Chapter 11

Migrants and Politics

As international migration reshapes societies, it inevitably and often profoundly affects political life. Yet, paradoxically, international migration is frequently viewed as a socio-economic phenomenon largely devoid of political significance. This viewpoint is part and parcel of the temporary worker idea examined earlier. Relatively few people foresaw that the decision to recruit foreign labour in the wake of the Second World War would one day affect the political landscape of Western Europe. But immigration did lead to a significantly altered political environment: one that now includes Islamic fundamentalist movements composed mainly of immigrants and their offspring, as well as extreme-right, anti-immigrant parties.

The most lasting significance of international migration may well be its effects upon politics. However, much depends on how immigrants are treated by governments, and on the origins, timing, nature and context of a particular migratory flow. It makes a difference whether migrants were legally admitted and permitted to naturalize or whether their entry (legal or illegal) was seen as merely temporary but they then stayed on permanently. On the one hand, immigrants can quickly become citizens without a discernible political effect, save for the addition of more potential voters. On the other hand, international migration may lead to an accretion of politically disenfranchised persons whose political marginality is compounded by various socio-economic problems.

The universe of possible political effects of international migration is vast and characteristically intertwines the political systems of two states: the homeland and the receiving society. The political significance of international migration can be active or passive. Immigrants can become political actors in their own right or manifest apoliticism, which itself can be important to maintenance of the status quo. On the other hand, immigrants often become the object of politics: allies for some and foes for others. Chapter 10 has already dealt with one key political issue: the extent to which immigrants and their descendants can become citizens with full rights of political participation. This chapter cannot hope to do justice to all the other facets of immigration-related politics. Only a few themes can be considered. The emphasis is on emergent forces that have rendered politics within and between states more complex and volatile.

Homelands and expatriates

Most states have significant populations of citizens or subjects living abroad. For many, if not most, expatriates, the country of origin and its politics remains the foremost concern. Likewise, governments of migrant-sending societies often nurture a relationship with citizens or subjects abroad. Such policies can be driven by economic concerns such as facilitating the sending of remittances. They can also be driven by national security concerns in cases where political opposition forces become active in expatriate populations and are perceived as a threat by a homeland government.

Perhaps the best example of a sending state projecting a form of governance to its citizens abroad was Algeria from 1962 to 1990. Algeria achieved independence from France only after an eight-year-long conflict that cost 1 million lives. During the war of independence, the major Algerian revolutionary party, the National Liberation Front, had created a substantial organizational membership and infrastructure in metropolitan France. After the cessation of hostilities, the National Liberation Front organization in France was transformed into the Amicale des Algériens en France (AAE).

The head of the AAE was usually also a high-ranking official of the National Liberation Front and of the Algerian government. The AAE enjoyed a quasi-diplomatic status in France. It represented the interests of Algerian emigrants in Algerian policy-making circles as well as vis-à-vis the French government. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the AAE virtually monopolized the representation of Algerians in France, although it was opposed by rival groups, like the outlawed Movement of Arab Workers, a revolutionary communist organization with ties to radical Palestinian factions, which played a key role in organizing protests against attacks on Algerians and other North Africans in 1973 (Miller, 1981: 89–104). The AAE opposed the French government's decision in 1981 to grant aliens the right to form associations (Weil, 1991b: 99–114). Prior to 1981, associations of foreigners required government authorization in order to operate, which condemned anti-Algerian regime parties to clandestinity. The 1981 reform undercut the virtual AAE monopoly, and open opposition to the Algerian regime soon flourished.

The Algerian government was particularly concerned by the ability of Muslim fundamentalist groups, such as the Islamic Salvation Front, to operate openly in France, which they could not do in Algeria. This concern was shared with other non-Islamic governments in predominantly Muslim societies such as Turkey and Tunisia. Political dissidence expressed on French soil presaged the fundamentalist victory in the December 1991 elections, although many Algerians who voted for the Islamic Salvation Front were not so much voting for an Islamic republic as protesting against

National Liberation Front rule. The influence of French policies with regard to aliens' associations illustrates how international migration binds together the politics of two societies.

More recently, Mexico, under the leadership of President Fox, has sought to bolster the Mexican government's relationship with the large Mexican-background population in the USA, estimated to number over 8 million, about half of whom are legally resident in the USA. Even prior to Fox's arrival in power, activist Mexican consular officials played an important role in leading opposition to Proposition 187 in California, which aimed to deny government services to non-US citizens, such as schooling for illegally-resident children. President Fox's visit to the USA shortly before 11 September 2001 had all the trappings of an election campaign and featured impassioned calls for legalization and increased legal admissions of Mexican workers (see Box 1.2).

One factor influencing homeland government efforts to improve conditions for expatriates obtains only in cases where expatriates can vote in homeland elections. The modalities for expatriate voting vary considerably. Some homelands, like Turkey, Italy and Mexico, require emigrants to return home in order to vote. Other states, like Algeria and Israel, permit consular voting. Still others permit absentee voting, as in the USA. Indeed, absentee balloting by Floridians abroad played a key role in the contested outcome of the 2000 US presidential election. Electoral campaigning increasingly reflects the weight of voters abroad. Ecuadorian and Dominican Republic presidential candidates campaign for votes in New York City, just as Italian and Portuguese parties campaign for votes in Paris.

Nevertheless, the potential for emigrants to influence electoral outcomes at home does not necessarily translate into effective representation of their interests by homeland governments. Overall, the track record of diplomatic representation of migrants' interests is deficient, in part because homelands are often reluctant to criticize treatment of emigrants for fear of offending the host government and jeopardizing the homeland flow of remittances. The asymmetrical power of homelands and immigrant-receiving states was clearly demonstrated when one Western European state after the other unilaterally curbed further foreign worker recruitment in the 1970s.

Immigrants as political actors in Europe

The inadequacy of diplomatic representation of foreign residents was one reason for the emergence of distinctive channels of alien political participation and representation in Europe. Indeed there is reason to believe that nascent immigrant participation in Western European politics contributed to the decisions to curb foreign worker recruitment. By the

early 1970s, supposedly politically-quiescent aliens had become involved in a number of significant industrial strikes and protest movements. In some instances, extreme leftist groups succeeded in mobilizing foreigners. Largely foreign worker strikes in French and German car plants (see Chapter 8) demonstrated the disruptive potential of foreign labour and constrained trade unions to do more to represent foreign workers. Generally speaking, foreigners were poorly integrated into unions in 1970. By 1980, significant strides had been made towards integration. This was reflected in growing unionization rates among foreign workers and the election of foreign workers to works councils and union leadership positions.

