or indigenous minorities (Lee 1993; Coleman and Salt 1996; Statistics Canada 1993). These classifications are based on self-identification with an ethnic group. No Continental Western European country uses ethnic categories. In France the concept is considered to be fundamentally contrary to the principles of the equality of citizenship (Haut Conseil 1991). France does not collect statistics on the basis of ethnic or religious criteria, although manipulation of data on the birthplaces of individuals and their parents permits partly equivalent estimates to be made (Tribalat 1991, 2004).

Projecting foreign-origin populations: Assumptions, methods, results

In response to the demographic, social, and political implications of the new diversity, cohort-component projections of national populations that incorporate separately the immigration and differential vital rates of foreign-origin populations have been prepared by a number of European statistical offices and by some demographic researchers. These include Austria, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Britain. The US Census Bureau has made projections according to race and Hispanic origin since 1993, and Statistics Canada and Statistics New Zealand (2005) have also made projections, in the former case for indigenous minorities only. In the context of this article it is worth remembering that 350 and 150 years ago respectively these “indigenous minorities” were the majority—indeed the only—populations.

Evaluating and projecting the demographic characteristics of foreign populations

National statistical systems in Western Europe record vital events only by citizenship or (as in Britain) by the birthplace of the mother or of the de-
ceased. However, those countries with population registers can determine the number of births and deaths separately for immigrants and for the children of immigrants, and relate these numbers to the appropriate base populations over two generations.

In making projections of this kind, assumptions of future levels of fertility and migration are obviously crucial. In general, the fertility of foreign-origin populations in industrial countries has tended to converge to the national average, and in some cases to drop below it. But only in a few cases is that process complete. Complete convergence might be expected according to a traditional view of demographic transition theory. But fertility differences may persist if immigrant groups do not achieve socioeconomic equality, if they retain strong attachment to religious or other elements of foreign culture, and if they continue to be numerically and culturally reinforced by large-scale migration, especially through importing unacculturated spouses from high-fertility countries. Their minority status per se may make some groups resistant to change (e.g., Siegel 1970; Goldscheider 1999; McQuillan 2004).

Total fertility rates among Indians in Britain and persons of Caribbean origin in the Netherlands and Britain have fallen to about the national average, and below it among many European immigrants and among Chinese and East African Asians in Britain (Coleman and Smith 2005). Muslim and African fertility remains elevated although mostly declining: among Turks and Moroccans everywhere, and among Algerians in France (a TFR of 3.2 in 1998/99; Legros 2003). In Britain in 2001, the total fertility of women born in Pakistan and Bangladesh was 4.7 and 3.9 respectively (ONS 2004a). Increased inflows of unacculturated populations may conserve or even drive up fertility rates, as among African populations in Sweden and Britain. In the latter the total fertility of women born in Somalia was about 5 around 2000.

Assumptions underlying the projections

Overall, the projections described below assume a convergence of the fertility of populations of Western origin to the native average (if not already identical), and to around replacement level or slightly above it among non-European populations (for details see Appendix 1). For practical reasons in each national projection the numerous foreign-origin groups are reduced to five or six for separate projection. For summary purposes, the groups are further combined into foreign-origin populations of developed-country origin (“Western” or “Developed,” mostly European), with demographic characteristics similar to those of the indigenous population, and “non-Western” (“Less Developed” or “Low Human Development Index” populations) with more differentiated characteristics and, typically, faster growth (de Jong 2001).
Estimating current and future levels of mortality is more straightforward. Evidence suggests that foreign-origin or immigrant mortality rates in the West are not very different from those of the national-origin populations and in some cases are lower (Courbage and Khlat 1996; Hummer et al. 1999; Griffiths et al. 2004), despite the low socioeconomic position of some foreign-origin groups. In all the projections discussed below except for Sweden, age-specific death rates are assumed to be the same for all groups.

Migration assumptions are the most troublesome of the three. Statistics on current levels of migration are unsatisfactory. Migration streams are heterogeneous, and no generally satisfactory model exists to account for their current level, let alone to predict their future value (Massey et al. 1998: Chs. 1 and 2; Howe and Jackson 2005).

But there are reasons for supposing that levels of migration will continue at least at their present levels for the foreseeable future and are more likely to increase. Recent trends in migration to Europe, despite fluctuations, have been high and rising (see Figure 1). At least the first two of the “revolutions” that underpin high migration flows (in mobility, information, and human rights) are unlikely to be reversed. Most components, except recently for asylum claiming, have tended to grow. The chief external factors driving migration from many poor countries persist: up to twenty-fold differentials in per capita real earnings and large differences in the rate of population growth. So has to various degrees corrupt, inept, oppressive, or nonexistent government. Of course some formerly poor countries such as India and China are modernizing rapidly, a phenomenon that will moderate flows and encourage return migration of the highly skilled; indeed return from among the latter group to India from abroad is already increasing.

Elsewhere relative economic disparities persist. Indeed disparities have widened in African and other countries that also have the highest levels of population growth. Even assuming some decline in fertility, the poorest countries, such as Ethiopia, Somalia, and most West African countries, are projected to increase in size by three- to four-fold by 2050 (UN 2005). These countries are already the source of substantial flows of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants to Europe. The same unstable, poorest-poor countries, many in arid zones, also face the most severe effects of global warming. Up to mid-century, migration may well be higher than current levels. By then, migration pressures from some source countries may have abated (Ortega 2005), but probably not from countries in Africa.

Partly for this reason, most of the projections assume that much of future migration will come from such “non-traditional” sources. Furthermore, attempts to improve economic performance in the developing world through aid and investment are likely to increase migration flows in the short term (Martin 2002) before they have any dampening effect.
In any case industrial countries may find continued immigration beneficial. Many analysts believe that projected labor shortages in low-fertility countries can be met only through immigration (e.g., McDonald and Kippen 2001; Bijak et al. 2005). Labor demand—legal or illegal—is likely to increase especially in those European countries that are unable or unwilling to reform their labor markets and mobilize their demographic reserves to augment their workforce (European Commission 2004). Indeed a future Italian economy has been proposed based upon the continued lowest-low fertility of a highly educated population combined with high levels of low-skill immigration from North Africa and Eastern Europe (Dalla Zuanna 2006): a proposal, it might be thought, certain to turn Italia into Carthago Nova.

Most important, future immigration levels from poor countries are underwritten by chain migration and by the rights that perpetuate it. Such migration expands ethnic minority enclaves through family reunification and, increasingly, family formation and other community-based movement. Along with asylum claiming, chain migration has comprised the major part of legal migration to Europe and the United States for the last 30 years or more. The postwar human rights conventions that guarantee these movements have been little challenged. Some immigrant populations preserve into the second generation their preference for arranged marriage with spouses from the countries of origin (e.g., Turks in the Netherlands: Lievens 1999; Pakistanis in Britain). As those populations grow, so do the inflows. This process of “cumulative causation” also accelerates migration more generally through the transformation of the host societies’ institutions, culture, language, and politics into forms more conducive to continued migration, so that in some respects they come to resemble more closely those of the sending countries (Massey et al. 1998; Massey and Zenteno 1999).

