

Chapter 3

Coercive Pronatalism and American Population Policy

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ABSTRACT

The formulation of explicit anti-natalist policies requires an awareness of existing pronatalist ones. Lacking such awareness, action is side-tracked by a spurious controversy as to whether coercion should be instituted or voluntarism maintained. This paper tries to show that our society is already pervaded by time-honored pronatalist forces whose constraining influence becomes obvious only when they are challenged and sanctions are invoked. The paper concentrates on two diffused and implicit pronatalist coercions in modern American society—the prescribed primacy of parenthood in the definition of adult sex roles, and the prescribed congruence of personality traits with the demands of the sex roles as defined. Given the existence of such coercions, it is argued that we cannot preserve a choice that does not genuinely exist. And, by the same token, it makes no sense to institute anti-natalist constraints while continuing to support pronatalist ones. The problem of adapting to low mortality is not one of browbeating biologically specialized individuals out of behavior that is “natural” for all. Rather, it is one of directing cultural and social institutions into the use of human variability for meeting the new functional demands of a modern, low-mortality society. In this endeavor, freedom for the development of individual potential may be greatly enhanced. The author seriously doubts that it will be curtailed.

Coercive Pronatalism and American Population Policy

The achievement of zero population growth implies that American childbearing be limited to an average of approximately two children per woman. Since women who are currently approaching the end of the reproductive age span have borne an average of three children, advocates of population stabilization are concerned about the mechanisms for achieving a two-child average.¹ The search for measures to insure a reproductive level that is both low and nonfluctuating is intensified by a growing recognition of the lead-time required to achieve zero population growth. For example, the two-child average will afford us zero growth only after the age structure of the population has become less favorable to reproduction than is currently the case. Until the baby-boom babies move out of the reproductive ages, the achievement of zero growth implies fewer than two children per woman.² It is clear, therefore, that long-run population stability will require either that Americans, in general, restrict themselves to micro-families, or that a substantial share of the population remain childless (and/or have only one child) while others have the moderate-sized families to which we are now accustomed.

Such a major change in our reproductive behavior would seem to call for the introduction of state-imposed coercions on individuals—an abrogation of the “voluntary” character of childbearing decisions.³ This popular view of what must be done in order to achieve population stability is, of course, both shocking and frightening to government officials. In the face of suggestions regarding state “control” over reproduction, programs that promise stabilization through the elimination of “unwanted” fertility alone seem reassuringly inoffensive. Understandably, they are embraced with relief regardless of how unlikely it is that they will be effective.⁴ Their selling point is “the right to choose” one’s family size and this “right” is celebrated as an ultimate end. In the words of Frank Notestein:

... Family planning represents a new and important freedom in the world. It will surely be a happy day when parents can have and can avoid having children, as they see fit. . . . It is a matter of major importance that this kind of new freedom to choose, now existing for the bulk of

the population, be extended to its most disadvantaged parts. If it were extended, reproduction would be brought fairly close to the replacement level. However, I would advocate the right to choose even if I thought the demographic consequences would be highly adverse, because it will always be possible to manipulate the environment in which the choice is made.⁵

However, both the coercion approach and the laissez-faire approach (“the right to choose”) suffer from a serious empirical flaw. They each assume that free choice and voluntarism now exist and that they are marred only by incomplete distribution of contraceptives. One approach says that voluntarism must be curtailed, the other claims that it must be preserved at all cost. Neither recognizes that it does not exist right now. Neither takes into account that at present, reproductive behavior is under stringent institutional control and that this control constitutes, in many respects, a coercive pronatalist policy. Hence, an effective anti-natalist policy will not necessarily involve an increase in coercion or a reduction in the “voluntary” element in reproduction, because individuals are under pronatalist constraints right now. People make their “voluntary” reproductive choices in an institutional context that severely constrains them not to remain single, not to choose childlessness, not to bear only one child, and even not to limit themselves to two children. If we can gain insight into the coercions and restraints under which we currently operate, it may become more obvious that an anti-natalist policy can be one that is more voluntary—allows a wider spectrum of individual choice—than is presently the case. Let us first examine why individuals may be said to be constrained and coerced, in any society, regarding reproduction. We may then turn to the main body of our paper—the actual nature of some important existing reproductive coercions in American society.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY AND THE REPRODUCTIVE FUNCTION

In order to understand the long-run determinants of birth rates, insofar as these relate to motivational and

not conditional factors, one must translate birth rates into the operational context of reproduction.⁶ People do not have birth rates, they have children. Their willingness to bear and rear children—to expend their human and material resources in this manner—cannot be taken for granted. Rather, childbearing and child rearing take place in an organizational context which strongly influences people to do one set of things—reproduce—and not to do other activities that would conflict or compete with reproduction. The bearing and rearing of children thus represents one kind of allocation and organization of human and material resources. In all viable societies, social control has operated to organize human beings into childbearing and child-rearing groups—families—that, by definition, are highly efficient reproductive machines. Reproductively inefficient societies have not survived for historical man to study.

As with other forms of social control, that responsible for the support of the family as an institution rests on informal and formal (legal) rules of behavior. These range from behavior that must be performed—prescribed—to behavior that is forbidden—proscribed. Large areas of behavior are simply permitted or preferred. What leads us to abide by these rules? Clearly, the same mechanisms of social control that lead us to abide by any rules: First of all, we are socialized from the beginning both to learn the rules and to believe they are right. Second, the everyday process of interaction with others puts us in constant contact with the norm-enforcement process, since other people have a stake in how we behave. They can reward us with approval, or punish us with rejection. If these informal sanctions are not effective, then formal ones may be invoked, such as the law. Finally, the master control of all is what might be called the “sociological predicament”: Any existing social organization represents a selection of possible roles and statuses, goals and activities, available to individuals. Not only are persons with certain characteristics allocated to particular roles and statuses and proscribed from others, but all individuals in a given society typically have available to them, as the outer perimeter of their expectations, only what that society has to offer from a role and status point of view. Such limitation of role alternatives obviates the need for many more direct coercions. Individuals are usually not afforded role options that might be deviant. This fact is abundantly documented by the social sciences. An illustration of particular relevance to this paper is Burgess and Wallin’s criticism of Waller’s well-known theory of the function of romantic love. Waller presupposed that the idealization and euphoria of being “in love” are necessary to propel people into marriage. He reasoned that a powerful force

is needed to overcome the attractions of alternative ways of life. Burgess and Wallin’s point is simple—such attractive alternatives do not exist.

... The woman who does not marry is likely to be judged a failure, the implication generally being that she was not chosen, she was not desired. Apart from the injury to her self-esteem, nonmarriage imposes difficulties and frustrations. Adult social life tends to be organized around married couples. Sexual satisfaction is not easily obtained without risk by the unmarried female who desires it, and the experience of motherhood is denied her. . . .

[As for men,] . . . to marry is to be normal, and from childhood on we are exposed to the idea of marriage as something to be desired, the risk of divorce notwithstanding. Although some men can secure their sexual satisfaction outside of the matrimonial relationship, most of them are strongly attracted by the promise of sexual gratification with the regularity, convenience, and comfort which marriage affords.⁷

In sum, reproduction and replacement, like other societal functions, require an organized allocation of human and material resources. Societies have resolved this problem of resource allocation by means of diffused control mechanisms (rather than a government planning board, for example); but the mechanisms are, nonetheless, quite palpably there. And they involve the individual in an articulated and coercive set of constraints. He has some choice among fixed alternatives, but, as we shall see, even his “choices” are deeply influenced by his past social experience and the kind of person he has been impelled to become. His behavior is “voluntary” only in a restricted sense—not in the sense of being unpatterned, uncontrolled, or unrestrained. In effect, regardless of whether a typical birth cohort of individuals contains a large proportion of persons who might be unsuited to family life, human societies are so organized as to attempt to make individuals as suited as possible, to motivate them to want to be suited, and to provide them with little or no alternative to being suited as they mature. By fiction and by fiat, parenthood is the “natural” human condition, and to live one’s life as a family member is the desideratum. In this context, individuals make their reproductive “choices.”