Immigrants also sought participation and representation in local government. In several countries, advisory councils were instituted to give immigrants a voice in local government. Experiences with these advisory councils varied and some were discontinued. Some people contested them as efforts to coopt aliens, while others saw them as illegitimate interference by aliens in the politics of the host society. In certain countries, aliens were accorded a right to vote in local and regional elections. Sweden was the pacesetter in this regard, but alien participation in Swedish local and regional elections declined over time. The Netherlands was the second country to accord qualified aliens voting rights. However, the results of alien voting there have also been somewhat disappointing (Rath, 1988: 25–35). Proposals to grant local voting rights to legally-resident aliens became important domestic political and constitutional issues, particularly in France and Germany. By 2001, Belgium had the most extensive network of local government consultative structures for resident aliens. Luxembourg and Switzerland were also noteworthy for the variety and extent of consultation of foreign populations at the local level (Oriol, 2001: 20).

By the 1980s, the stakes involved in the granting of voting rights were quite high in many Western democracies. Aliens were often spatially concentrated in major cities and certain neighbourhoods. Enfranchising them would dramatically affect political outcomes in many local elections. Supporters of the granting of municipal voting rights generally regarded it as a way to foster integration and as a counterweight to the growing influence of parties like the FN in France. However, many immigrants were already politically enfranchised, particularly in the UK. This did not prevent the eruption of riots involving immigrants and their British-born children in the mid-1980s. The granting of local voting rights was thus not in itself a panacea for the severe problems facing immigrants in Western Europe.

Since the 1970s, immigrants have increasingly articulated political concerns, participated in politics and sought representation. Immigrant protest movements became part of the tapestry of Western European politics and frequently affected policies. Persistent hunger strikes by

undocumented immigrants and their supporters, for example, brought pressure to bear on French and Dutch authorities to liberalize rules regarding legalization (see Chapter 5). There was great variation in patterns of alien political participation and representation from country to country, with some countries, like Sweden, succeeding in institutionalizing much of it.

Mobilization of immigrants and ethnic minorities outside the normal channels of political representation is often linked to experience of exclusion, either through racist violence or institutional discrimination. For instance, members of ethnic minorities often feel that the police are more concerned with social control than with protecting them from racist violence. In the UK, Afro-Caribbean and Asian youths have organized self-protection groups against racist attacks. Sub-cultures of resistance developed around reggae music and rastafarianism for the West Indians, and Islam and other religions for the Asians (Gilroy, 1987). The reaction by government and the media was to see ethnic minority youth as a problem of public order: a 'social time bomb' on the verge of explosion. There was widespread panic about the alleged high rates of street crime ('mugging') by black youth and a tendency to see black people as an 'enemy within' who threatened British society (CCCS, 1982).

Black youth discontent exploded into uprisings in many inner-city areas in 1981 and 1985 (Sivanandan, 1982; Benyon, 1986). Later, there were new disturbances, in which 'joyriders' stole cars and publicly raced them to destruction in inner-city streets, to the acclaim of crowds of onlookers. After the riots, the initial official response was to insist that the central issue was one of crime and to lament the breakdown of parental control (Solomos, 1988). Newspapers blamed the problems on 'crazed Left-wing extremists' and 'streetfighting experts trained in Moscow and Libya'. The disturbances were generally labelled as 'black youth riots', but, in fact, there was a high degree of white youth involvement (Benyon, 1986).

The riots were caused by a number of interrelated factors. Deteriorating community relations and lack of political leadership against racism were major causes of alienation of black youth. There were concentrations of disadvantaged people (both white and black) in inner-city areas, marked by high unemployment, poor housing, environmental decay, high crime rates, drug abuse and racist attacks. As Benyon (1986: 268) points out, the areas where riots took place were politically disadvantaged: they lacked the institutions, opportunities and resources for putting pressure on those with political power. Finally these areas had suffered repressive forms of policing, experienced by young people as racism and deliberate harassment. The riots may be seen as defensive movements of minority youth, connected with protection of their communities as well as assertion of identity and culture (Gilroy, 1987; Gilroy and Lawrence, 1988). Similar urban uprisings have taken place in France, where a second generation has

emerged of young people of mainly Arab descent who feel French, but find themselves excluded by discrimination and racism. The spectre of insecurity became a major campaign issue for mainstream French parties of the right and the left, not only the FN.

Fear of further unrest has led to a multifaceted response by governments. Some of the French and British measures were mentioned in Chapter 10. However, it is doubtful whether such policies can effectively combat the powerful economic, social and political forces which marginalize ethnic minority youth. Moreover, the capacity and willingness of Western European governments to carry out social policy measures in favour of immigrants has in many cases declined, resulting in situations of severe and persistent social exclusion.

After the reinforcement of the powers attributed to the European Union in the 1990s, the EU became a more important factor affecting migrants and politics in Europe. Citizens of the EU residing in other member states were empowered to vote in local and European elections in their countries of residence. In the 2001 French municipal elections, statistics compiled for municipalities of more than 3500 people indicated that 204 non-French EU citizens were elected as municipal concillors, less than 1 per cent of all elected. EU citizens comprised about 2 per cent of the total population (*La lettre de la citoyenneté*, 2001: 1). Many pro-immigrant activists hoped that the strengthening of federal-level governance would facilitate enfranchisement of third country nationals and extend to them freedom of movement. But proposals such as these were blocked. Nevertheless, European institutions became an important focus of migrant political activism in the 1990s.

New issues and new political forces: Islam in Western Europe

By 1970, Islam was the second religion of France. By 1990, it was the second religion of the French. There were 15 million Muslims in Europe in 2002, including over 4 million in France (Hunter, 2002: xiii; Leveau *et al.*, 2002: 140–1). Nevertheless, as late as 1970 Islam was largely invisible in France. According to Kepel and Leveau (1987), the affirmation of Islam since then was an essential part of the settlement of foreign workers, the progression of the migratory chain. It was manifested primarily through construction of mosques and prayer-rooms and through formation of Islamic associations. In turn, the reaction to Islamic affirmation, manifested above all through the emergence of the FN, has undermined governmental integration policies. By 1990, immigration had become one of the key political issues in France and the politicization of immigration issues at times appeared to threaten the stability of French democratic institutions. The paradox was that this was largely unforeseen.