Immigration can, of course, go down as well as up, as Figure 1 shows. For example, asylum claims to Europe fell to 314,300 in 2004, the lowest level since 1997 (UNHCR 2005). However, the root causes of asylum claiming seem unlikely to diminish. The consensus of the faithful in migration studies (not shared by this author) is that migration will inevitably increase in the train of the juggernaut of globalization. It is claimed that policies of control cannot work (Castles 2004) or at least are difficult in democracies (Freeman 1994) because the revolutions in information, transport, and rights and entitlements that facilitate recent migration are impossible or difficult to reverse. Accordingly, many commentators believe that substantial further immigration to Europe and other developed regions is unavoidable. As Massey et al. conclude (1998: 287), “Few of the causal processes we have identified as underlying mass immigration are easily controllable using the policy levers normally available to public officials.” While the role of state policy in restraining migration has been neglected (Hollifield 2000; Teitelbaum 2002), so far only the governments of Denmark and the Netherlands have shown the political
will substantially to restrict immigrant entitlements to family migration and other aspects of chain migration. Only a few have seriously curtailed asylum entitlements (e.g., Germany in 1992) and no government has yet withdrawn from, or sought to modify the Geneva Convention or the European Convention on Human Rights.

In general, the projections described below assume that migration from poor countries will continue at the same absolute (not relative) level as in recent years while migration from richer countries will diminish (see Table 1). Given the considerations above, those are conservative assumptions. Usually the medium-variant migration forecast, at least from poor countries, is imposed as a level straight line at the end of a time series of recent data that mostly show substantial, if fluctuating, upward growth. Such simple approaches are typical of migration projections (Eurostat/NIDI/MRU 2000). Few attempts have been made to model recent upward trends (Glover et al. 2001 is an exception), and few except the successive Danish projections attempt to incorporate the effects of policy measures. No feedbacks between changes in the size of the working-age population and levels of migration are assumed except in the 1999 US projections.

Methods used to project the population of foreign origin

All projections in this study are based on the cohort-component method. Vital rates are projected on the lines noted above, often with central and variant projections. In most, the first and second generations of the foreign-born population are projected separately. The population sizes of each of the various foreign-origin categories are determined using the numbers with parents or grandparents born abroad or of foreign citizenship, the proportions naturalizing, and the proportions of mixed unions, expressed as coefficients. In the projections for Germany, Norway, and Sweden, persons are classified as second-generation “foreign ancestry,” “foreign origin,” or “foreign background” if both of their parents are born abroad, in the Netherlands and Denmark if only one parent is born abroad, in the latter case on a proportional basis. For exact details it is necessary to refer to the original publications.

An additional probabilistic projection is available only in the case of the Netherlands (Alders 2005) and experimentally for Britain, neither of which is discussed here (Coleman and Scherbov 2005). All are made on a “bottom-up” basis; that is, the individual foreign-origin categories are projected separately and then added to obtain the national total for each year. This raises the question of compatibility with national projections made without subdivision. No difficulty arises in the case of the US, Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish projections because the foreign-origin and native-origin components are an integral part of the national projections; there are no
## Table 1: Summary projection assumptions and results, selected populations, Western Europe, 2000–2050

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>England and Wales</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
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<td>-15</td>
<td>-4</td>
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<td>0.96</td>
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<td>36.1</td>
<td>8.74</td>
<td>14.76</td>
<td>9.90</td>
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<td>11.6</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>3.30</td>
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<td>Percent non-Western</td>
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<td>5.07</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>5.96</td>
<td>11.45</td>
<td>6.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The rate of foreign immigration is the net annual rate, percent of total population.

others. In other cases, the two forms of projection are made separately and the aggregate results of the subdivided projections are constrained to fit the projected national totals obtained from a conventional projection. All of the Continental projections assume that all or most of the third generation (grandchildren of immigrants) becomes assimilated and they are included as natives, not foreign origin. That approach tends to produce linear, not exponential, growth in the proportion of the population of foreign origin. None of the projections incorporates “mixed-origin” categories.

In some cases (e.g., Austria) the proportion of the population of foreign origin can also be derived approximately by simple subtraction of a “zero-migration” projection from a standard projection in which no allowance is made for naturalization in any generation. That was the procedure adopted by the United Nations in the aforementioned volume on replacement migration (UN 2000). Such a method is acceptable only if the level of emigration of the national-origin population is small enough to be ignored; otherwise the foreign-origin population will be underestimated. In such a case, the growth of the foreign-origin or ethnic population tends to be gently exponential. The best-known examples of projections by racial or ethnic origin (where ethnic attribution is potentially perpetual) are those made for the United States (e.g., US Census Bureau 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004; Smith and Edmonston 1997), following the pioneering work of Bouvier and Davis (1982).

Results of the projections

By the starting point of these projections, around the year 2000, immigration had already created novel and substantial foreign-origin or ethnic minority populations in the countries under consideration, up to 17–18 percent of the total population (Table 1). For example, in Sweden the proportion of the population born abroad had increased from 3 percent in 1950 to 11 percent in 2000, and the population of foreign origin stood at 16 percent. Within that foreign-origin population, the proportion that was of European or “Western” origin varied from country to country: 29 percent in Denmark, 47 percent in the Netherlands, 65 percent in Sweden. Some summary data are given in Table 1.

On the assumptions discussed above, the countries here can expect the proportion of the future total population of foreign origin to grow to a much higher level than today. Foreign-origin populations are projected to comprise between 15 percent and 32 percent of the total population in a number of Western European countries by 2050 (see Figure 4). The roughly constant rate of increase of the proportion foreign shows little or no sign of diminution by the end of the projection period. Within that total, the proportion of Western origin diminishes over time, as higher projected rates of immigration and fertility shift the balance in favor of non-European populations.
FIGURE 4  Projected growth of the population of immigrant or foreign origin as percent of total population 2000–2050, selected countries

NOTE: A different variant Austrian projection is shown in Table 1.

Were the projected trends to continue without change, Sweden and the Netherlands would have majority foreign-origin populations by the end of the century, even on the conservative “two-generation” criteria (the projections for Austria do not even include the second generation explicitly). Only those based on ethnic (Britain) or racial and ethnic criteria (United States) avoid the two-generation assumption, together with those estimates derived by subtraction. The 1999-based US projection includes only minorities of immigrant origin, black and Native American populations being excluded. It shares a trajectory similar to those of some European countries. That may seem surprising, but European countries typically have lower indigenous fertility rates than the United States and lack the momentum built into the US population structure by its earlier large and protracted baby boom. European populations therefore lack the “‘protective mantle of natural increase’ that softens and to some extent obscures immigration-related compositional trends” (Espenshade 1987: 257).