The present paper will concentrate on two such diffused and implicit pronatalist coercions in modern American society—the prescribed primacy of parenthood in the definition of adult sex roles and the prescribed congruence of personality traits with the demands of the sex roles as defined. I believe it can be shown not only that there is, in American society, an absence of

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legitimate alternatives to sex roles having parenthood as a primacy focus, but that change is particularly difficult to effect because those individuals who might aspire to such alternatives are suppressed and neutralized. My thesis is that unless we realize that we have been locking pronatalism into both the structure of society and the structure of personality, the problem of fertility control will appear to be the reverse of what it actually is. We will continue to believe that our principal policy problem is one of instituting anti-natalist coercions instead of lifting pronatalist ones. We will see fertility reduction as involving more regimentation than presently exists, when, in fact, it should involve less, since individuals will not longer be universally constrained to forsake other possible interests and goals in order to devote themselves to the reproductive function.

ROLE DIFFERENTIATION BY SEX AND THE PRIMACY OF PARENTHOOD

Role differentiation by sex in American society makes actual or anticipated parenthood a precondition for all other aspects of men's and women's roles.⁸ The content of sex roles—men's and women's "spheres"—uses as a bench mark the sexually differentiated relation to childbearing and child rearing. The feminine role is normatively maternal and, hence, intrafamilial, "integrative," emotionally supportive, and "expressive." The masculine role is normatively paternal and, as a result, primarily the complement of the maternal role—extrafamilial, protective, economically supportive, and "instrumental" (or "task-oriented"). By according primacy to the kinship statuses of "mother" and "father," these role expectations thus assume that parenthood is implicit in the very definition of masculinity and femininity. Moreover, not only does the identification of masculinity and femininity with parenthood mean that reproduction is implicitly prescribed for everyone but, as might be expected, it means that alternative role definitions for the sexes are, at best, tolerated, and, at worst, proscribed.

Since we have been speaking of the United States, it is worth asking whether the identification of gender with parenthood is unusual in human societies. Are Americans odd? The answer is, of course, negative. We share this linkage of sex roles and parenthood functions with a large number of primitive and technologically backward peoples, as well as with some more modern ones.⁹ Indeed, it is probably true that, insofar as men and women engage in reproduction in families, this division of labor will be subject to only minor modifications. What is open to question, however, is the demographic appropriateness for a low-mortality society of rigidly identifying, for everyone, the sexual with the parental

role. Since sex is an aspect of a person's identity that begins its influence from birth, we appear to be locking ourselves into reproduction through sex-role expectations that ceased to be demographically necessary for our entire population before most of us were born.

What is the evidence for the identification of sex roles with traditional parental functions in American society? Is such an identification really normative? One significant way of answering this question is to see what happens when the norm is challenged, or when there is some large-scale defection from the sex-role expectations as defined. If the norm is operative, we would expect to discover that a variety of sanctions are invoked to bring behavior back into line. Additionally, we might expect to see an effort to label the deviation as not merely contra-normative but pathological as well.

In the remainder of this section on sex roles, we shall examine a number of challenges to the traditional expectations for the sexes in American society. These challenges are: the labor force participation of women, higher education for women, feminism, and male homosexuality. We shall find, in all cases, widespread opposition to the recognized threat to sex-role expectations. Furthermore, in the case of the first three, we shall see that adjustment to this opposition has taken place so effectively as to substantially neutralize these sources of change in sex-role expectations. In the case of the last example, the deviancy is regarded as an aberration (a pathology) for which diverse causes and cures are sought. There is systematic refusal to recognize that intra-sex variability in temperament, personality traits, and physical and mental capability may, in actuality, be fully as important as inter-sex variation, if one but excludes the difference in reproductive capacity.

The Working Woman and the Primacy of Parenthood for Both Sexes

Nothing better illustrates the absence of genuine options to parental roles in our society than the nature of the opposition to having women work outside the home. The most salient and enduring objections to a genuine career role for women—a commitment to outside work—have been two: First, no women—even unmarried women—should be allowed to challenge men's prior claim on jobs since men must support families; and second, outside work is physically and mentally unsuited to women since their natural fulfillment lies in another sphere entirely—motherhood. In effect, the opposition to work commitment by women has reaffirmed both the male's role as father and family supporter and the female's role as mother and housewife. Smuts documents legal and public concern along these lines since the 1870's.¹⁰ Although, as he shows, the emphasis on

the physical inappropriateness of outside work for women has disappeared, the "psychological" and temperamental uniqueness of women is still emphasized strongly. Hence, jobs are sex-typed; women are "protected" by legislation; and both hiring and firing take advantage of the typical woman's marginal commitment to full-time, long-term employment. Through an analysis of articles on women's labor force participation in major American popular magazines since 1900, Betty Stirling has shown that the dual considerations of concern for protecting the man's family-supporting job and concern for protecting the woman's motherhood role have characterized opposition to female employment outside the home from the beginning.¹¹ Public opinion polls have demonstrated the same anxieties.¹² Religious opposition to women working has been particularly vocal in the Catholic press and marriage manuals—specifically on the bases of threats to the supporting role of men and the motherhood role of women.¹³

In effect, although economic opportunities might have led us to expect the emergence of a career role for a numerically important group of unmarried and married-but-childless women, in actual fact the immense increase in labor force participation by women took a different tack entirely. Women's labor in the market has been utilized and tolerated only on condition that it supported and enhanced the traditional parental roles for both sexes. In the words of the National Manpower Council:

... Americans view the man in the family as the primary breadwinner and, when jobs are scarce, are inclined to believe that women workers should not compete with men who have families to support. Americans also believe that mothers should personally care for their children during their early formative years. Consequently, even though there are today over 2.5 million mothers in the labor force whose children are under six, there is still little sympathy with the idea of mothers holding full-time jobs when their children are of pre-school age, unless they are compelled to do so by economic necessity...¹⁴

The difficulties women experienced who wished to challenge the identity of sexual and parental roles have not stemmed simply from "male dominance" or "male power," but rather from the intense societal supports for the family roles of mother and father. The opposition to women working thus stemmed fully as much from the obligatory nature of family formation (and the sex differentiation of parents), as from a fear of the diminution of male authority generally. We shall see,

moreover, in a later section, that, after World War II, when women's educational and economic opportunities could, objectively, have provided some challenge to the primacy of the parental role, the unmarried and married-but-childless women came under attack from "scientific" sources. In the face of declining religious influence, a breakdown of Victorian "traditions," and expanding career opportunities for women, "science" stepped in, in the guise of psychoanalysis, to provide an authoritative prescription of parenthood and severe condemnation of the career woman. Not surprisingly, few unmarried or childless females were available to redefine the role of the working woman along career lines. Women's labor force participation evolved as an adjunct, not an alternative, to motherhood.¹⁵ The peculiar character of this participation—low wages, dead-end jobs, and sex-typing—tends, moreover, to be self-perpetuating. Each generation of girls views the market and finds few realistic career options therein. The primacy of men's and women's family roles has successfully absorbed what might have been a genuine alternative to reproduction for a number of women. As Smuts says:

... the woman who urgently wants to develop and utilize her abilities in work still has barriers to overcome. Employers tend to judge all working women on the basis of their experience with the majority who are content with modest rewards for modest efforts...¹⁶

Higher Education for Women: The Mother's Helper

Theoretically, the provision of higher education to women constituted a major challenge to the primacy of motherhood as the sex role for American females. Far more than the franchise, higher education seemed to imply that women should be given career avenues equal in all respects to the channels afforded to men. In this sense, it cast into doubt the norm that motherhood is the primary role for all but the unhappy few.