This politicization became apparent around 1970 (Wihtol de Wenden, 1988: 209–19), when extreme-right student groups began to demonstrate against *immigration sauvage*, or illegal migration. Counter-demonstrations took place and violence erupted. By 1972, the extremist groups principally involved in this violence – the Trotskyist Communist League and the neo-fascist New Order – were banned. Leftist groups continued to mobilize immigrants in various struggles such as the long rent strike in the SONACOTRA housing for foreign workers (Miller, 1978). Elements of the extreme right, however, began to mobilize on anti-immigration themes. Françoise Gaspard (1990) has related how the FN began to campaign in local elections in the Dreux area near Paris. The FN gradually increased its share of the vote before scoring a dramatic breakthrough in 1983, when it obtained 16.7 per cent of the vote. In 1989, an FN candidate in a by-election in Dreux won a seat in the Chamber of Deputies, with 61.3 per cent of the vote. In the space of 11 years, the number of FN voters increased from 307 to 4716 (Gaspard, 1990: 205). By 1997, the FN dominated municipal governments in four southern cities, including Toulon, and was supported by about 15 per cent of the national electorate. Nearly 4 million French citizens voted for FN candidates in the first round of the 1997 legislative elections. Hence, the second place finish of FN candidate Le Pen in the first round of the presidential elections of 2002 did not reflect a major, sudden increase in support for the FN.

The French reaction to Islam was irrational but grounded in concrete immigration-related problems. The irrational dimension stemmed from the trauma of the Algerian war and the association of Islam and terrorism. In 1982, following a series of crippling strikes in major car plants in the Paris region which principally involved North African workers (see Chapter 8), Prime Minister Mauroy insinuated that Iran was trying to destabilize French politics by backing Islamic fundamentalist groups (*Le Monde*, 1 February 1983). While no evidence of an Iranian involvement was produced, it was clear that Islamic groups were heavily involved, with the French Communist Party and its trade union affiliate, the CGT, desperately trying to regain control of the strike movement (Miller, 1986: 361–82). Islam was seen by many as incompatible with democracy because it made no distinction between religious faith and state. France's Muslims were portrayed as heavily influenced by Islamic fundamentalism when, in fact, only a small minority of them considered themselves fundamentalists and these were divided into multiple and often competing organizations (Kepel and Leveau, 1987).

The integration problems affecting France's Islamic minority were perhaps more central to the politicization of immigration issues. Gaspard (1990) recounts how tensions over housing exacerbated French-immigrant relations in Dreux. Immigrants, particularly those of North African origin, were living in disproportionate numbers in inadequate housing. As

settlement and family reunification proceeded, more and more immigrants applied for subsidized governmental housing, causing severe friction when their numbers grew, while the number of non-immigrant residents diminished. Before long, entire buildings came to be viewed as immigrants' quarters. The physical isolation of many immigrants in substandard housing, along with the educational problems faced by schools with a disproportionately high number of immigrant children, contributed to a malaise on which the FN fed. By the 1980s, primarily North African Muslim-origin youths, most of whom were French citizens, became involved in urban unrest that was deeply unsettling to the French.

The French Socialist Party sought to galvanize support by appealing to North African-origin voters. The pro-immigrant SOS-Racisme organization was largely an initiative of the Socialist Party. The party clearly appealed to voters as a bulwark against the FN. Yet support for the Socialists had plunged dramatically by 1992 and they were booed at pro-immigrant rallies. The socialist message of integration of resident aliens and curbing illegal immigration was viewed as pro-immigrant by the extreme right and as anti-immigrant by the extreme left.

Illustrative of the broader issue was the question of the *foulards* or Islamic headscarves worn by some young girls to school in the late 1980s. In a country where the tradition of the separation of religion and state is deeply rooted and politically salient, the wearing of headscarves appeared to many people as incompatible with the very principles of the French Republic, which prohibited the wearing of religious articles. On the other side of the debate was the claim that the choice of wearing a headscarf was an individual's prerogative, a private matter of no consequence to public authorities. In the end, French authorities ruled in favour of the girls, but not before the question had become a *cause célèbre*. Should school cafeterias serve *halal* food (that is, food prepared in accordance with Islamic ritual prescriptions)? Should Muslims be granted representation in French politics, as Catholics are through governmental consultations with the bishops, and Jews are through the consistory? Should factories honour Islamic holidays in addition to Catholic feast days? As Islam was affirmed, a host of long latent issues came to the fore, with major consequences for the French political system.

Paradoxically, the French government had encouraged the creation of mosques and prayer-rooms back in the 1960s and 1970s. Islam was seen by some businesses and public authorities as a means of social control. Prayer-rooms were constructed in factories in the hope that North African workers would be less likely to join left-wing trade unions. Moreover, supporting Islam was part of a policy of cultural maintenance, designed to encourage the eventual repatriation of migrant workers and their families. Saudi Arabia and Libya financed the construction of mosques across Western Europe, hoping to influence the emerging Islam of Western

Europe (Kepel and Leveau, 1987). Despite the separation of faith and state in France, many local governments supported the construction of mosques as part of integration policy. The building of mosques was often violently opposed, and several were bombed. Other Western European governments also fostered Islam through policies which brought Islamic teachers to Western Europe. These policies usually stemmed from provisions of bilateral labour agreements which granted homeland governments a role in educating migrant children. Many Koran schools in Germany were controlled by Islamic fundamentalists. Such institutionalization of Islam in Western Europe has probably progressed the furthest in Belgium.

Most of Western Europe's Muslims saw their religion as a private matter. The Rushdie affair made Islamic identity more of a political problem than, say, Catholicism or Protestantism. Salman Rushdie is an Indian-born Muslim citizen of the UK, who scandalized many Muslims with his book *The Satanic Verses* and was condemned to death by Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini. Much-publicized anti-Rushdie demonstrations by Muslims in England, France and Belgium confirmed the incompatibility of Islam with Western institutions in the eyes of some people.

The crisis over the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990 also prompted fear of Islamic subversion. Muslims in France were more supportive of Iraq than was French society as a whole (Perotti and Thepaut, 1991: 76–9). But many Muslims opposed the Iraqi invasion, and the Gulf War did not produce the terrorism and mass unrest in Western Europe that some had predicted. Nonetheless it was clear that French governmental support for the war effort alienated it from France's Islamic community. Tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims reached new heights. Similarly in Australia, incidents of abuse and harassment against Muslims, particularly women, increased during the Gulf crisis, prompting government action to improve community relations.