A predictable component of this future growth—up to 50 percent—is underwritten by the relatively youthful age structure of the foreign-origin populations, particularly those of non-European origin. Variation in mortality between groups is unlikely to be important. Fertility differentials are
apt to diminish, although probably not to disappear. Projections with variant fertility levels do not greatly affect the outcome at least in the medium term. The projections are most sensitive to assumptions about migration, where the major uncertainty lies. That judgment, of course, depends on the magnitude of the supposed variation in the two variables (fertility and migration), but in reality the range of fertility is much more constrained. In recent years the scale of migration has been much more variable than that of any other demographic factor. For example, as late as the mid-1990s, net migration into Britain (all citizenships) was zero, and net foreign immigration was about 50,000. In 2004, mostly as a result of policy changes dating from 1997, net immigration was 245,000 and net foreign immigration 350,000. The central projections from different countries show surprisingly parallel trends of growth in the proportion of foreign origin in the total population. Although all projections were done independently, the rate of foreign net immigration assumed by the end of the projections is very similar in most cases: between 0.27 and 0.30 percent of population per year in Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and England and Wales, and 0.20 and 0.21 percent in the cases of Austria and Denmark respectively.

Comparing the main scenarios with the zero net immigration scenarios, where these are available, immigration has great demographic weight (see Figure 5). Zero immigration reduces, by between one-third and one-half, the projected foreign-origin populations by 2050. The proportion of the population of foreign origin, which otherwise would reach about 25–35 percent by mid-century, would instead be limited to between 10 percent and 15 percent on a zero net migration assumption, with little or no further scope for increase. In the Netherlands example, zero immigration combined with naturalization would reduce the foreign-origin population from the current 17 percent to 14 percent of the national total by mid-century.

If their fertility remains at or below replacement level, foreign-origin populations would eventually peak, and, under the naturalization conventions of these projections, they would in the long run diminish and disappear as statistically defined entities. Neither of the Austrian projections above includes naturalization, and they develop in exponential form, not linear.

**An avoidable transformation? The role of policy**

These trends are, of course, not written in stone. The assumptions behind them may all be falsified, not least by steps taken in reaction to the projected outcomes. The level of migration is at least nominally under public policy control. The population changes projected above can be regarded as determinable, if unintended, consequences of the continuation of high migration levels. Sometimes, long-term increases in immigration are the unforesen consequence of policies intended to have much more limited and
short-term aims, such as the 1965 US Immigration Act (Teitelbaum and Winter 1998: Ch. 7). Only the government of Canada has had, since the late 1980s, an explicit demographic aim in its migration policy, namely of increasing population by immigrant numbers equivalent to 1 percent of the population per year. Many European governments promoted temporary guestworker policies to meet short-term labor needs in the 1950s and 1960s, the long-term consequences of which are apparent today. Labor migration under work permit continues, and all Western governments are committed to rights of family reunification and to refugee conventions. The longer-term consequences of these commitments and inflows have remained little considered; their discussion discouraged. Governments may be unaware of their implications, or, in the case of Britain, may refuse to take a view on them. In France the preparation of projections such as those described above would be impossible. In Britain they have been approached as though through a minefield.

Immigration policies can change radically in response to political events or pressures, either to restrict or to relax controls. In this respect the factors affecting migration are different from those determining death and birth
rates. As noted above, there is little consensus about the possible effectiveness of measures intended to limit movement. However, as Castles and Miller point out (2003: 8), “...international migration is not an inexorable process. Government policies can prevent or reduce international migration and repatriation is a possibility.” For example, the restrictive legislation adopted in 2002 in Denmark and the Netherlands shows that migration inflows can be substantially moderated, at least in the short run, and that projections need to be modified accordingly. Gross inflows of non-Western immigrants to the Netherlands were reduced from 64,000 in 2002 to about 32,000 in 2004. Emigration of foreign citizens also increased, and for a short time net migration fell to zero and is projected to stabilize at about 20,000 annually in the medium term, compared with about 35,000 annually in the previous decade. Net annual immigration to the Netherlands from Western countries was reduced to about 8,000 from a peak of 22,000 (Alders 2005: Fig. 7). In 2002 the Danish government tightened the conditions for migration for purposes of marriage. Family migration declined from 10,950 in 2001 to 3,525 in 2005. This decline has affected both actual trends and subsequent projections. Before the legislation, the projected proportion of foreign-origin population in Denmark by 2040 was 18.4 percent; it was later revised downward to 13.8 percent. Policies intended to expand immigration can also be very effective, of course, as in Britain since 1997.

A new demographic transition?

Should the transformation of the ethnic or racial composition of European countries in the twenty-first century, which is presaged in these projections, be regarded as a third demographic transition in progress? To warrant the label “transition,” population change must presumably be fast in historical terms, without precedent, irreversible, and above all of substantial social, cultural, and political significance. The sections below explore these points.

Is there a precedent?

Migration and population change have been a persistent if variable feature throughout Europe’s history. Change in population composition itself was pervasive in Eurasia and elsewhere in the first millennium AD and earlier from Northern Europe, Central Asia, and Arabia, with the expansion of Mongols and Ottomans as the last major examples. But then it was invariably accomplished by force. The movement of peoples during the Völkerwanderung period changed political, economic, and language structures throughout Europe (Dodgshon 1998): the violent dismemberment of the Western Roman Empire (Heather 2006) is only one example, although as elsewhere not devoid of accommodation and negotiation. Those earlier
migrations have left persistent genetic traces in today’s European populations (Falsetti and Sokal 1993; Miles 2005). The extent of the population replacement is difficult to judge; different kinds of evidence do not entirely reinforce each other.

Thus historical, linguistic, and much genetic evidence has suggested a comprehensive replacement of Celtic by Anglo-Saxon population in England from the fifth to the eighth centuries (P. Wormald, personal communication; Weale et al. 2002). That evidence has been difficult to reconcile with some archaeological evidence and with demographic considerations—for example, that the likely inflow may not have been more than one-tenth the size of the settled population, which points more to elite dominance (Hamerow 1997). Other genetic analyses suggest a more nuanced picture, with substantial replacement of the Britons by Anglo-Saxon and later Norse invaders in the North and East, and (surprisingly) less in the South, with some Western areas revealing little intrusion since the Palaeolithic (Capelli et al. 2003). Thus in some areas an “immobilist” model of elite dominance, not replacement, seems appropriate, and elsewhere a more “migrationist” model.

Partisans of both models have not been insensitive to contemporary ideologies (Chapman and Hamerow 1997; Härke 1998; Hills 2003). A demographically informed review of archaeological, historical, and genetic evidence suggested that the Anglo-Saxon invasions might have contributed up to 20 percent to English ancestry, the later Danish invasions 2–4 percent, and finally the Norman kleptocracy not more than 1–2 percent, all over a protracted period of time. In none of these cases is there any evidence of a great surge of population. In the first case the native British were assimilated and acculturated by the immigrants; in the second and third cases the invaders were absorbed by the natives (Härke 2002). The most recent genetic research has strengthened the “replacement” view of the Anglo-Saxon migration despite their initially small numbers (Thomas, Stumpf, and Härke 2006) through a hypothesized reproductive advantage and social segregation. At any rate it is certain that nothing remotely like these events has happened since in the British Isles. The effect of migration into England from the eleventh to the twentieth centuries has been undetectable using genetic markers, as would be expected from Britain’s political and demographic history, one of the best documented of any country (see Hinde 2003).