The initial efforts in the United States to provide higher education for women were met with much explicit verbalization concerning the possible undermining of the wife-mother role—the only proper feminine role. This history is well-known and need not concern us here.¹⁷ More important is the mounting evidence that genuine educational opportunities for women have been subtly infused by an implicit (occasionally even explicit) premise—the unchallenged assumption that the wife-mother role is a precondition for all other roles women might wish to play. As Mabel Newcomer has said:

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The fact that homemaking is woman's most important role has never been seriously questioned either by those arguing in favor of college education for women or by those opposing it. Those opposing higher education for women have usually expressed the fear that it will encourage them to pursue independent careers, foregoing marriage; or if they marry, that it will make them dissatisfied with the homemaker's lot. Those promoting higher education have, on the contrary, insisted that college women make better wives and mothers than their less educated sisters. Even those who have been concerned with the rights and interests of unmarried women have never argued that higher education might encourage women to remain single, except as it occasionally offered a reasonably satisfactory alternative when the only available young men were not entirely acceptable.¹⁸

Indeed, the women's colleges—in the vanguard of higher education for women—learned early to stress that their effect on diverting their charges from the path of wifehood and motherhood would be nonexistent. Defensively, they assured their trustees, their backers, the prospective parents of their tuition-paying student bodies that higher education for women would leave unchallenged woman's role and women's expectations.¹⁹

The stated "aims" of the colleges, as reviewed by Newcomer in the late 1950's, were sufficiently vague concerning the purposes for which young girls were attending as to leave unthreatened either the classical feminine role definition, or the intellectual fantasies of the students.²⁰ Clearly, the educators of young women had learned the hard way that the uncomfortable resolution between the promise of "equality"—even for some—and the reality of motherhood for all was best left to each individual girl to resolve as best she could. The college was not to be the champion of the "odd-ball" girl.

The most obvious deviant among the college presidents and promoters of women's education was Lynn White, Jr. (then President of Mills College), who attempted to clarify and make explicit the hidden agenda behind women's education in America. Almost all women do marry, few women pursue systematic careers, and even these careers are typically "feminine" rather than masculine. Why not face it? Why not educate our daughters in the light of definitively sex-linked capabilities and the appropriate social roles that express these capabilities?²¹ So eager was White to clinch his point, that he fell into the familiar position adopted by some

of the feminists—the moral superiority of the traditional female virtues over the crasser male qualities. Thus, if women were constitutionally debarred from the more highly regarded cultural pursuits, they should not feel badly. These pursuits have been overrated anyway.²² White thus invoked the position that helped legitimate the downfall of feminism—women's battles were to be on higher ground as befits their universally more civilized, sensitive, and gentle natures. Of similar sentiments expressed by the feminists, O'Neill has written: "Definitions like this left men with few virtues anyone was bound to admire, and inspired women to think of themselves as a kind of super race condemned by historical accident and otiose convention to serve their natural inferiors."²³ In keeping with his effort to legitimate separate and unequal education for women, White celebrated motherhood as women's noblest pursuit.²⁴ He even deplored the anti-family bias that, he alleged, was being transmitted to men by the "celibate tradition" in higher education. For men as well as women, the family should come first; "... unless men as well as women can be given the conviction that personal cultivation and career are secondary to making a success of the family, and indeed that both are bleak satisfactions apart from a warm hearth, we shall not have found wisdom."²⁵ In a significant chapter that constitutes a paean to motherhood, he claimed that the American population was not replacing itself, that "the best" people were particularly remiss in their reproductive obligation, and that it was the duty of high-minded American women to devote themselves to maternity.²⁶ Repeatedly he emphasized the hopelessness of combining a genuine career with a family of sufficient size, and enjoined college women not to be inhibited by a college education from "flinging themselves with complete enthusiasm and abandon" into family life.²⁷

Is the aim-inhibition that has suffused higher education for women—its absorption into the anticipated motherhood role—merely an intellectual preoccupation of the educators, or have young college women themselves received the message that their college experience must be adapted to their future role as mothers? Two studies of American college girls, one done by Komarovsky in the 1940's, and another done by Goldsen and others in the 1950's, show clearly that the pressures on women to remain undiverted from motherhood followed them into college.

Komarovsky, writing in 1953, expressed the concern of the educator over holding out to women impossible and contradictory goals.

... The very education which is to make the college housewife a cultural leaven of her family and her community may develop in her

interests which are frustrated by other phases of housewifery. We are urged to train women for positions of leadership in civic affairs when, at the same time, we define capacity for decisive action, executive ability, hardihood in the face of opposition as "unfeminine" traits. We want our daughters to be able, if the need arises, to earn a living at some worth-while occupation. In doing so, we run the risk of awakening interests and abilities which, again, run counter to the present definition of femininity.²⁸

Her case studies of women students seemed to indicate to her that these young women were presented with "equally compelling" but "contradictory" pressures. Actually, the data seem to trace a temporal change in parental and peer pressure concerning academic and occupational achievement and the traditional female role. Parents and peers encouraged achievement until it seemed to stand in the way of marriage and motherhood. Then, for the girl who had not already received "the message" by means of less obvious cues, sanctions came into play. She was effectively told that she should not allow academic or professional achievement "to get in her way." For example:

All through grammar school and high school my parents led me to feel that to do well in school was my chief responsibility. A good report card, an election to student office, these were the news Mother bragged about in telephone conversations with her friends. *But recently they suddenly got worried about me: I don't pay enough attention to social life, a woman needs some education but not that much.* They are disturbed by my determination to go to the School of Social Work. Why my ambitions should surprise them after they have exposed me for four years to some of the most inspired and stimulating social scientists in the country, I can't imagine. They have some mighty strong arguments on their side. What is the use, they say, of investing years in training for a profession, only to drop it in a few years? Chances of meeting men are slim in this profession. Besides, I may become so preoccupied with it as to sacrifice social life. The next few years are, after all, the proper time to find a mate. But the urge to apply what I have learned, and the challenge of this profession is so strong that I shall go on despite the family opposition. I . . . work for a big metropolitan daily as a correspondent in the city room. I am well liked there and may possibly stay as a reporter after

graduation in February. I have had several spreads (stories running to more than eight or ten inches of space), and this is considered pretty good for a college correspondent. Naturally, I was elated and pleased at such breaks, and as far as the city room is concerned I'm off to a very good start on a career that is hard for a man to achieve and even harder for a woman. General reporting is still a man's work in the opinion of most people. *I have a lot of acclaim but also criticism, and I find it difficult to be praised for being clever and working hard and then, when my efforts promise to be successful, to be condemned and criticized for being unfeminine and ambitious.* [Emphasis mine.]²⁹

The 1952 study of both male and female Cornell students by Goldsen *et al.* shows that the co-eds had almost universally accepted motherhood as a precondition for any other activity.

A traditional middle-class idea that a woman's only career should be her family is rejected by almost all the students. Instead, they are neither unequivocally for nor unequivocally against the idea of women having careers. The attitude seems to be, "It's okay providing. . . ." Providing she is not married, or providing she has no children, or providing her children are "old enough"—a notion about which there is a wide range of opinion. Let the women have careers, indeed encourage them, but be sure it does not interfere with her main job of bearing and rearing children.³⁰

Interestingly, the young women in the Cornell study had adjusted their ideas of the proper jobs for women to the demands of their motherhood role. Unlike the new feminists of the 1960's and 1970's, these women assumed that their labor market activity would not be equal in demands or prestige with that of men.

. . . Our data indicate that just about every college girl wants to marry and have children, and that she fully expects to do so. . . . Most of them see no essential conflict between family life and a career—the sort of career, that is, that they consider "suitable" for a woman. . . . The occupations women choose to go into are quite different from those chosen by men. They overwhelmingly select the traditional "women's occupations."³¹

Why did they want to work at all? One reason was to keep occupied before marriage. Another was insurance—against the remote possibility of remaining single, and against adversity in their marriage. More

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significant, however, was ambivalence about the suitability of homemaking and motherhood to their interests and temperaments. A striking feature of these data is that these young women did not appear to be overwhelmingly attracted to maternity, they simply did not see any alternative role as realistic.