The renewal of Israeli-Palestinian violence in 2001 had major repercussions for France. Over 120 acts of violence and vandalism against French Jewish targets occurred in one month. Youths of North African Muslim background were thought to have perpetuated most of the attacks (Perotti and Thepaut, 2001).

While the vast majority of Muslim immigrants eschewed fundamentalism, Western Europe certainly was affected by the upsurge in religious fervour that swept the Muslim world. Fundamentalism often had the greatest appeal among groups suffering from various forms of social exclusion. Across Western Europe, Muslims are affected by disproportionately high unemployment rates. In areas where unemployment is compounded by educational and housing problems, and these underlying socio-economic tensions are overlaid with highly politicized religious identity issues, the ingredients for socio-political explosions are strong. All it takes is an incident, usually a violent encounter between a Muslim

youth and the police, for violence to erupt. This was the pattern behind urban unrest in France in the 1980s and 1990s. The profound problems facing Western Europe's Muslims are one reason why integration will remain the top immigration policy priority for Western European governments and for the EU for the foreseeable future (Commission of the European Communities, 1990).

In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, there were hundreds of arrests of Muslims living in North America or Western Europe for suspected involvement with Al-Qaida and its confederates. And the role played by certain mosques in radicalizing worshippers became better understood and documented. Some observers portrayed the West as a fertile ground for the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. However, such views did not withstand close scrutiny. The Al-Qaida network was present in many Western democracies, including Canada and the USA, but it did not have a significant base of support. Most Muslims in the West condemned Al-Qaida and its terrorism.

Immigrants as objects of politics: the growth of anti-immigrant extremism

The French were not alone in finding it difficult to come to grips with the emergent Islamic reality in their midst. Belgium became the scene of urban unrest in 1991, when youths who were largely of Moroccan origin clashed with police following a rumour that an anti-immigrant political party, the Flemish Vlaams Blok, was going to organize a political rally in an area heavily populated with immigrants (*The Bulletin*, 1991: 20). Partly as a result of this violence, support for the Vlaams Blok increased sharply in the 1991 Belgian elections.

Similarly, in the 1991 Austrian municipal and regional elections, the anti-immigrant Freedom Party scored an important breakthrough by increasing its share of the vote to almost one-quarter. Eventually, the Freedom Party achieved a rough parity with the Austrian Socialist Party and the People's Party and formed a government with the latter. This precipitated a crisis in EU-Austria relations, as other EU member states regarded the Freedom Party's position on immigration as unacceptable. In reality, Freedom Party preferences for migration were not that different from those of the EU mainstream. Nevertheless, the Freedom Party's leader Jörg Haider resigned as chairman in 2000 as a result of the imbroglio. In Italy, a backlash against immigration figured importantly in the political convulsions of the 1990s. The Northern Leagues, Forza Italia and the neo-fascist National Alliance expressed frustration over immigration to varying degrees. Meanwhile, the politically influential Catholic clergy and the Pope

himself voiced support for humanitarian initiatives such as legalization. Many Italian voters supported right-wing parties and protested against the deeply-embedded corruption of the Christian Democrats and the Socialists. Protest voting against a discredited *partitocrazia* was far more prevalent than anti-immigrant voting. But the second Berlusconi government announced a crackdown on illegal immigration by 2002.

Certainly support for anti-immigrant parties involved an element of protest voting. While 15 per cent of the electorate voted for the FN in France and one-third of all voters sympathized with FN positions on immigration (Weil, 1991a: 82), it also was clear that the FN was picking up part of the protest vote traditionally received by the French Communist Party. The FN did particularly well in areas with concentrations of *Pieds-Noirs*, Europeans repatriated from Algeria in 1962 and their offspring. FN opposition to the European institutions was also a major point of attraction to some of its electorate (Marcus, 1995).

In 1997, it was estimated that the FN candidates would be strong contenders in 200 of France's 577 legislative districts. However, in most French elections, if one candidate does not win a seat outright with more than 50 per cent of the vote, there is a second run-off election. After the first round of the 1997 elections, 133 FN candidates became eligible for the second round by garnering more than 12.5 per cent of the vote. Candidates from parties which have fashioned national electoral alliances – generally there is one for left-leaning and one for right-leaning parties – are favoured in second-round voting. The FN had encountered difficulty forging such electoral pacts outside the Marseilles area and therefore stood little chance of winning seats in the National Assembly. It won only one seat in the 1997 election and none in 2002. Its candidates received under 400 000 votes in the second round of the 2002 legislative elections, less than 2 per cent of votes cast (de Montvalon, 2002). The major exception to this pattern occurred in the 1986 elections when the FN won 35 seats in the National Assembly. That election was conducted according to modified proportional representation rules, unlike other national legislative elections during the Fifth Republic (Tiersky, 1994: 111–12).

By 2000, anti-immigrant political movements had developed virtually across Europe, even in formerly communist states like the former Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Many of these movements had historical precedents. Part of the hardcore support for the FN, for example, came from quarters traditionally identified with the anti-republican right. These political forces had been discredited by the Second World War and their programmes and policies were generally viewed as illegitimate until the anti-immigrant reaction of the 1980s and 1990s. Immigration issues have served as an entrée for extreme right-wing parties into mainstream politics across Europe, even in Scandinavia.

It would be a mistake to dismiss the upsurge in voting for anti-immigrant parties as simply an expression of racism and intolerance. As pointed out in Chapter 2, support for extreme-right groups is often the result of bewilderment in the face of rapid economic and social change. The erosion in organizational and ideological strength of labour organizations due to changes in occupational structures is also important. Extreme-right parties also attract support as a result of public dissatisfaction with certain policies, such as those concerning asylum seekers and illegal immigration. Other extremist parties have fared less well. The National Front in the UK, for example, appeared to be gaining strength in the mid-1970s before the Conservative Party, under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, pre-empted it by adopting key parts of its programme (Layton-Henry and Rich, 1986: 74–5). The UK's two party system and its 'first past the post' electoral law make it very difficult for any new party to win seats in the House of Commons.

Some scholars have suggested that the emergence of right-wing parties has had anti-immigrant effects across the political spectrum (Messina, 1989). It has been argued, for example, that French socialist stands on immigration shifted to the right as support for the FN increased. However, it is difficult to reconcile the Socialist Party's celebration of its anti-racism with such a thesis. As Patrick Weil observed, 'immigration can appear as the ideal arena for differentiating politics of the Left from the Right. The Socialist Party, first and foremost François Mitterrand, found in immigration and antiracism a privileged domain for political intervention' (Weil, 1991a: 95).