Similar considerations apply to the potentially much larger-scale movements associated with the spread of farming, or of farmers, from the Levant during the Neolithic. The traditional “demic diffusion” model emphasized the movement of people (Ammermann and Cavalli-Sforza 1984; Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, and Piazza 1994), while Y-chromosome and mitochondrial DNA evidence suggests a continuity of European ancestry little changed since the late Palaeolithic (Sykes 1999; Richards et al. 2000; McEvoy et al. 2004). However, finer-grained data on polymorphic systems give greater
weight to the partial replacement of hunters by farmers rather than a cultural replacement of hunting by farming (Barbujani and Bertorelle 2001). Either way, on the broad scale, no new major additions to the European gene pool are apparent since the Neolithic—very recent immigrant populations excepted.

In recent centuries demographic change resulting from peaceful migration within Europe usually was more modest until the industrial mobility of the later nineteenth century (Moch 1992), mostly involving local and regional migration. With the major exception of the huge forced displacements of the twentieth century (Kosinski 1970), populations have been relatively stable in their ancestry and in their language and culture, most major migration flows being directed overseas, provoking radical replacements in the New Worlds.

For our purposes, all of these earlier examples emphasize the discontinuity created by immigration to Europe since the 1950s. The changes currently underway, unlike those of the past, are not violent but do involve substantial population inflows from cultures of remote origins. The effects on ancestry in the long run may eclipse anything that has gone before, in the degree of replacement, in the geographic remoteness of origins, and in the speed of change.

**Timetables and thresholds**

How does the speed of change compare with other major transformations? The US Census Bureau (2000, 2004) projects an ever-diminishing minority status for the US white non-Hispanic population from around 2050, although that group would not become a minority compared with immigrant-origin groups until about 2120. If the rise of the immigrant minorities in the United States that are responsible for this projected “twilight of the WASPs” can be dated arbitrarily from the Immigration Act of 1965, then the process would have occupied less time than it took for the first demographic transition to run its course.

At what threshold, if any, can a transition be recognized, as opposed to a new state of diversity? Fifty years ago the first demographic transition was defined after the event with reference to Europe. It was presented as a hypothetical path for the rest of the world to follow, although it had hardly begun elsewhere. The second demographic transition rests its case on population prevalences of lifetime cohabitation without marriage, of divorce, and of single parenthood that seldom exceed 50 percent in any population. But the trends have shown few signs of reversing: in many countries popular acceptance of such behavior is general. It remains a hypothesis that such behavior will become general throughout the developed world.

Likewise for the hypothesized third demographic transition. A priori, a decline of former majority populations to below 50 percent of the total
seems an obvious benchmark for transition. However, its significance would obviously depend on the continued distinctiveness and self-identification of the populations concerned, and on the integration of minorities to native norms, or conversely the mutual adaptation and convergence of all groups. But even on the assumptions presented above, the countries concerned would not become “majority foreign origin” for a further period of time, in some cases not until the twenty-second century.

Nevertheless, averages conceal great diversity in geography and by age group. Even a foreign-origin population stabilized at the projected 25–35 percent of foreign origin by 2050, with about two-thirds of non-European origin, would imply majority-foreign-origin populations in many, if not most, major European cities. Even in the 1990s 40 percent of the population of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, and 28 percent in Brussels and Frankfurt were of foreign origin (Musterd, Ostendorf, and Breebaart 1998), while by 2001 40 percent of London’s inhabitants were of non-British ethnic origin, and over 50 percent in nine boroughs each with populations of about a quarter of a million. Transformations would also be more striking among younger cohorts, powerfully influencing perceptions and assumptions among young people at school and college, which would become divorced from those of their parents and elders. For example, in the overall projection for Britain, by 2031 all minorities together would comprise 27 percent of the total population but 36 percent among the 0–14 age group. Among those aged 65 and older, the minority proportion would be just 11 percent—the national overall average in 2001. The distribution of minority proportions by age would thus reflect the process of transition. By 2050 births of minority origin would approach 50 percent, with further change in the total inevitable. A final criterion might be specified, at a lower overall total, when the electoral and political system makes the migration process irreversible. By no means all members of minority groups support further immigration, but most do. As numbers and naturalization grow, so will influence, as all political parties must compete for immigrant support. This effect is particularly powerful in Britain, where Commonwealth immigrants may vote without becoming British citizens. Policies to restrict immigration may then disappear from the agenda. The recent Congressional impasse suggests that a turning point has been reached in the United States. Britain may be at the same point following a recent realignment of policy in the only major political party traditionally opposed to migration, explicitly in order to attract more support from ethnic minorities.

A universal transition?

The changes discussed here are unlikely to be universal in the way that the first demographic transition is expected eventually to be. They are likely to
be confined to the countries of the current developed world. Even there, some major areas have so far experienced only modest immigration and limited ethnic diversification. In Japan and Korea, fears of rapid aging and population decline, and demand by some employers for immigrant labor, must contend with opposition to migration in an ethnically and culturally homogeneous society. Similar conflicts of interest are apparent in Russia, despite immigration from the “near abroad.” Elsewhere over the last century, the populations of many developing countries have been made more homogeneous, not more diverse, by the departure, forced removal, or destruction of immigrant and minority groups, some of great antiquity. Examples include Greeks and Armenians from Anatolia, Jews, Greeks, and other Europeans from a number of countries of the Middle East, and most Europeans and Indians from tropical Africa. Some developing-world populations are already so large that no amount of globalized migration in the future is likely to make much difference to the composition of their populations. All of that raises a question regarding the validity of the term transition here, except in a limited geographical context.

Further complications: The absorption and hybridization of groups

These projections assume that population groups remain distinct. Many substantial European migratory groups have been absorbed completely: the Huguenots in seventeenth-century England, Italians and Poles in twentieth-century France, and Jews to a more varied degree. Future populations, however, are likely to include many people of self-identified mixed origin. For simplicity, none of the projections described here incorporates such mixed categories. All assume instead that the children of mixed unions are absorbed into one or the other parental group. However, individuals may prefer to identify explicitly with a new identity of mixed origin, not one or the other of their parental groups (Shaw 1988; Phoenix and Owen 2000; Tizard and Phoenix 2000). In the United States the children of parents of mixed origin mostly describe themselves as having mixed origins (Hollmann and Kingcade 2005). In the British census of 2001, 661,200 people voluntarily identified themselves as mixed (1.1 percent of the British population), or were so identified by their parents; and in the US census of 2000, 7.3 million (2.6 percent) identified themselves as of mixed origin (Jones 2005). A simple probabilistic projection of the growth of the mixed population in Britain gave a median value of 8 percent of the total population mixed by 2050, including 26 percent of infants (Coleman and Scherbov 2005). Preferences for self-identification vary greatly. In the 2001 census of Britain, 22 percent of Chinese mothers, 18 percent of West Indian mothers, and 7 percent of African mothers described their children as mixed, compared with just 3 percent among the primarily
Muslim Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, where over half of marriages are arranged with spouses from the country of origin. The likely growth of mixed-ancestry populations further underlines the irreversibility of the processes discussed here. All this is reflected in, and possibly encouraged by, the increasing complexity of the ethnic categories used in British and US censuses (Goldstein and Morning 2002; Jones 2005).