There is no question that college girls count on building up equity in family life, not in professional work. A dedicated career-girl is a deviant: in a real sense she is unwilling to conform to her sex-role as American society defines it. For professional work among women in this country (and the college-trained women agree) is viewed as an interlude, at best a part-time excursion away from full-time family life which the coeds yearn for, impatiently look forward to . . . and define as largely monotony, tedium, and routine.³²

The intention to work, the vision of personal realization through the use of the talents and capabilities they had come, through their college training, to know they possessed, represented the psychological life-preserver they promised themselves to keep at hand.³³

By what mechanisms was the "career-girl" role rendered so deviant? One mechanism was clearly the girls' perception of what men wanted in a woman. The Cornell study found, for example, that, other than the condition that an ideal mate love her spouse, two-thirds of all college men in the sample cited "interested in having a family" as highly important in a mate.³⁴ To the young college woman, a way of life as deviant as a genuine and demanding career represented a journey toward an unknown, inappropriate, and potentially tragic destination. She might never meet any man who was interested in such a freak. Half of the Cornell men were quite clear in stating that they either did not approve of women having careers, or approved only if the woman was unmarried or, if married, had no children. Only 22 percent of the men approved of a woman having a career regardless of the age of her children, and most of the remainder approved only if the children were of high school age or older.³⁵ Finally, the young women's sense of constraint concerning premarital sexual relations made an indefinite postponement of marriage appear lonely and sexless. Even among girls who were interested in careers, sexual relationships were defined only in romantic, emotional terms; and, close to 40 percent felt that premarital sex relations were "never justified" for women. Among young women who ranked low on careerism, half felt that premarital relations were "never justified."³⁶

Has it all changed by 1971? Obviously, there have been many external changes. The development of

contraception—especially the Pill—has greatly altered the conditions under which young college men and women may consider nonmarital relationships. Public policy is increasingly concerned with equal educational and occupational opportunity for women, and the country has been literally deluged by anti-natalist and neo-feminist propaganda. How have college women reacted? And what reactions must they cope with in college men? Is there yet a perceived alternative to marriage and a family, or simply a scaling down of family size desires? In an attempt to clarify this and other issues, I inserted a set of questions on family size preferences, preferred age at marriage, nonmarriage, and attitudes toward the Pill and abortion in a special youth study conducted by the Gallup Poll in June 1971. The study included two samples of young people aged 18 to 24—one a college sample and one a representative national sample of persons in this age group. Table 1 presents some relevant data for the college sample.

Table 1.—Family-Size Preferences and Attitudes Toward Age at Marriage and Nonmarriage Among a National Sample of White American College Students, June 1971 (Percent)

	Men	Women
How many children would you like to have?		
No children	7	9
One child	3	4
Two children	56	49
Three children or more	33	38
Total	100	100
(N)	(548)	(348)
According to your personal tastes and preferences, what size family do you think is too small—a husband, wife, and how many children?		
No children	36	31
One child	53	58
Two children	7	6
Three children or more	4	5
Total	100	100
(N)	(529)	(331)
And what size family do you think is too large—a husband, wife, and how many children?		
One child	1	0
Two children	1	1
Three children	19	16
Four children	25	21

Table 1.—Continued

	Men	Women
Five children	25	23
Six children	11	15
Seven children or more	17	25
Total	100	100
(N)	(548)	(350)
What do you think is the best age for a girl to marry?		
Under 18 years	1	0
18-19 years	5	2
20 years	14	12
21 years	21	16
22 years	23	20
23-25 years	31	44
Over 25 years	5	6
Total	100	100
(N)	(529)	(343)
What do you think is the best age for a man to marry?		
Under 21 years	5	3
21-22 years	22	20
23-24 years	26	26
25 years	24	27
26-30 years	21	24
Over 30 years	2	1
Total	100	100
(N)	(533)	(344)
Do you think a woman can have a happy life even if she never marries?		
Yes	81	82
No	16	15
DK	3	3
Total	100	100
(N)	(562)	(355)
What about a man—do you think he can have a happy life if he never marries?		
Yes	87	84
No	12	13
DK	1	3
Total	100	100
(N)	(562)	(355)
Total respondents	(562)	(355)

Note: The differences between N's shown under the various questions and the total number of respondents (562 males and 355 females) constitute the NA/DK category in each case.

The results indicate clearly that few men or women in this college sample would like to be childless, or have

only one child. More than half of the men, and approximately half of the women would like to have a two-child family. A third of the men and almost 40 percent of the women want three or more children. Although these results show that family-size preferences are smaller than those expressed in the 1950's and 1960's, the desire for at least two children is clear and apparently firm.³⁷ A question on the family size considered "too small" demonstrates that an acceptable family size begins with two children. On the other hand, there seems to be no clear proscription against even a relatively large family. A question concerning the size family the respondent would consider "too large" shows that three children are tolerated by all but a minority of respondents—20 percent. Even at the level of five children, 27 percent of the men and 40 percent of the women have not yet designated the family as "too large."

Turning to age at marriage we see that, according to both men and women, women should definitely be married by age 25. Men believe that women should marry earlier than do women themselves, but there is consensus that age 25 is the upper limit. Although the best age at marriage for men is clearly older than for women, there is remarkable consensus between men and women concerning what this age should be—not before age 21, not after age 30, and preferably between ages 21 and 25. However, although marrying and having a family are clearly the norm, the college men and women in this sample do not deny that either a man or a woman can have a happy life in the unmarried state. There is a clear recognition that at least some people can do this. Unfortunately, we do not know, from this single question, whether respondents believe the "average" or "normal" person can be happy unmarried, or whether they believe only an unusual person can so exist.

These results may seem surprising in today's context. Has neo-feminism had no effect? Why is there no clear break with the family role altogether among a substantial number of the college elite?³⁸ In order to understand their position, one must realize that no call has come to make such a break, no models have been presented, no champion of a genuinely alternative role has appeared. "Women's liberation," like higher education for women and women's labor force activity, has absorbed, in its turn, the norm that the American woman's adult role includes motherhood. To have done otherwise would have been to sacrifice its principal constituency, as we shall see. It, like higher education for women and jobs for women, has accommodated itself to maternity and even become its militant champion. Motherhood is, after all, one of "women's rights."

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Feminism and the "Do Both" Syndrome

It is often assumed that the present-day "women's liberation" movement is essentially anti-natalist in ideology and that its effects will be anti-natalist as well. Actually, however, the main thrust of the movement's stand is supportive of motherhood for all; what is decried is the relative disadvantage that women experience because of childbearing and rearing. In effect, women's liberation is concerned with lowering the exclusionary barriers for women in the labor force, opening up educational channels, elevating women's awareness of subtle forms of discrimination against them in the outside world, and supporting women's right to have families as well. Rather than concerning itself with the atypical spinster or childless woman, the movement has gained popularity through its recognition of the problems of women who have already made a choice to be mothers and who then are dissatisfied with their impaired occupational chances, or who find motherhood less than they expected it to be and wish to switch gears. Betty Friedan's book, *The Feminine Mystique*, was addressed primarily to this group of women—those suffering from "the problem that has no name." However, although the movement has pitched its appeal to women who have already made their reproductive choices and urged them to seek out an alternative identity as well, its general philosophy for all women is one of combining marriage and motherhood, on the one hand, with a nonfamilial role, on the other. Indeed, it is this militant statement that women should not have to make a choice that gives the movement wide appeal. For example, Friedan says:

When enough women make life plans geared to their real abilities, and speak out for maternity leaves or even maternity sabbaticals, professionally run nurseries, and other changes in the rules that may be necessary, they will not have to sacrifice the right to honorable competition and contribution *any more than they will have to sacrifice marriage and motherhood.* [Emphasis mine].³⁹

The movement sees the major injustice toward women as inherent in the expenditure of time and effort on child rearing, together with the loss of seniority and skills in the labor market due to interrupted career patterns. This philosophy is embodied in the Statement of Purpose of the National Organization for Women.

The modern liberationist position, which requires that women generally be enabled to forego choice in their dominant career roles and shift child rearing onto outside agencies, has been elaborated by a number of sociologists.