Migrants and ethnic voting blocs

The most extreme example of international migration transforming politics is the case of Palestine and Israel. From 1920 to 1939, British-authorized immigration increased the Jewish share of the population in the British mandate of Palestine from roughly 10 per cent to one-third, despite fierce Palestinian Arab opposition including strikes, riots and revolts. The goal of the mainstream Zionists was the creation of a Jewish homeland, which did not necessarily connote the creation of a Jewish state. A minority Zionist current – the so-called Revisionists, led by Vladimir Jabotinsky – proclaimed the creation of a Jewish state on all the territory of the Palestine Mandate, including the East Bank of the Jordan, as the goal of Zionism (Laqueur, 1972). During the Holocaust and the Second World War, the Zionist movement was radicalized and the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine became the paramount goal of the movement. Palestinians and other Arabs had long opposed the Zionist project because they feared it would displace the Palestinian Arabs or reduce them from

majority to minority status. Fighting broke out in 1947 and the worst fears of the Arabs were realized.

The politics of the Jewish state of Israel, created in 1948, remain heavily influenced by immigration. As a result of the inflow of Oriental or Sephardic Jews primarily from largely Muslim societies during the 1950s and 1960s, the Sephardic-origin Jewish population surpassed that of European-origin Ashkenazi Jews in the mid-1970s. This demographic shift benefited the modern-day followers of Jabotinsky and the Revisionists: the Likud bloc led by Menachem Begin, who was elected prime minister in 1977 with the support of Sephardic-origin Jews. In 1990, a new wave of Soviet Jewish immigration began, again affecting the balance between Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews as well as the Arabs. Nearly 1 million Soviet Jews arrived in Israel between 1990 and 2002.

Now comprising about 15 per cent of the Israeli electorate, the Soviet Jewish vote decisively affected the outcomes of general elections beginning in 1992. By the 1996 election, an immigrant party led by the former Soviet dissident Natan Sharansky won seven seats in the Knesset and joined the coalition government dominated by the Likud. In the 2001 Israeli election there were several predominately Soviet Jewish parties competing for votes, with Sharansky's again receiving the most. A number of Soviet Jewish political leaders called for mass expulsion of Israeli Arabs and Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza. In 2002, the government of Jordan sought reassurance that an attack on Iraq would not lead to mass deportation of Palestinians. Polls revealed growing support for 'transfer', the Israeli euphemism for ethnic cleansing of Palestinian Arabs.

The Israeli case illustrates in the extreme the potential impact of an immigrant voting bloc upon electoral outcomes. Immigrants generally are not such an important factor as in Israel and immigrants do not necessarily vote in ethnic blocs. Yet immigration clearly is affecting electoral politics across Western democracies as growing numbers of aliens naturalize, and as immigrant-origin populations are mobilized to vote. In the 1996 referendum over the future of Quebec and the Canadian Federation, Quebec's immigrant voters overwhelmingly voted against the referendum and for maintenance of the status quo. They decisively affected the outcome, prompting angry anti-immigration remarks by Quebecois leaders. In the close 2002 German elections, the 350 000 Germans of Turkish background emerged as a potentially decisive voting bloc whose backing may have enabled the Social Democratic–Green coalition to scrape through to victory. Although only 1 per cent of the electorate in 2002, the Turkish-German voting bloc is expected to double in size by 2006. Naturalized German citizens from Eastern Europe, on the other hand, strongly favour conservative parties (Wüst, 2002).

The growing mass of immigrant voters has made many political parties and their leaders more sensitive to multicultural concerns and issues. In

some instances, immigration policy debates have been influenced by electoral calculations. In general, political parties on the left side of the political spectrum appear to take the lead in appealing to immigrant voters and are rewarded for their efforts. Conservative parties often benefit electorally from anti-immigrant backlash. And a number of conservative parties have begun to compete in earnest for the immigrant-origin electorate, particularly in the UK and the USA. Following the 1996 US elections, some Repubicans felt that President Clinton and the Democrats had outmanoeuvred the Republicans by encouraging a naturalization campaign while several Republican presidential candidates embraced anti-immigrant positions. Subsequently, George W. Bush ran a campaign in 2000 that courted Hispanic voters and electoral concerns drove his immigration initiative towards Mexico in 2001 (see Box 1.2). The endorsement of multiculturalism by the conservative coalition which was in power in Australia from 1975 to 1982 also seemed to be connected with concern about the 'ethnic vote' (Castles *et al.*, 1992a). In several countries, new ethnic voting blocs have come into existence. This is seen as normal in some democracies, but as a problem in others.

Many naturalized immigrants do not register to vote nor exercise their voting rights. DeSipio suggests that claims that naturalized Americans participated more than other Americans in the 1920s and 1930s are not empirically grounded. His review of studies of naturalized American participation in the 1996 election led him to conclude that the naturalized participate less than other Americans, even with controls for socio-economic differences in place. Naturalized US citizens are more likely than the population as a whole to have socio-demographic characteristics associated with political marginalization. Moreover, he argues that the process of immigrant political adaptation to the USA is not a group process but a highly individual one. Participation of immigrants is shaped by class and education factors that shape participation in US politics in general (DeSipio, 2001).

Abstention rates are very high among Asian-American voters despite voter registration and participation drives aimed specifically at them. In 1992, only 350 000 of the estimated 2.9 million Asian-Americans living in California were registered to vote (Choo, 1992). The 33rd US Congressional district in California, downtown Los Angeles, was thought to be one of the districts with the highest number of non-citizens: 225 116 out of the 384 158 adults resident in 1992. Only 13 per cent of the adult population voted in the 1992 election. Twenty-eight per cent did not exercise their voting rights and 59 per cent were ineligible as non-citizens. This compared to a national average of 52 per cent of adults voting, 44 per cent not voting and 4 per cent ineligible to vote due to non-citizenship (*Washington Post*, 22 May, 1994). Abstention rates are also high for French citizens of immigrant background. In the first round of the 1997

legislative elections 32.1 per cent of the electorate abstained and 3.3 per cent cast blank ballots. Abstention rates were especially high in the Saint-Denis district which is heavily populated by immigrants.