The potential significance of ethnic transformation

Should these demographic changes come to pass, to what extent would they actually matter? That issue raises various political and philosophical considerations untouched by earlier demographic transitions. In non-Western societies the importance and undesirability of any such change would be so axiomatic as not to warrant discussion. In majority popular opinion in the West, the response would probably be similar (one can only speculate in the absence of specific opinion polls). But elite opinion is more nuanced, some finding it difficult to articulate acceptable reasons for objecting, others actively welcoming a more diverse society on various ideological grounds, seeing positive merit in greater diversity. Much would depend, among other things, on the persistence of distinctions of culture, identity, and attitude between immigrants and natives; on whether the immigrant societies adopted native norms or their own norms prevailed or some hybrid society evolved; on the relative rights of the native and immigrant populations to their own perpetuation; and on whether the outcome could be accommodated in a prosperous, peaceful welfare society.

Contrasted perceptions in Europe and the United States

The social, cultural, and political impact of the projected changes could be substantial, indeed transforming, as urban daily life outside the home is conducted increasingly in the company of strangers, with an older indigenous population becoming increasingly suburban and rural. Alternatively the transformation could be accommodated smoothly through gradual adjustment, so that posterity would regard the trends described here as of little more than historical demographic significance. For example, American success in integration is claimed to ensure that future inflows, however large and diverse, will remain a national asset and an example to the rest of the world (Hirschman 2005). Today’s European anxieties are compared with similar fears prevalent in the United States in the early twentieth century, then confronted with large novel inflows of Southern and Eastern Europeans thought to be unable or unwilling to adjust to American norms. In Europe, however, all this is rather new. Most European populations lack much prewar experience, except for France, which attracted many immigrants from Poland, Italy, and elsewhere in Europe, and some from North Africa, in the early twentieth
century (Dignan 1981), although not without friction. Their descendants today have no identity as a minority. Moreover, those inflows to the United States provoked a severe and successful restriction on immigration for several decades after 1924, and major inflows to France ceased for two decades with the advent of World War II. Those cessations of immigration greatly facilitated integration (Graham 2004). Both countries had, and still have, a strong sense of national identity with an absolute assumption, at least until recently, that immigrants will naturally adopt the identity and values of their new home, there being none better in the world.

The greater cultural, racial, and religious distances between native populations and newer and numerically growing non-Western immigrant populations in Europe may lead to less favorable outcomes for both immigrants and natives than the one just described for France and the United States (Dench 2003). Among non-European minorities in European countries, Muslims, not Hispanics, predominate. Integrative pressures and desires are weaker, except for the natural inclination toward economic success. Diverse postwar immigrant cultures, with robust identities and religious faith, encounter in the receiving countries secularized liberal societies with weakened feelings of self-esteem and national identity. The changing interpretation of human rights that facilitated recent immigration also tended to erode the assumption that immigrants should adapt to national norms, instead favoring more multicultural responses.

Potential difficulties with the growth of diversity

Some concerns about minority growth arise not specifically from alarm about “ethnic replacement” but from a more general view that even the current level of diversity is problematic, and that therefore in the absence of more successful integration policies, further growth will simply exacerbate difficulties. These points are all controversial but need to be noted. Some immigrant groups now occupy a more elevated educational, economic, and social position than the average native population, as among Indians in Britain (ONS 2002). Such material success may coexist with a transnational, not a transformed identity (Ballard 2003), in which population size and international communication sustain parallel societies whose numbers are reinforced by a continued preference for arranged marriage from the country of origin. A high proportion of the population of other groups, usually less economically successful, remain encapsulated, especially Muslim populations: Turks in Belgium (Lesthaeghe 2000), Bangladeshis in Britain (Eade, Vamplew, and Peach 1996). Later generations may be no further assimilated than the first, or even more alienated, as appears to be the case among young North Africans in France, Moroccans in the Netherlands, and Pakistanis in Britain, leading to serious problems of security. When democratic societies acquire multiple cultures, new wedges may be driven into the social structure (Coleman 1997).
Identities and welfare concerns can remain focused on kin, community, and religion, not on a universal secular citizenship in a broader society—the familiar incompatibility between traditional Gemeinschaft and modern Gesellschaft. Imported disputes about Kashmir, Punjab, Kurdistan, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, not previously thought to be related to the national interest, have become embedded in European domestic politics, and the concerns of immigrant-origin minorities constrain foreign policy: the pro-Israel lobby in the United States is claimed—controversially—to provide a notable example (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006; Mearsheimer et al. 2006). Intercommunal friction has become more complex with more diverse inflows. It is also claimed that diversity threatens the solidarity required to maintain and fund universal welfare systems, undermining the moral consensus that underpins them (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001; Goodhart 2004).

With larger numbers, populations of foreign origin may feel less need to adapt to local norms, instead becoming more confident in extending their own values, language, or laws in a wider society. The population could become disconnected from the history of the territory in which they live, and from its values, shared identity, and legends (Rowthorn 2003). Distinct physical appearance would reinforce that discontinuity. As numerical balance changes, assimilation may become increasingly a two-way street, and old assumptions about majority values and shared identity may cease to be tenable. Literalist religion may thereby regain the salience that it has mostly lost in Western Europe. A few signs are already apparent. In Britain, for example, Muslim organizations, citing the increase in numbers shown by the 1991 and 2001 censuses and underlined by the 2001 census question on religion, have pressed for the introduction of shari’a law in parts of Britain where Muslims predominate, a view apparently supported by 40 percent of the country’s Muslims (ICM Opinion Poll, Sunday Telegraph, 19 February 2006). A recent 13-nation survey in Europe revealed strong feelings of hostility and mistrust between Muslim and indigenous populations, with anti-Western sentiment particularly marked among Muslims in Britain (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006).

No European immigrant policy, neither the accommodating multiculturalism of Britain with its emphasis on group rights, nor the prescriptive secular principles of France with its theoretical insistence upon the equality of the citizen unqualified by religious or ethnic divisions, has yet overcome these difficulties.

Rights and responses

Other concerns relate more specifically to the balance of numbers, locally and nationally. The political process in most countries has not addressed the long-term consequences of current high immigration levels (Teitelbaum
and Winter 1998), although in 2006 both the President of France and the Chancellor of Germany drew attention to them. However, as births to immigrant or minority women approach 50 percent in major European cities (47 percent in London in 2003), the prospect is becoming more visible at least at the local level.

Human rights are the starting point for much modern political argument, and here the balance of discussion is markedly asymmetrical. Almost all concern about rights in connection with migration focuses upon the rights of immigrant populations (e.g., the Global Commission on International Migration 2005), not upon the rights of natives to conserve their own way of life, language, laws, neighborhoods and communities, and prior privileges (Dench, Gavron, and Young 2006). Principles of cultural conservation, nowadays recognized and defended on behalf of the Yanomamö and Tapirapé of the Amazon forest (Colchester 2002), find little parallel on behalf the native inhabitants of Tower Hamlets or Toulouse, although their complaints would meet most of the criteria proposed for such protection (see Kenrick and Lewis 2004). In Europe, local nativist protests tend to be denounced as racist, xenophobic, and deluded, including by anthropologists who do not accept the “native” parallel (Kuper 2003). Instead the usual response is that such dissenters need simply to be more thoroughly re-educated on the actual benefits of immigration to themselves and to global GDP.