Writing in 1964, Alice Rossi claims that:

... There is no sex equality until women participate on an equal basis with men in politics, occupations, and the family. . . . In politics and the occupational world, to be able to participate depends primarily on whether home responsibilities can be managed simultaneously with work or political commitments. Since women have had, and probably will continue to have, primary responsibility for child-rearing, their participation in politics, professions or the arts cannot be equal to that of men unless ways are devised to ease the combination of home and work responsibilities.⁴⁰

Rossi goes on to outline the need for mother-substitutes, child-care centers, less sexual demarcation in personal traits, and a less demanding definition of the mother's role in socialization. However, she accepts the parental roles for both sexes. Rather than recognizing that men and women may be variably suited to parenthood, she assumes that all are suited and all could be androgynous. Thus, they could reconcile the demands of child care and the desire of the woman to excel outside the home by having both parents play the "inside" and "outside" roles.⁴¹

Epstein sees the primacy of motherhood obligations for women as the principal barrier to occupational commitment and success. Yet, like Rossi, she does not question the basic premise of the universal desirability of motherhood. As she notes, being single or childless is being a "nonconformist." Thus, the basic inequality lies in the fact that although women are normatively held to child care and the home, men can ignore their families with impunity. She says:

The man who spends too much time with his family is considered something of a loafer. . . . In extreme cases of neglect, wives may be permitted to complain, but clearly the absorption of the man in his work is not considered intolerable. Professors who prefer their work to their wives or children are usually "understood" and forgiven. A similar absorption in work was reported by Stanley Talbot in *Time* magazine; he found that the business tycoon (not surprisingly) clearly preferred his work to his family. There is no comparable "lady tycoon" with a husband and children to neglect; and the lady professional who gives an indication of being more absorbed in work than in her husband and family is neither understood nor forgiven. The woman, unlike the man, cannot spend "too much time" with her family;

her role demands as mother and wife are such that they intrude on all other activities. She remains on call during any time spent away from the family and, if she works, many of her family tasks must be fitted into what usually would be working time.⁴²

We thus see that, far from questioning the basic premise that all women should be mothers, or for that matter that all men should be fathers, the women's liberation movement accepts the goal of reproduction for all as a basic "good." Childlessness is regarded as an inherent deprivation for all, rather than a socially induced deprivation for some (perhaps even many). Women who cannot share equally with men in ignoring and neglecting their children are "disadvantaged." Unquestioned is the notion of why persons of either sex who have such a marginal commitment to child rearing should be pressed into having children. If a man wishes to spend virtually his entire time on occupational achievement, travel, and golf, why should the parental status be socially supported as obligatory, or his way of life condemned as self-centered and hedonistic? At present, he has to buy his way out of censure by having a family as "window-dressing" even though he may not change his way of life as a result.⁴³ Similarly, if a woman wishes to enjoy an externally oriented way of life, it is intensely pronatalist to specify that nominal parenthood—shored up by maids, nurseries, and child-care centers—be required as a badge of respectability, normality, or conformity.

The women's liberation movement thus parts company with anti-natalism by failing to recognize that it is not in society's interest to encourage the emergence of families in which neither parent is committed to parenthood. Rather, a genuine anti-natalist policy would be aimed at the indiscriminate nature of the family-building vortex that now exists. At present, marriage and parenthood are almost ascribed statuses. They are not really chosen; they happen to people, as the Burgess and Wallin quotation cited earlier states admirably. Moreover, the state takes an essentially frivolous attitude toward the contracting of the marital obligation, far more carefree than the attitude it takes toward business contracts. This point is well made by Robert Kingsley in an article on the grounds for granting annulments in the United States:

A few courts have said that the issue was whether or not the party was mentally capable of entering into an ordinary commercial contract; but the later cases have held that there is no necessary connection between the capacity to make commercial contracts and the capacity to become married. The test today is usually

put as requiring the mental ability to "understand the nature of the marriage relation and the duties and obligations involved therein." So put, it is clear that the capacity to enter into business relations has no bearing on the capacity to marry. . . . For the numerically considerable group of mentally weak persons, whose estates are controlled by guardians but who are permitted to go at large in the community, a legal prohibition on marriage would simply result in fornication, temporary liaisons, and similar socially undesirable practices. Consequently, the law wisely has permitted such persons to marry if it appeared that, concerning that particular kind of relationship, they had a reasonably intelligent attitude.⁴⁴

Clearly, the state has, as a matter of public policy, viewed marriage not as the licensing of parental responsibility, but as a sop to Mrs. Grundy. Yet, the modern interest of the state concerning a marriage lies in the quality of the children produced, not in the prevention of premarital fornication. Nonetheless, the law of marriage is still geared to a time when it was important to use sex as a means of enticing people into marriage and childbearing. In this regard, we may suggest that a significant control over reproductive motivation in the future could be the further development of the legal personality of the child, and a diminution of his being treated, at law, as the property of his parents. The "rights" of parents to "choose" parenthood and the number of offspring they will have could be tempered by the rights of children to certain legal guarantees from their parents.⁴⁵ If fathers have already been "liberated" from many parental obligations, and mothers are on the way to "liberation," then obviously the rights and welfare of children must come under far more detailed legal and social scrutiny.

It is of some interest that the origins of the acceptance of (even insistence on) universal motherhood were clearly visible in the suffragette movement. As O'Neill points out:

. . . Having already taken the economic context of American life as essentially given, feminists went on to do the same thing for the marital and domestic system, accepting, for the most part, Victorian marriage as a desirable necessity. In so doing they assured the success of woman's suffrage while guaranteeing that when women did get the vote and enter the labor market in large numbers, the results would be bitterly disappointing.

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against stifling domesticity. . . . by the end of the century most feminists had succumbed to what Charlotte Perkins Gilman called the "domestic mythology." . . . The original feminists had demanded freedom in the name of humanity; the second generation asked for it in the name of maternity. What bound women into selfless sisterhood, it was now maintained, was their reproductive capacity.

. . . So the effort to escape domesticity was accompanied by an invocation of the domestic ideal—woman's freedom road circled back to the home from which feminism was supposed to liberate her. In this manner feminism was made respectable by accommodating it to the Victorian ethos which had originally forced it into being.⁴⁶

Charlotte Perkins Gilman, however, recognized the logical problems inherent in the motherhood emphasis and presaged the feminist movement of the 1960's and 1970's by a formula that is now familiar to us: Women, generically, should both have families and take an equal place with men in the nonfamilial world. In order to enable them to do this, the society must provide mechanisms to relieve them of their homemaking burdens.⁴⁷

The assumption was made then, as it is now, that men—most or all men—find self-expression and fulfillment in the labor market, and that parenthood (and the economic obligations it involves) essentially leaves men's, but not women's, life chances untouched. Since the movement is a special pleading device, it cannot be expected to recognize that those differential social and economic advantages that men experience as patriarchs have constituted an incentive for them to undertake the economic obligations of domesticity and parenthood. In many cases, men's chances for social and personal mobility, for education, or for promotion may be impaired by parenthood, although these personal losses may be concealed or dulled by the satisfactions of conforming and the lesser social approval attached to bachelors and the childless. As with women, so with men, the society has many mechanisms for obscuring the costs of parenthood. The fact that men's story of frustration and despair has found expression in a context different from women's—that of liberation from external economic exploitation—should not obscure the relevance of this story for our concern with pronatalist coercions. The dominant, powerful male of the feminist, women's liberation script, the male in whose interest and for whose pleasure the society appears to exist, is clearly not the same character who appears in the Marxist-New Leftist script. In the latter, modern man is enslaved by a

"system," forced to labor at meaningless tasks from which he is totally alienated, an "un-person," a "nothing." As Marcuse has said:

Men do not live their own lives, but perform pre-established functions. While they work, they do not fulfill their own needs and faculties but work in *alienation*. Work has now become *general*, and so have the restrictions placed upon the libido: labor time, which is the largest part of the individual's life time, is painful time, for alienated labor is absence of gratification, negation of the pleasure principle. Libido is diverted for socially useful performances in which the individual works for himself only insofar as he works for the apparatus, engaged in activities that mostly do not coincide with his own faculties and desires.⁴⁸

Although neither the feminist nor the New Left movements can be taken as unbiased observers of the social scene, the quotation from Marcuse cautions us not to forget that men undergo both direct and opportunity costs in meeting their economic obligations to their families. It is possible, indeed probable, that many men would choose a different way of life were it both honored and accessible.