The immigration trends of the last several decades have significantly affected electoral politics in many Western democracies. The ability of legal immigrants to naturalize, and eventually to vote, constitutes a major concern for any democracy. That immigrant political participation is viewed as legitimate and as an anticipated outcome demarcates the USA, Australian and Canadian experiences from those of many Western European nations. Political exclusion is inherent in the concept of temporary worker policy. That is one reason why such policies are commonplace in authoritarian and undemocratic settings, such as in the Arab monarchies of the Gulf. Post-Second World War Western European guestworker policies created a conundrum when unplanned, unforeseen mass settlement occurred. The guestworkers and their families could not be excluded from Western European democracies without grievous damage to the fabric of democracy.

The UK constitutes an exception to the Western European pattern in that most post-1945 immigrants – those from the Commonwealth up to 1971, and the Irish – entered with citizenship and voting rights. However, as previously suggested, this seemed to have little effect upon the socio-economic position of immigrants which was quite similar to that of guestworkers on the continent. Immigration became an object of political debate as early as 1958 when there were race riots in Notting Hill in London and other areas. In 1962, British immigration law was tightened up, setting a precedent for even more restrictive measures in the future. In the late 1960s, right-wing politicians such as Enoch Powell warned of looming racial conflict, of 'rivers of blood' on the horizon. Immigration became increasingly politicized in the mid-1970s. The National Front, a descendant of Sir Oswald Mosley's British Union of Fascists of the 1930s, played a key role in provoking immigration-related violence. British neo-fascists and leftists battled over immigration in the 1970s in much the same way that French neo-fascists and left-wing, pro-immigrant groups had confronted one another several years earlier (Reed, 1977).

The frequently violent clashes, which then were regarded as uncharacteristic of normally civil British politics, combined with the mounting numbers of immigrants to make immigration a key issue in the 1979 general election. Margaret Thatcher adroitly capitalized on the immigration backlash to deflate support for the National Front and to score a victory over the Labour Party, which was supported by most immigrant voters. A 1975 pamphlet published by the Community Relations Commission underscored the growing electoral significance of immigrant ethnic minorities, and even the Conservative Party began efforts to recruit ethnic minority members as a result (Layton-Henry, 1981).

In subsequent general elections and in local elections, black and Asian Briton participation became more conspicuous. In 1987, four black Britons were elected to Parliament and three of them joined a black member of the House of Lords to form a black parliamentary caucus styled upon the then 24-member US Congressional black caucus. Hundreds of black and Asian Britons were elected to positions in local government. In the industrial city of Birmingham, for example, the first Muslim municipal councillor (a Labourite, like most immigrant-origin elected officials) was elected in 1982. In 1983, two more Muslim Labourites were elected. By January 1987, there were 14 municipal councillors of immigrant origin, including six Muslims. Within the Birmingham Labour Party, in the Sparkbrook area, 600 of the 800 local party members were Muslims (Joly, 1988: 177-8). But, Studlar and Layton-Henry argue, this growing black and Asian participation and representation in British politics generally did not result in greater attention being paid to immigrant issues and grievances (Studlar and Layton-Henry, 1990: 288).

Part of the difficulty faced by immigrants in getting their concerns onto the Labour Party agenda stems from the necessity of defining group issues in terms of class. However, formation of an alternative immigrants' party is not a viable option. Hence, even in a Western European country where most immigrants are enfranchised, their participation and representation remains problematic. Immigrant-origin voters can significantly affect electoral outcomes in 30–60 of the UK's 650 parliamentary constituencies. These are located in cities.

In Australia, there has been considerable debate on the impact of post-war immigration on politics. Most observers argue that the effects have been very limited (Jupp *et al.*, 1989: 51). McAllister states that post-war immigration 'has not resulted in any discernible change in the overall pattern of voting behaviour. Despite large-scale immigration, social class, not birthplace, has remained the basis for divisions between political parties' (McAllister, 1988: 919). A study of the role of Italo-Australians in political life found that they did not have a high profile, and argued that this was typical for immigrants in Australia (Castles *et al.*, 1992a). Italians have not established their own political parties or trade unions, and neither have they gained significant representation in Parliament. On the other hand, there are a large number of local councillors and some mayors of Italian origin. Yet even at this level of government Italo-Australians are underrepresented in comparison with their share in the population. Despite this, the 'ethnic vote' appears to be an 'issue' which influences the behaviour of Australian political leaders. Not only do they make efforts to approach ethnic associations to mobilize electoral support, they also make concessions to ethnic needs and interests in their policies.

The explanation for this combination of a low political profile with fairly successful interest articulation seems to lie in the relative openness of

the Australian political system for immigrant groups, at least at a superficial level. As a reaction to mass immigration since 1947, governments and trade unions combined to guarantee orderly industrial relations, which would not threaten the conditions of local workers. The policy of assimilation from the 1940s to the early 1970s provided civil rights and citizenship, which laid the groundwork for political integration. Multicultural policies after 1972 accepted the legitimacy of representation of special interests through ethnic community associations. Their leaderships were granted a recognized, if limited, political role in government consultative bodies. Thus immigrant groups obtained some political influence in ethnic affairs and welfare policies. Yet they were still far from gaining significant influence in central political and economic decision-making processes. The question is whether this situation will change as the mainly poorly-educated migrant generation leaves the centre stage and is replaced by a new self-confident second generation, which has passed through the Australian educational system (Castles *et al.*, 1992b: 125–39).

Migration and security

The duality of international migrants as political actors and as targets of politics is perhaps most vivid when broaching the increasingly important topic of migration and security, and particularly political terrorism. Involvement of a minority of immigrants in political violence contributed to international migration's new salience on post-Cold War security agendas. Skewed and insufficiently informed discussion of immigration and terrorism was only to be expected in the post-Cold War period and new measures and laws against terrorism eroded the legal status of aliens in several Western democracies, most notably Germany and the USA. Three cases can be summarized to elucidate why migration and security concerns have become so important.

It has long been known that Turks of Kurdish background were overrepresented in the ranks of Turkish emigrants. There were nearly 1 million Kurds in Europe in 2000 (Boulanger, 2000: 20). However, during the mass recruitment period, this seemed to be of little political consequence. In the 1980s Kurdish aspirations for independence or autonomy from Turkey galvanized (see Box 6.2). The PKK, or Kurdish Workers Party, emerged as an important force and began an armed insurrection against the Turkish Republic.