For the most part, non-European migration for permanent settlement has developed with the indifference or favor of elite opinion, but in the face of consistent popular opposition. For example, in Britain for some time public opinion has put immigration first or second among the issues that concern it (British Social Attitudes Survey 2004; YouGov, February 2005, March 2006; and MORI, May 2003, January 2006). Even in the United States, there have been few years when opposition to current levels of immigration has not been the most widely expressed concern (e.g., Zogby Poll, 3 May 2006). So it is perhaps surprising that discussion of the prospect outlined here has not been more sharply focused. It has received some critical scholarly attention (Bouvier 1991; Smith and Kim 2004; Huntington 2004), along with some scholarly refutation (Rumbaut, Massey, and Bean 2006), and airing from thoughtful journalists (Booth 1998), and more from some think tanks and special-interest groups (e.g., Center for Immigration Studies in the United States) but until recently has been politically quiescent.

Critical comments are muted in the media, in publishing, and in academic life by pervasive pressures and self-censorship (Browne 2006). In Britain, for example, the government will not comment on the longer-term consequences of high immigration, instead merely condemning as irresponsible those who raise any less than favorable reflection on it. However, following one of the rare media airings of “population replacement” in Britain (The Observer, 3 September 2000), minority activists and race relations work-
ers—in the Commission for Racial Equality, in London local government, and in the media—welcomed the prospect of ethnic transformation variously as marking the final response to white racism, as an appropriate rejoinder to colonial exploitation, or at the very least as a matter of no consequence (see Browne 2006).

Conclusions

If the changes projected above come to pass, it seems reasonable to regard them as significant and to warrant use of the term transition, even though restricted to the developed, low-fertility countries of the world. The process is likely to be asymmetrical: the composition of the population of the developed world will come to resemble more that of the developing world, but not conversely. Transformations of population composition on the scale projected have not hitherto been experienced under peaceful circumstances. Major changes would be apparent within the time scale of a century. Their effects would be irreversible, although their significance is arguably contingent on the pattern of integration and assimilation, or its absence.

All this is still amenable to policy change, noted above in Denmark and the Netherlands. Migration for the purpose of marriage is the major open-ended and accelerating migration channel (Lievens 1999; Storhaug 2003). New immigration policy could change that. A return to the lower immigration levels of the 1980s would render obsolete the projections above and would stifle any third demographic transition. On the other hand, growth in inter-ethnic marriages would moderate the projected trends in a different way, generating a variety of new mixed-origin populations. That is the major missing element in the projections described here.

A new homogeneity might eventually emerge, in which ethnic labels would cease to be meaningful or identifiable except to genealogists. The boundaries of some existing populations are already becoming blurred, for example those of West Indians in Britain. The children of mixed unions can choose to identify themselves in a diversity of ways. In the end, this trend may make the identification of separate national-origin or ethnic groups, which has been taken for granted in the descriptions above, more and more difficult or even meaningless. Depending on migration levels, that would not, however, weaken the case for describing such future changes as a transition.

These prospective changes are proceeding in the absence of overt intentions to procure their predictable outcome and despite widespread public opposition to the levels of migration that are driving them. Without restraint from policy, or spontaneous moderation of trend, the process is likely soon to become irreversible in some countries. In ignoring its long-term consequences the countries of the West are facilitating a radical transfor-
mation of the composition of their societies and the cessation of a specific heritage: a transition by default, through embarrassment at discussing difficult issues or in a fit of absence of mind. Democratic approval might have been thought necessary for so notable and permanent a change, the prospect of which would have been dismissed as absurd just a few decades ago.

Appendix 1  Projections of the foreign-origin population of six countries

Austria

The projections for Austria (Lebhart and Münz 2003) deal only with “citizens” and “foreigners,” with no broader “foreign-origin” population. There is no “medium variant” projection, although one issued separately by Statistics Austria projects a total population in 2050 returning to the level of 2002. Instead three scenarios are presented, starting from the base population of 8.1 million in 2000. In the “Compensatory” scenario, migration keeps constant the population of working age, rising from 6,000 to 18,000 per year. In the “Restricted” scenario immigration is limited to a lower ceiling of 11,000, and in the “Zero immigration” scenario all migration is stopped. The TFR overall is assumed to rise to only 1.5 by 2050, that of Austrian citizens from 1.32 to 1.40 and that of foreigners from 1.95 to 2.00.

Thanks to overall sub-replacement fertility, in the first two scenarios population would fall modestly. Without migration the population would fall to 6.3 million, 19 percent fewer people than under the first (see Figure 6). These projections do not take into account the increase in TFR in Austria from 1.33 in 2001 to 1.42 (Sobotka et al. 2005), following the introduction of a new family welfare policy (“Kindergeld”) in 2002.

The same high rate of naturalization is assumed in all three main scenarios (about 20,600 annually). Thanks to that, even in the high migration “Compensatory” scenario, the foreign-citizen population does not exceed 1.03 million (13.1 percent of the population, from 8.9 percent) by 2050. With zero migration, naturalization reduces the foreign-citizen population to 5.1 percent. Inevitably that generates much more modest “foreign” populations than those incorporating the second generation.

However, two of the scenarios are also presented without naturalization, even of the third or subsequent generation, mimicking “ethnic minority” populations with potentially permanent distinct identities. Accordingly with zero migration the proportion foreign rises from 9 percent to 13 percent by 2050, through its higher natural increase. With restricted migration and without naturalization the percent foreign rises to 17 percent. The proportion foreign without naturalization in the Compensatory scenario is not given. However, as before it can be approximated by subtracting the annual population totals of Austrian citizens in the “No immigration and no naturalization” scenario from the overall totals in the “Compensatory” variant. The difference between the two would be the foreign citizen population: the descendants of those already in Austria in 2000 plus the immigrants
FIGURE 6  Austria 2000–2050: The effect of immigration on the percent of population with foreign citizenship under various assumptions as to immigration flows and naturalization

and their descendants from 2000 onward, all of whom may be assumed to be foreign (net migration of Austrian citizens is negative). On that basis, the foreign-origin population would represent 28 percent of the total by 2050.

Germany

The projections of the foreign-origin population in Germany from 1999 to 2050 (Ulrich 2001) incorporate five groups separately both by citizenship and by “ancestry” (equivalent to “foreign origin”): Germans, Turks, Yugoslavs, other EU, and other foreign. “Ancestry” is determined by having two foreign parents, irrespective of naturalization. The third generation is assumed to be German irrespective of origin. Three scenarios are presented—high, middle, and low—together with a zero immigration scenario. Fertility is assumed to remain at or to decline below replacement in all five groups specified, that of Turkish women, the most important foreign population, from its then current 2.3 to 1.6 by 2010. Total fertility of all others is assumed to remain at or below 1.2, and 1.35 for the Germans themselves. The middle migration scenario assumes that net immigration will fall from 203,000 in 1999 to an annual constant 185,000 by 2015, yielding a 17 percent drop in the population to 68.3 million in 2050. That is substantially less than the 74.6 million projected for 2050 by Eurostat (2005), which assumes higher fertility and survival (Table 2).
TABLE 2  Population and citizenship scenarios, Germany 2000–2050 (millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Ancestry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medium variant</td>
<td>Zero migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>74.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2050</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2050</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslav</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2050</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other EU-15 states</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2050</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other foreign</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2050</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All foreign</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2050</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>82.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>68.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The foreign citizen population, net of naturalization, in the medium variant scenario is projected to increase by 49 percent, from 7.4 million to 11 million by 2050, while the “foreign ancestry” population (ignoring naturalization) is expected to double from 8.1 million (9.9 percent) in 2000 to 16.1 million or 23.6 percent. Without migration, the foreign-origin population would decline to 7.7 million. In addition to those 5.1 million naturalized foreign persons, a further 1.9 million of the German citizen population in 2050 are projected to be of aussiedler origin (there were 2.5m in 2000). As in the Dutch projections, the greater part of the future growth of foreign population comes from “other non-EU foreigners” (mostly asylum seekers).