Taboo on Homosexuality: A Reinforcement of the Family's Sexual Monopoly

Given the polarization of male and female sex roles in terms of a division of labor that is congruent with parenthood, it is hardly surprising that American society should taboo homosexuality. Although this taboo is doubtless supported by the Judeo-Christian tradition of emphasizing the procreative, as against the purely hedonistic, aspects of sexual intercourse, the religious values do not explain the homosexual taboo but rather covary with it. Both the Judeo-Christian doctrines and the taboo on homosexual relations are part of a pronatalist normative structure that we have inherited.⁴⁹

The function of the homosexual taboo as a support for the normative identity of sex roles with parental roles has been stated explicitly by Parsons:

. . . the prohibition of homosexuality has the function of reinforcing the differentiation of sex roles, the earliest and hence in one sense most fundamental *qualitative* differentiation of role and personality. Put a little differently, seen structurally the taboo on homosexuality is the obverse of the intra-familial incest taboo, in that it protects the monopoly by the parties to the marriage relationship over erotic gratifications within the family. From the societal point

of view it serves to prevent competing personal solidarities from arising which could undermine the motivation to marriage and the establishment of families. In the case of individual psychology it reinforces sex-role identification very strongly. The relation of any erotically bound pair must be to some important degree analogous with the marriage relationship, given the immense importance of the latter in the social structure and in the socialization process. Then at least implicitly the question must always arise, which partner plays which role? This means, if it is a homosexual relationship, that one of the partners must be radically denying his sex role, while the other does so less drastically by admitting erotic attraction to the same rather than the opposite sex. Put very generally, homosexuality is a mode of structuring of human relationships which is radically in conflict with the place of the nuclear family in the social structure and in the socialization of the child. Its nearly universal prohibition is a direct consequence of the "geometry" of family structure.⁵⁰

The same point is made by Kingsley Davis:⁵¹

Homosexual intercourse is obviously incompatible with the family and the sexual bargaining system. The norms and attitudes required to support these institutions as a means of getting the business of reproduction and sexual allocation accomplished tend to downgrade homosexuality. . . . Homosexual devotion . . . directly competes with male-female relationships; it may even mimic heterosexual love, as when the pair pretend to be "married," set up "housekeeping" together, demand mutual fidelity, and distinguish between the dominant (masculine) and the subordinate (feminine) mate.

Thus, by placing a whole class of possible sexual partners beyond the pale, the taboo on homosexuality has the same social effect as the constraint on premarital intercourse, or the pariah status of prostitution. It helps to channel sexual motivation and activity into the narrow range of legitimated marital-parental roles. What is condemned in the cases of deviance from sexual norms is not a specific item of behavior, or even a specific motive, but rather that the behavior and/or the motive are antithetical to the primacy of the family as a goal and the subordination of sexual bargaining to the family's interest. Speaking of the condemnation of the prostitute, Kingsley Davis has said:⁵²

Her willingness to sell her favors and her feeling of *emotional indifference* are also condemned, but . . . a wife who submits dutifully but reluctantly to intercourse is often considered virtuous for that reason, although she is expected to cherish her husband in a spiritual sense. The trading of sexual favors for a consideration is what is done in marriage, for in consenting to get married a woman exchanges her sexual favors for economic support. As long as the bargain struck is one that achieves a stable relationship, especially a marriage, the mores offer praise rather than condemnation for the trade. The prostitute's affront is that she trades promiscuously.

In spite of the taboo, the homosexual alternative is seized upon by a sizable proportion of men in the United States (and elsewhere).⁵³ The pervasive public concern about increased "conversion," should the legal bans on homosexual acts be lifted, is doubtless not unrealistic.⁵⁴ Like prostitution, homosexual relationships are very convenient. They do not require that a man either make long-term commitments, or engage in complex and expensive courting merely to achieve sexual satisfaction. Male homosexuality, as Cory points out, takes place between two individuals who are, physiologically and by social expectation, promiscuous. The inhibiting and restraining influence that women are expected and constrained to exert, and in fact do exert in the high proportion of cases where they are attempting to utilize the man's sexual interest for precipitating a marriage, does not exist. As Cory says:

The key to the puzzle and problem of homosexual promiscuity is therefore quite simple: the promiscuous (heterosexual) male meets the discriminating (heterosexual) female. She acts as the restraining factor. He cannot indulge indiscriminately without her, but she will not permit him to do so with her. But, the promiscuous (homosexual) male meets the promiscuous (homosexual) male, and the restraints are entirely removed. . . .⁵⁵

However, it is important that homosexuality differs from prostitution in not axiomatically involving inequality of social status between partners. Two homosexuals may be of the same socioeconomic class and, although both would be under a cloud if their proclivities were made public, it is not true that one is a pariah and the other a respected citizen, as is the case with the prostitute and her client. Hence, homosexual relations are not, by definition, ephemeral, promiscuous, or segmental.⁵⁶

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Since homosexuality offers a range of alternatives, from the casual to the mimicking of stable marriage, it is far more threatening to the traditional definition of sex roles in terms of marriage and parenthood than are other sexual transgressions. Understandably, societies requiring relatively high and stable fertility have exercised strong coercion against homosexuality. As we shall see in the next section, the challenge that *de facto* homosexuality presents to traditional sex role expectations has been met in modern American society by relegating the homosexual to the realm of pathology. His way of life does not represent an alternative but rather an illness.

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE LAW: THE REAFFIRMATION AND LEGITIMATION OF PRONATALIST SEX ROLES

Implicit in our description of how challenges to traditional sex roles have been neutralized is the existence of powerful sources of legitimation for the identity of masculinity and femininity with parental functions. Meeting the challenges required reaffirmation and revalidation of the norm. However, the traditional legitimations would not do for moderns who had rejected a fundamentalist interpretation of Genesis, on the one hand, and a blind faith in natural law, on the other. What did it mean when women were working under the same conditions as men, competing with men in universities, demanding the right to vote? What did the psychiatric cases in World War I, the ineffective soldiers of World War II, the increasingly obvious manifestation of "effeminacy" in men portend? Where were we going? Where was there a model of a society—a successful, functioning society (not, like Rome, on the road to ruin)—in which the obligations and rights of the sexes were in such a muddle? Were there other principles of organization more suited to modern life? If so, what were they?

To such questions no novel answers were forthcoming. Yet people had to make decisions, to act, to see themselves and their children as living in and moving toward some way of life that was predictable and socially validated. The answers they found reconnected them with the past. These answers came primarily from the social sciences—from psychology, sociology, and anthropology. They came directly, through the popularization of social science, and, indirectly, through the educational system, social welfare, the ministry, clinical medicine and psychology, and the courts. With few exceptions, the social sciences served to reaffirm the validity of identifying sex roles with parental functions. In the case of psychoanalysis, this legitimation involved an elaborate biologicistic psychology. With regard to sociology and anthropology, the legitimation came

about not because the research itself was necessarily biased or contaminated, but because the questions that were asked virtually assumed the consequence. Rather than regarding the identity of sex role with parental role as an object for research, sociology and anthropology have, by and large, taken this identity as given. The research questions that have been raised related (1) to possible differences in sex role definitions, given the assumption of almost universal parenthood, and (2) to an investigation of child rearing by means alternative to the nuclear family. There has been a notable lack of interest in, even recognition of, sex roles apart from the family and kinship. With tradition seemingly validated by scientific expertise, it is hardly surprising that legal reaffirmations of the identity of sexual and parental roles should seem legitimate as well. Let us look at the record.

Psychoanalysis and Prescriptive Parenthood

One of the strongest sources of legitimation for parenthood as the only "normal" adult sexual role comes from psychoanalytic psychology. Psychoanalysis views parenthood as the natural culmination of "normal" development to adulthood and insists that sex-role differentiation should be congruent with the basic psycho-biological substratum. The natural predispositions should not be thwarted or bypassed by inappropriate social demands, activities, or expectations. Indeed, it is regarded as mandatory that the sex roles properly express what is believed to be the normal psycho-biological given. The only "normal" woman is heterosexual and a mother, the only "normal" man is heterosexual and a father.

Freud's writings on the diverse characters of the sexes, particularly his unabashed denigration of women under the guise of "scientific" description, have already been criticized in a voluminous literature.⁵⁷ Our concern here, however, is not with Freud's misogyny, but with the pronatalism which the psychoanalytic view of female psycho-biology has prescribed.