It is estimated that one-quarter to one-third of the over 2 million Turkish citizens resident in Germany are of Kurdish origin. Perhaps 50 000 of these sympathize with the PKK and up to 12 000 are active members of the party or its front organizations (Boulanger, 2000: 23). As argued above, it is not unusual for migrants to be actively engaged in

homeland-oriented political parties. What is unsettling to German and Turkish authorities is that the PKK transformed Germany into a second front in its struggle and frequently struck at Turkish consulates, airlines and businesses in Germany and elsewhere in Western Europe. Moreover, Turkish repression of the PKK-led insurgency, which has taken tens of thousands of lives, has seriously complicated its diplomatic ties with EU member states. Turkish counter-insurgency measures have included mysterious death squads and the uprooting and forced relocation of millions of Kurdish civilians. This backdrop renders the PKK activities on German soil and German and Turkish counter-measures highly emotive and significant. Indeed, the PKK became one of the primary German national security concerns by the mid-1990s, particularly after the PKK leader Öcalan threatened to send Hamas-style suicide bombers against German targets in retaliation for German cooperation with Turkey in its war against the PKK.

Despite the decision to outlaw the PKK and its front organizations, the PKK possesses an extensive organizational infrastructure in Germany and nearby European states. PKK tactics have featured protest marches and hunger strikes. German authorities have routinely banned street demonstrations on Kurdish and Turkish issues. Nonetheless, many have been staged and they frequently result in violent clashes. Formerly, participation in such events was legally only a minor offence and resident aliens apprehended at them did not become subject to deportation. In 1996, the German government sought to strengthen its ban on PKK street protests by making participation in banned events a major offence. Several Kurdish protesters were subsequently apprehended and recommended for deportation, at a time when hunger strikes in Turkish prisons had cost the lives of numerous prisoners and torture and ill-treatment of prisoners appeared to be commonplace. Hence, deportation of Kurdish activists raised important legal and human rights issues which polarized German public opinion.

The arrest of Abdallah Öcalan by Turkish authorities in 1999 sparked a massive wave of Kurdish protests in Europe and as far away as Australia. Three Kurds were killed after trying to enter the Israeli consulate in Berlin and scores of protesters were injured. During his subsequent trial, Öcalan called upon his followers to abandon armed struggle. This resulted in a large decrease in Kurdish militant activities on German soil but the unresolved Kurdish question remained and with it the potential for renewed conflict.

Such concerns undoubtedly contributed to Germany's opposition in 2002 to a US-led attack upon Iraq. German–US divergence over Iraq damaged overall diplomatic relations between long-time allies. This dramatic turn of events had much to do with differing German and US perspectives on the migration and security nexus in the Middle East. With

an estimated 3.3 million Muslims in a total population of 83 million in Germany, only about 1 per cent of Muslims were estimated to be political extremists (Johnson, 2002).

Across the Rhine, French authorities grappled with the spillover of the fundamentalist insurgency in Algeria to French soil. An offshoot of the Islamic Salvation Front, the Armed Islamic Group, pursued an insurgency against the Algerian government, which is dominated by the military. As seen in Chapters 1 and 6, tens of thousands have died in a merciless war of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Algeria. France has given military and economic support to the Algerian government which became the pretext for the extension of Armed Islamic Group operations to French soil. A network of militants waged a bombing campaign, principally in the Paris region in 1995, before being dismantled. In late 1996, the Armed Islamic Group was thought to have been behind another fatal bombing, although no group took responsibility for the attack.

French authorities undertook numerous steps to prevent bombings and to capture the bombers. Persons of North African appearance were routinely subjected to identity checks. These checks were accepted by most French citizens and resident aliens of North African background as a necessary inconvenience. Indeed, information supplied by such individuals greatly aided in the dismantling of the terrorist group, several of whom were killed in shoot-outs with French police. From time to time, French police have rounded up scores of suspected sympathizers with the Armed Islamic Group.

Several guerrillas involved in attacks against hotels in Morocco, designed to disrupt the economically-important tourism industry so despised by some Islamic militants, were French citizens of North African background. They had been recruited into a fundamentalist network in the Parisian suburbs and their involvement was deeply disturbing to the French population, including most of the Islamic community. All available evidence suggests that mobilization of North African-origin citizens and permanent residents of France into violence-prone Islamicist organizations is extremely rare, but this particular incident stoked concern over the potential for that to happen more frequently.

Such fears appeared warranted in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. Scores of Armed Islamic Group and Al-Qaida-linked individuals, mainly of North African background, were detained for involvement in various plots, including one to attack the US embassy in Paris. Several of those arrested were French citizens of North African background including Zacarias Moussaoui, who was accused of plotting with the perpetrators of the 11 September attacks. At least one French citizen of North African background died during the Allied military campaign against the Taliban and Al-Qaida in Afghanistan. Algerians and other individuals of North African Muslim background with links to the Armed Islamic Group

figured prominently in the hundreds of arrests in the transatlantic area. The anti-Western resentment of some of those arrested was linked to perceived injustices endured by migrants and their families and their exclusion.

The USA has also received large inflows of Islamic immigrants. The total Muslim population of the USA in 2002 was estimated at 3 million, of whom 2 million were immigrants (Pipes and Durán, 2002: 1). Most Muslim immigrants have arrived legally, but many others have come as asylum seekers or illegally. Islam is one of the fastest growing religions in the USA. The Iranian-origin population alone, for instance, was estimated to number over 1 million by one Iranian-American organization (*The New York Times*, 29 June 1995). Major influxes of Palestinians have occurred since 1967 which were connected to the turmoil and difficult living conditions faced by Palestinians in the Middle East.

Middle East-origin immigrants were principally involved in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre. That attack led to the adoption of a new counter-terrorism law in 1996 with significant implications for the rights of immigrants. The new law empowered the government to expedite detention and removal of aliens without customary judicial review. Fundraising activities by terrorist organizations and their fronts were also targeted. A major target of the 1996 law was Hamas, a Palestinian Islamist movement which had emerged during the Intifada of the 1980s. Israeli authorities complained that the USA had become a major base of operations and fund-raising for Hamas.

In late 1999, the capture of Ahmed Ressam and the discovery of a plot to bomb Los Angeles airport indicated that the Armed Islamic Group from Algeria had extended its range of activities to North America, putting the USA onto a state of alert. A 2002 study of 48 Muslim radicals arrested since 1993, including the perpetrators of the 11 September attacks, indicated that one-third of them were tourists in the USA, another third were lawful permanent resident aliens, a quarter were illegal residents and three were asylum seekers (Camarota, 2002).

In the wake of those attacks, hundreds of immigrants, mainly of Middle Eastern background, were detained by US authorities. The legality of many of the arrests was challenged. In some instances, charges were dropped and detainees released. But critics charged that there was widespread violation of the civil rights of detainees. Middle East-background applicants for visas were subjected to additional scrutiny and Middle East students were systematically questioned by federal authorities.