Denmark

Projections of the population of foreign origin in Denmark, initially based on 1998 data (Danmarks Statistik 1997), have incorporated seven categories: (1) Danes, (2–3) immigrants and their descendants from developed countries, (4–5) immigrants and their descendants from more developed third-world countries accord-
Thus the foreign-origin populations become “Danish” over time through a combination of the effects of naturalization, mixed marriage, and generations of residence. Coefficients derived from information in the population registers on origins and naturalizations determine the distribution of the numbers of “descendants” and “Danes” among the offspring of immigrants born in Denmark in the projections. If all “descendants” chose to naturalize and if immigration ceased, then eventually no foreign-origin population would remain; all would be “Danish.”

Earlier projections are described elsewhere (Coleman 2003). Projections made in 2002 and 2004 illustrate the effects of a change in policy (Statistics Denmark 2004: 5; Larsen, personal communication). Total fertility of immigrants from less developed countries is assumed to decline to 2.1 by 2030, and of descendants to 1.9.

**FIGURE 7** Denmark, percent of population of non-Danish origin, four projections, 1997–2004 based

![Graph showing population projections](image)

The Aliens (Consolidation) Act 2002\(^1\) has substantially changed the pattern of immigration to Denmark, as well as the assumptions incorporated into subsequent population projections. Among other measures the act limits marriage migration to spouses aged 24 and over, and imposes further conditions on marriage migration, asylum seeking, and other channels of entry. Annual net immigration from more developed countries is assumed to decline by 2040 from 4,400 to 3,600 and from less developed countries from 11,200 to 8,100 (Statistics Denmark 2002). To put these apparently modest net immigration figures in perspective with the larger European countries such as France, Italy, and Britain, a multiplier of around 11 would be appropriate and, for the United States, a multiplier of around 56. On the new 2004-based assumptions, the proportion of the population in Denmark of non-Danish origin is projected to rise by 2040 to 13.8 percent from the 2004 base compared with 18.4 percent on the 2002 base, and by 2050 to 14.8 percent (Figure 7). Among these, populations of non-Western origin increasingly predominate.

**Netherlands**

Several sets of projections of the foreign-origin population have been made for the Netherlands; the latest show the effect of recent, more restrictive changes in immigration and asylum policy (Alders 2001b,c, 2005; Statistics Netherlands 2001).

As usual, two major foreign groups are distinguished: “Western” and “non-Western.” The latter include Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, Antilleans, Arubans, and others (de Jong 2001). Only two generations are recognized. The “First Generation” comprises people born outside the Netherlands with at least one parent born outside the Netherlands. A member of the “Second Generation” is a person born in the Netherlands with at least one parent born outside the country. Subsequent generations are assumed to be Dutch. Children born in the Netherlands with a Dutch-born parent and at least one foreign-born grandparent comprise a mixed second-third generation that is included, for these statistical purposes, in the second generation. Registration linkage permits identification of a third generation (persons with at least one grandparent born abroad), a small but fast-growing group.

In the 2004-based projections, the TFRs of the Moroccan and Turkish population are projected to converge to 2.0 from 3.4 and 2.3 in 2004, respectively, that of Antilleans and Surinamese to 1.75 from 1.8 and 1.7 respectively, with similar convergence in other non-Western groups. The TFR of Dutch and Western-origin populations is expected to remain at 1.75. Immigration assumptions were revised downward substantially from 2001 to 2004, reducing the projected 2050 population by 1.1 million to 16.9 million. Without migration, the total would be 14.9 million, so migration would account for a population 18 percent larger by mid-century, by which time 5.0 million people, 29.7 percent of the total, would be of foreign origin: 2.8 million (16.5 percent) of “non-Western” origin and 2.2 million (13.2 percent) of “Western” origin, the former growing, the latter declining (Figure 8). The 2004 projections reflect the decline of asylum claims following the introduction of more restrictive policies, especially the 2002 Aliens (Consolidation) Act 2002.\(^2\) These projected numbers of immigrants from Africa, Asia, and Latin America in 2050 have been substantially reduced, to 48 percent, 55 percent, and 84 percent respectively compared with 2001 (Alders 2001c: 30, 2005). The projections still assume a sub-
FIGURE 8 Netherlands 2005–2050: Percent of population of foreign origin (Western and non-Western) with and without migration

SOURCE: Data from Central Bureau of Statistics; Alders (2005 and personal communication).

stantial increase in “new” foreign immigrant populations. Africans and Asians are projected to increase almost two-fold and three-fold respectively to 289,000 and 720,000, partly from asylum claiming and, from Asia, mostly from labor migration (Alders 2001c, 2005), and Latin American populations five-fold, to 201,000.

Norway

The Norwegian projections (Statistics Norway 2005) from 2005 to 2060 incorporate five groups differentiated by “background”: that is, first-generation immigrants plus persons born in Norway with two foreign parents. The five groups are: Norwegians; other Norden; other “Western” populations from the EU and EFTA, North America, and Oceania; Eastern Europeans; and a group corresponding to “Non-Western” populations, from Africa, Asia, Turkey, and Latin America. Projections are made on three variants of fertility and migration, the former differentiated on the length of residence in Norway. The variant migration assumptions have the most powerful demographic effect. Foreign immigration is projected to be 17,000 per year on the medium variant (although the high variant fits past trends better). In 2005 the foreign-origin population was 365,000 out of a total of 4.55 million (8.0 percent). European-origin fertility is assumed to remain at 1.85 or to converge on that figure by 2060, non-European fertility to decline from 3.1 to 2.5. By 2060 the median projection of the foreign-origin population is 1.4 million (23.5 percent of the total; Figure 9). The non-Norwegian Norden population—essentially that of Scandinavia—
scarcely increases at all. Eastern European and “Western” populations increase to 200,000 and 300,000 respectively, while the non-Western population increases about 8-fold to 850,000 by 2060—primarily, it is assumed, from asylum claiming.

Sweden

The Swedish 2000-based projections of the population of foreign origin define a population of “foreign background” that comprises persons born outside Sweden together with persons born in Sweden with both parents born abroad. Persons born in Sweden with at least one parent born in Sweden are defined to be of Swedish background or foreign background in varying proportions depending on the birthplace of the mother (Statistics Sweden 2003: 17, 77).