As is well known, in the Freudian scheme, the basic determination of female psychology is negative. Freud believed that women were highly motivated to compensate for the lack of a penis by having children. Indeed, in Freudian psychology, the only way for women to achieve a "normal" (that is, not cripplingly neurotic) existence is to accept their passive and denuded condition and seek their fulfillment in childbearing. Freudian psychology, from Freud to Deutsch to Erikson, is invariant in its insistence that the reproductive capacity must be actualized for the woman to approach mental health. Motherhood is what women do, and they should not be encouraged to embark on social roles that

conflict with the realization of their basic psychological needs.⁵⁸

One might, of course, argue that Freudian psychology has had little popular influence, that Freud's depiction of the "normal" feminine role (updated by Erikson and others) has exerted no moral pressure on women to pursue reproduction as a career and to eschew social roles that might label them as neurotic "masculine protesters." I believe, however, that the burden of such an argument rests with its proponent. Not only has Freudian psychology been popularly absorbed throughout the Western world, but its influence on mediating agencies of society—on schools, welfare agencies, the medical profession, and the arts and mass media, to say nothing of the social sciences—has been demonstrably profound.⁵⁹

In the words of Philip Rieff:

In America today, Freud's intellectual influence is greater than that of any other modern thinker. He presides over the mass media, the college classroom, the chatter at parties, the playgrounds of the middle classes where child-rearing is a prominent and somewhat anxious topic of conversation; he has bequeathed to many couples a new self-consciousness about their marriages and the temperature of their social enthusiasms.⁶⁰

Indeed, as will be readily apparent, the Freudian influence on the other social sciences has contributed what might be called "back-up" legitimation for the emphasis on motherhood as the primary lifetime role for women. For example, Parsons says:

... By and large a "good" marriage from the point of view of the personality of the participants, is likely to be one with children; the functions as parents reinforce the functions in relation to each other as spouses. . . . The most important part . . . is the contingency of sexual love on the assumption of fully adult responsibilities in roles other than that of marriage directly. Put very schematically, a mature woman can love, sexually, only a man who takes his full place in the masculine world, above all its occupational aspect, and who takes responsibility for a family; conversely, the mature man can only love a woman who is really an adult, a full wife to him and mother to his children. . . .⁶¹

The "experts" thus appear to agree. And, indeed, the more the dogma is paraphrased and embellished by sources at some remove from psychoanalysis, the more pervasively "right" it seems to be.

Perhaps the best evidence of the normative influ-

ence of psychoanalytic thinking concerning sex-role differentiation is the allegedly disastrous effect on child rearing if the parents do not adhere to traditional, polarized sex roles. In effect, a person who does not exemplify the Freudian sex role definitions will not only suffer himself but, if he has children, will warp their personalities as well. The following quotation exemplifies (1) the psychoanalytic belief in the overriding importance of the early years; (2) the emphasis on parents playing highly differentiated, traditional sex roles; and (3) the attribution to parental "failure" of diseases of unknown etiology, like schizophrenia (that is, the clear formulation of a terrible punishment for nonconformity):

The maintenance of the appropriate sexual roles by parents in their coalition plays a major role in guiding the child's development as a male or female. Security of sexual identity is a cardinal factor in the achievement of a stable ego identity. *Of all factors entering into the formation of personality characteristics, the sex of the child is the most decisive.* Confusions and dissatisfactions concerning sexual identity can contribute to the etiology of many neuroses and character defects as well as perversions. Probably all schizophrenic patients are seriously confused in this area. . . .

Clear-cut role reversals in parents can obviously distort the child's development, both when they are marked in the sexual sphere, as when the father or mother is an overt homosexual, or when they concern the task divisions in maintaining the family. A child whose father performs the mothering functions both tangibly and emotionally while the mother is preoccupied with her career can easily gain a distorted image of masculinity and femininity. . . . While the sharing of role tasks has become more necessary and acceptable in the contemporary family, there is still need for the parents to maintain and support one another in their primary sex roles. [Emphasis mine.]⁶²

Not only has psychoanalysis provided a "scientific" rationalization for prescriptive motherhood, it has attempted to consign to the realm of abnormality and mental illness any deviation from patriarchal masculinity for men. Thus, psychoanalysis views male homosexuality as axiomatically indicating mental illness. In Bieber's words:

All *psychoanalytic* theories assume that adult homosexuality is pathologic and assign differing weights to constitutional and experiential de-

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terminants. All agree that the experiential determinants are in the main rooted in childhood and are primarily related to the family.⁶³

Indeed, psychoanalytic studies of homosexuals, based invariably on those who have psychological problems serious enough to bring them to an analyst, turn up pathological syndromes.⁶⁴ Data such as these are used to question controlled studies of homosexuals and heterosexuals who are functioning adequately in the community without psychoanalytic help.⁶⁵

It may be noted that the psychoanalytic view of homosexuality, which equates deviation from a social norm with mental illness, is not shared by biologically oriented students of sexual behavior.⁶⁶ Both the Kinsey study and the Ford and Beach study present evidence indicating that human beings, like other animals, are normally capable of indiscriminate sexual responsiveness. In their view, the rejection of homosexuality is culturally conditioned rather than indicative of the only "normal" psychological development for the human male.⁶⁷

Finally, we must emphasize that the doctrine of the libidinal causes of neurosis, promulgated by psychoanalysis, has prescribed a sexually active way of life for all. Within this framework there is no place, except as a deviant, for the person of relatively low-keyed sexual interests. Thus, the social role of the unattached bachelor or spinster has been denigrated as psychologically abnormal.

In sum, in a century of massive social change (and accompanying personal uncertainty and anxiety), Freud reaffirmed for modern man the family roles of a people whose customs long antedated the Christian era. Freudianism, whether applied to women or to men, decreed that any deviation from the ideal of the tribal Jewish patriarch should be an object of clinical contempt. At best, psychoanalysis could guide human beings who did not measure up to the ideal from "hysterical misery" to "common unhappiness" as a way of life.

The Reproductive Function and Sex Role Differentiation in Sociology

Psychoanalysis has viewed traditional role differentiation by sex—differentiation in terms of wife-mother and husband-father roles—as a reflection of human psycho-biology in its "normal" form. By contrast, sociology has studied masculinity and femininity in cross-cultural perspective and has come to the conclusion that the relative invariance in sex-role definitions among human societies relates to the functionality of these definitions for the family—that is, for reproductive efficiency. This conclusion is, however, essentially very similar to that of psychoanalysis—there is not much

variability possible in the masculine and feminine roles. Why? Not because of a psycho-biological substratum but because of the need for role differentiation within the family (as within other small groups) along the lines of internally versus externally oriented activities and functions, "task-oriented" versus "emotionally supportive" behavior.⁶⁸ The internal, familiarly oriented role goes to women, because of their biological connection with childbearing and child rearing (particularly nursing and feeding); the external role goes to men pretty much *faute de mieux*.⁶⁹ It is frequently noted that efforts to vary this pattern of sex differentiation within the reproducing family have not, to date, proven very successful.⁷⁰ In the United States, Parsons now believes that American women no longer suffer from the "role conflict" he once postulated as resulting from the option to work outside the home. They have adjusted to the "functional demands" of their wife-mother role—adjusted better than he believed they would when he first started writing about American women.⁷¹ Recently, he has said:

It seems quite safe in general to say that the adult feminine role has not ceased to be anchored primarily in the internal affairs of the family, as wife, mother and manager of the household, while the role of the adult male is primarily anchored in the occupational world, in his job and through it by his status-giving and income-earning functions for the family. Even if, as seems possible, it should come about that the average married woman had some kind of job, it seems most unlikely that this relative balance would be upset; that either the roles would be reversed, or their qualitative differentiation in these respects completely erased.⁷²

In a footnote to the passage just quoted, Parsons makes the point that, even when women do attain "higher-level jobs," they typically mirror the "expressive" components of the "normal" female role.

The distribution of women in the labor force clearly confirms this general view of the balance of the sex roles. Thus, on higher levels typical feminine occupations are those of teacher, social worker, nurse, private secretary and entertainer. Such roles tend to have a prominent expressive component, and often to be "supportive" to masculine roles. Within the occupational organization they are analogous to the wife-mother role in the family. It is much less common to find women in the "top executive" roles and the more specialized and "impersonal" technical roles. Even within professions we find comparable differentiations,

e.g., in medicine women are heavily concentrated in the two branches of pediatrics and psychiatry, while there are few women surgeons.⁷³

Consequently, in interpreting the relevance of sociological thinking to possible changes in sex roles, we must be aware that such thinking is about men and women viewed as actual and potential parents. The sociological questions that have been asked about sex roles have never strayed far from the basic presupposition that most, or all, persons will and should form families of procreation. Indeed, modern sociology has typically assumed that no structured deviations from parentally defined sex roles can be tolerated (except perhaps in pariah form), since they detract from individual motivation to marry and have children.