These three cases illustrate why migration increasingly is viewed as germane to national security policies in the transatlantic area. However, as Myron Weiner in particular has demonstrated, concern over the security implications of international migration has been a significant factor

around the world (Weiner, 1993). A common thread in transatlantic regional responses to immigrant violence has been increased repression and erosion of the legal status of resident aliens. Too often there has been conflation of immigration with terrorism when, in fact, very few immigrants have been involved in it.

Organized, politically-motivated violence against immigrants and foreign-born populations is distressingly commonplace. This is why Turkey, for instance, declares the security of its citizens abroad to be a top foreign policy objective. The vulnerability of migrants to political violence appears to have grown in the post-Cold War period. Yet discussions of political terrorism and counter-terrorism strategy pay little heed to anti-immigrant violence.

The risk of overreaction to violence by a handful of immigrants appears quite high. Without minimizing the importance of the integration barriers faced by Islamic-origin immigrants in Western democracies, the overall pattern is one of integration and incorporation. The results of several surveys of France's Muslim population, citizen and non-citizen, confirm this (Tribalat, 1995). The most important survey found that persons of Algerian Muslim background are quite secular in orientation. The Moroccan-origin population is considerably more religiously oriented. However, like Catholics, Protestants and Jews in France, only a minority practise their faith regularly. There is considerable dating and socializing with non-Muslims, and intermarriage is not uncommon. The surveys confirm the importance of unemployment and educational problems faced by France's Muslims, but the unmistakable overall thrust of the findings is that integration is occurring.

Integration, of course, provides security for immigrants and the host population. It is the decisive long-term factor affecting migration and security. The risk taken in measures like the 1996 counterterrorism legislation and those adopted after 11 September 2001 is that they will adversely affect integration without appreciably enhancing deterrence of terrorism. As argued elsewhere in this book, policies that exclude immigrants by denying them equal rights risk generating conflict over the long run. Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that democracies have a vital security interest in immigrant rights.

The growing, if belated, interest in migration and security involves a paradox. Many states have a profoundly important security interest in effective implementation of their immigration laws and regulations. Yet, all too often, insufficient appropriations are made or too few personnel engaged to enforce laws and regulations effectively. Stated or proclaimed policies are often undermined by funding or staffing decisions or undercut by political pressure to protect certain constituents, clients or (especially in the USA) contributors to election campaigns. One result is a credibility gap

which potentially endangers legally-admitted aliens who have an extra-ordinary stake in well-managed policies which ensure that immigration and settlement are consented to and are legitimate.

Thus far, there is little evidence that racism and violence against immigrants have provoked violent counter-measures by immigrants. However, the potential for racism and anti-immigrant violence begetting terrorism in response should not be underestimated, once again underscoring everyone's stake in vigilance against violent opponents of immigrants.

Conclusion

International migration has played a major role in fostering multicultural politics. Migration can dramatically affect electorates, as witnessed in the Israeli case, and immigrants can influence politics through non-electoral means as well. Immigrants have fostered transnational politics linking homeland and host-society political systems in fundamental ways. Migrants and minorities are both subjects and objects of politics. An anti-immigrant backlash has strengthened the appeal of right-wing parties in Western Europe. One way in which migration has fundamentally altered the Western European political landscape is through the constitution of increasingly vocal Islamic organizations, which present a dilemma for democratic political systems: refusal to accept their role would violate democratic principles, yet many people see their aims and methods as intrinsically anti-democratic. International migration has fostered new constituencies, new parties and new issues. Many of Western Europe's newer political parties, such as the FN in France, feature anti-immigrant themes. Violence against immigrants is also a factor in ethnic minority formation and political mobilization.

In the USA, Canada and Australia immigrant political participation and representation is less of a problem, partly because of the preponderance of family-based legal immigration. However, disenfranchisement of legally-resident aliens and illegally-resident aliens in major US cities increasingly troubles authorities. Much of New York's population cannot vote, either because they are not naturalized or because they are illegally resident. Virtually everywhere, international migration renders politics more complex. Ethnic mobilization and the ethnic vote are becoming important issues in many countries. Another new issue may be seen in the politics of naturalization. One or two decades ago, virtually no one knew naturalization law or considered it important. The changing nature of international migration and its politicization has changed that. Most democracies now face a long-term problem stemming from growing populations of resident aliens who are unable or unwilling to naturalize; the status of illegal immigrants is particularly problematic (Rubio-Marin, 2000).

Immigrant politics are in a continual state of flux, because of the rapid changes in migratory flows as well as the broader transformations in political patterns which are taking place in many Western societies. As migratory movements mature – moving through the stages of immigration, settlement and minority formation – the character of political mobilization and participation changes. There is a shift from concern with homeland politics to mobilization around the interests of ethnic groups in the immigration country. If political participation is denied through refusal of citizenship and failure to provide channels of representation, immigrant politics is likely to take on militant forms. This applies particularly to the children of immigrants born in the countries of immigration. If they are excluded from political life through non-citizenship, social marginalization or racism, they are likely to present a major challenge to existing political structures in the future.

Guide to further reading

Miller (1981) provides one of the first comparative studies on the political role of migrant workers. Layton-Henry (1990) looks at the political rights of migrant workers in Western Europe. The *International Migration Review* Special Issue 19:3 (1985) gives information on the political situation in several countries. The comparative studies on citizenship by Brubaker (1989) and Hammar (1990) are of great value. Solomos and Wrench (1993) examine racism and migration in several European counties, while Layton-Henry and Rich (1986) focus on Britain. Shain (1989) looks at the consequences of refugee movements for the nation-state.

More recent important books include Ireland (1994) on immigrant politics in France and Switzerland. Feldblum (1999), Geddes and Favell (1999) and Joppke (1999) examine dimensions of migrant politics, citizenship matters and implications of migration for political identities and for the state. Gerstle and Mollenkopf (2001) provide contemporary and historical reflections on immigrant political incorporation in the USA while Rubio-Marin (2000) explores the challenge posed by migration, and particularly illegal migration, to democratic institutions in the USA and Germany. Koslowski (2000) offers seminal insight into the implications of international population movements for the study of international relations, a theme also explored in Miller (1998). Cohen and Layton-Henry (1997) provide an invaluable collection of key contributions to the study of the politics of migration in the *International Library of Studies of Migration* series.