The projections, which are unusually detailed, incorporate separate assumptions about fertility, mortality, and migration for six populations: Swedes, populations from the Norden countries (excluding Sweden), the EU-25 (excluding Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland), and separately for countries with high (excluding the EU-25), middle, and low values of the Human Development Index (HDI).

Net immigration to Sweden in 2002 resulted in a net loss of 2,500 people born in Sweden and a net gain of 33,600 others, including 20,100 from countries of middle or low HDI. As Sweden has a population of 9 million, a multiplier of 6.5 would give the equivalent figure for net inflows to countries the size of France, Italy, and Britain and a multiplier of 32 for inflows to the United States. Those inflows are pro-
Projected to decline slightly to an annual 31,100 by 2020, of which 20,400 are projected to be from countries of middle or low HDI.

There are no variant projections. The population of Swedish background remains almost constant because the relatively high projected fertility (TFR = 1.78) is supplemented by constant recruitment from the foreign population, among whom all the third generation, and most of those with a Swedish-born parent, are classified as “Swedish background.” By contrast, the TFR of the population of low HDI background is not projected to fall below 2.5. By 2020, the limit of the 2003-based projections, the number of overseas-born residents is projected to rise to 1.49 million and the children of immigrants to 0.55 million, giving a total population of foreign-background of 21 percent of the Swedish population (Statistics Sweden 2003: 18, Figure 6).

Further projections for the total population of Sweden, based on 2003, extend to 2050 (Statistics Sweden 2004a), later revised (Statistics Sweden 2004b). The general assumptions behind the new projections are very similar to those in the 2002-based projections, with annual net immigration of 24,000 by 2050 (Statistics Sweden 2004a: Table 9.1). The new projections do not subdivide the population by “background” as above, although they do project the population born abroad, estimated to increase to 18.0 percent of the total population by 2050.

An unpublished zero-migration projection from Statistics Sweden (Nilsson, personal communication) permits one to judge the overall demographic impact of immigration and to infer a rough minimal estimate of the additional foreign-ori-
gin population arising from immigration from 2004 on, on the assumption that Swedish emigration is of modest size. That is done by simple subtraction of the zero-migration totals from the principal projection totals, using the foreign-origin population in 2004, interpolated as 1.44 million as a starting point. That simple procedure, inevitably, assumes that all immigrants and their descendants remain in the “foreign background” category, contrary to the assumption in the previous projection. The difference in assumptions is apparent in the mild exponential growth of the population of foreign background evident from 2020 on. All the additional population arising directly or indirectly through immigration from 2004 is thereby deemed to be, and remain, non-Swedish, although all the future natural increase of the population already resident in Sweden in 2004 on will be regarded as “Swedish” even though a (diminishing) proportion will be of “foreign background.” On those assumptions, the population of foreign background would reach 32.3 percent by 2050. The results of the projection from 2005 to 2020 are identical with those projected on the previous basis. Population rises from 9.01 million in 2003 to 10.63 million in 2050, compared with 8.64 million for the zero migration assumption—a population larger by 1.6 million or 19 percent (Figure 10).

Appendix 2 Projections of the ethnic minority population of Britain

The last official long-term projections of the “foreign-origin” population in the United Kingdom, specifically of the “New Commonwealth ethnic minority” (NC) populations for Great Britain only, were published in 1979, giving totals up to 1991 (Immigrant Statistics Unit 1979). These NC populations are of postwar Asian, West Indian, and African origin, roughly corresponding to “non-Western” foreign-origin populations, or “middle and low HDI foreign-background populations” discussed above. Ethnic status, defined by self-identification in the census (Bulmer 1996) and the Labour Force Survey, is a potentially permanent attribution, although in practice somewhat labile (Platt, Simpson, and Akinwale 2005). New projections are now being prepared for England (Haskey 2002; Large 2005; Large and Ghosh 2006) that include white non-British minorities (akin to “Western” foreign origin).

Simple preliminary projections of the ethnic minority populations are presented here, for England and Wales only, where almost all the ethnic minority populations of Britain live. The total nonwhite ethnic minority population in 2001 was 4.5 million (7.6 percent), roughly equivalent to populations of non-Western or non-European origin. Inclusion of non-British or Irish white foreign-origin population increases the figure to 11.3 percent. Estimates of vital rates and migration by ethnic origin must be made indirectly, by the own-child method (Smith 2005) from the Labour Force Surveys; and the net immigrant flows are made by adjusting broad-brush estimates of net immigration by the ethnic distribution of recent immigrants (see Coleman and Smith 2005).

Overall ethnic minority total fertility was 2.14 for the years around 2001, compared with a white rate of 1.65. In some populations, e.g. the Indian and Chinese, mean TFR is already at or below the national average. Mortality is assumed to be the same in all groups.
The aggregate trend of ethnic minority fertility is assumed to decline from the present 2.14 to 1.9, slightly higher than the projected national overall total (1.75). Fertility of the white population (immigrant and native) is assumed to increase from 1.64 to 1.74. Net migration from all sources was officially estimated to be an annual 161,000 on average from 1999 to 2003 (ONS 2004b). Net annual inflow of the nonwhite population is assumed to be a constant 108,000 and -53,000 for the British and Irish population. This assumption of constant levels of net inflow to Britain, averaged over recent years, is highly conservative, as net inflows have risen sharply since the late 1990s up to the time of writing, with foreign immigration and British citizen emigration both increasing. A variable level of immigration is assumed for the white non-British population. By 2001 the annual net inflow was estimated to be 110,000. From May 2004 to June 2005, 232,000 registrations of immigrants to Britain were recorded from the ten countries that joined the EU in 2004 (mostly Polish; Home Office 2005). The net inflow is not yet known, but has been conservatively projected here to be an additional 50,000 per year for the four years after 2004, over and above the baseline assumption of 110,000. After that, net white non-British inflow is assumed to fall to 60,000 per year, roughly balancing the net British outflow.

Overall, the population of England and Wales is projected to increase from 52.0 million in 2001 to 63.1 million in 2051, about the same as in the official 2004-based projection (GAD 2005). The white British and Irish population would decline from 88.7 percent of the total in 2001 to 63.9 percent by mid-century, a

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**FIGURE 11  England and Wales: Projection of total population and its ethnic composition, 2001–2051 (millions)**

[Sources: GAD (2005); author's projection (see Coleman and Smith (2005); Coleman and Scherbov (2005).]
non-British-origin proportion therefore of 36.1 percent, about the same as the corresponding figure projected for the United States and Sweden and slightly higher than that projected for the Netherlands, at the same date (Figure 11).

The non-white ethnic minority populations, on the assumption of net immigration of 107,900 persons per year, would increase from 4.5 million in 2001 to about 15.5 million by 2051, its proportion therefore rising from 8.7 percent to 24.5 percent and the white non-British-origin proportion rising from 2.7 percent to 11.6 percent. With zero immigration the non-white total would eventually stabilize at about 7 million by 2050 and then begin a slow decline, given the assumptions about fertility.

Notes

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2 For provisions and commentary see http://www.ministerievanjustitie.nl:8080/a_beleid/thema/vreemd/vreemd.htm

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