Yet, this definition of sex roles is "functional" for the society only insofar as the number of children so produced is actually needed. If the society needs fewer children, far fewer, than will be forthcoming from sex-role differentiation on the basis of parenthood, then such differentiation, in its traditional form, is no longer functional. The logic of sociological analysis concerning sex roles may well be correct. However, the conclusions are based on a long-outdated demographic assumption—that the country's problem is to secure itself an abundance of children. If the same logic were applied to our current demographic needs, the conclusion would be that role differentiation by sex must be released from its total dependency on kinship, if the country is to achieve fertility low enough to match its highly favorable mortality.

The Legal Identification of Sex Roles With Parental Functions

In a recent review of sex discrimination and the law in the United States, Kanowitz traces the ways in which the law explicitly and implicitly considers issues of sex differentiation in terms of parental roles.⁷⁴ Although his study was undertaken to expose the "injustice" of sex-based legal discrimination and its presumed reinforcement of male dominance, Kanowitz acknowledges that it would be a mistake to assume that all (or even most) sex-based legal differentiation disadvantages women in the sense of restricting their rights or elaborating their obligations. On the contrary, such discrimination in many cases defines the obligations of men as husbands and fathers.⁷⁵ Indeed, what comes through most consistently in Kanowitz's presentation of American sex-discrimination laws and the philosophy behind them is not a dimension of social stratification, of "advantage" or "disadvantage" of one sex over the other, as much as an explicit legal affirmation of and

concern for the differential familial roles of the sexes, particularly their parental roles. The law sees men and women primarily in terms of the reproductive arrangement, and draws its conclusions accordingly. Given the assumption that the sex roles are incommensurable and complementary, the conclusions cannot be regarded as affording one sex an advantage. There is also the assumption that intra-sex variability in physique, temperament, or actual achievement of the ideal sex role in society is negligible. Hence, the application to all men and all women of a legal philosophy that assumes universal parenthood seems to be only logical.

However, from a demographic point of view, such a legal philosophy clearly represents a strong pronatalist coercion since the basic assumptions are applied to cases in which role alternatives might emerge were it not for the precedent of reaffirming the primacy of marital and parental roles. For example, Kanowitz notes that some of the language used by the United States Supreme Court in the famous case of *Muller v. Oregon* "was unnecessary to the decision."⁷⁶ As a result, this case has often been invoked by the courts in upholding a wide variety of sex-discrimination laws. Indeed, when one realizes that the case involved no more than a consideration of the validity of Oregon's law limiting women's hours of work to '10 per day, the language clearly indicates that the Supreme Court had a larger issue in mind—the issue of reaffirming and elaborating on the sexual division of labor implied by parenthood.

... The two sexes differ in structure of body, in the functions to be performed by each, in the amount of physical strength, in the capacity for long-continued labor, particularly when done standing, the influence of vigorous health upon the future well-being of the race, the self-reliance which enables one to assert full rights, and in the capacity to maintain the struggle for subsistence. *This difference justifies a difference in legislation*, and upholds that which is designed to compensate for some of the burdens which rest upon her. . . .⁷⁷

The success of the Supreme Court's effort at legitimation is measured by the fact that this language has affirmed the principle that "sex is a valid basis for classification." This principle, as Kanowitz says, "... is often repeated mechanically without regard to the purposes of the statute in question or the reasonableness of the relationship between the purpose and sex-based classification."⁷⁸ With forgivable sociological naivete, Kanowitz puzzles over and condemns the influence and immortality that this legitimation has achieved.

... The subsequent reliance in judicial decisions upon the *Muller* language is a classic example of

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the misuse of precedent, of later courts being mesmerized by what an earlier court had *said* rather than what it had *done*. For though *Muller* was concerned only with a protective labor statute which took account of the general physical differences between the sexes, it has been cited, as Murray and Eastwood point out, in cases "upholding the exclusion of women from juries, differential treatment in licensing various occupations and the exclusion of women from state supported colleges."⁷⁹

The language of Mr. Justice Brewer in *Muller v. Oregon* is so archaic that we may be moved to dismiss its substance as outmoded as well. We may believe that the operating norms of modern Americans do not prescribe either men's or women's roles in such polarized terms—protector and economic supporter of the family at one pole, mother and gentle housewife at the other. However, we have seen that potential challenges to the primacy of motherhood for all women have, so far, been neutralized by prescriptive reproductive norms. Even today, Brewer could be cited as an accurate observer of the "real" norms governing the modern woman—more correct than those who believe that higher education, labor force participation, and feminism have effected "basic changes."

THE IMPRINT OF SEX ROLES ON PERSONALITY

The magnitude of pronatalist coercions in human societies, ours included, is far from encompassed by the fact that sex roles are so closely identified with the division of labor according to parental functions. As an added precaution, human societies (and American society is no exception) have built the perpetuation of pronatalist sex roles into the structure of personality, through socialization "for" personality traits that are congruent with these sex roles, and "against" traits that could produce conflict with them. Such rigid sex-typing of personality traits doubtless explains, in part, why a change in sex role expectations is so difficult to effect. Intra-sex variability is, as we shall see, systematically suppressed by the socialization process which can, in the case of sex-typing, begin to take place from the moment of birth.

Research concerning socially prescribed, preferred, permitted, and proscribed personality traits for the sexes has not been extensive. However, since the explicit research of Komarovsky (on college populations) in the 1940's, it has continued systematically. Hence, we have a long-range body of data concerning the views of college students with regard to the normatively appropriate traits for men and women. Other data on socializa-

tion practices generally indicate that the norms expressed among college populations correspond to differential child-rearing practices for the sexes and that, if anything, college students are more permissive concerning a blurring of sex-typed personality traits than are less advantaged groups in the population.

Komarovsky's work on the inconsistent role expectations by parents for their daughters has already been discussed. We saw that the college girls studied by Komarovsky were encouraged to play a "modern" role of achievement in sports and academic life up to the point when this role (if taken seriously by the girl) clearly began to interfere with courtship. At that point, many of the parents (and even male siblings) of the girls began to lecture concerning the advisability of not allowing the modern role to be carried "too far." In effect, the girls were frequently advised to modify their goals and their behavior so as to be in line with anticipated wifehood and motherhood.

The Komarovsky research also showed, as might indeed be expected, that the traditional sex-role expectations were accompanied by expectations that the young women's personality traits would be congruent with the sex role. In Komarovsky's research, the young women perceived young men as the principal enforcers of such traits since, of course, the men were the active agents in initiating dates and marriage. Girls who did not exemplify the appropriate traits risked being sanctioned by unpopularity with the opposite sex and endured the threat of nonmarriage. Komarovsky points out that the desired female personality is "often described with reference to the male sex role as 'not as dominant, or aggressive as men' or 'more emotional, sympathetic.'"⁸⁰

One of the principal findings of the Komarovsky study was the extent to which her subjects felt called upon to dissimulate their real personalities, to "fake" traits that they did not have and did not evaluate highly—traits of helplessness, dependency, lesser intelligence relative to men, and so on. Such deprecating presentations of self were seen by these women as catering to their escorts' need to live up to the role expectation of males—higher dominance, security, and intelligence than that of females. Clearly conveyed to them was the fact that the existing social roles for the sexes presupposed that males would typically have the personality traits that are congruent with occupational achievement and the demonstration of superior physical strength. Since, in actuality, some men may not have these traits, maintenance of the male image requires collusion by women. These young women, although at the outer reach of "modernity" for American girls, nonetheless learned that "success" for a woman, namely the achievement of the wife-mother role, meant subordi-

nating their personality traits to the personality requirements of sex-role differentiation on the basis of parent-hood. The following quotations from Komarovsky illustrate the problem as perceived by her subjects:

When a girl asks me what marks I got last semester I answer, "Not so good—only one 'A.'" When a boy asks the same question, I say very brightly with a note of surprise, "Imagine, I got an 'A.'"

On dates I always go through the "I-don't-care-anything-you-want-to-do" routine. It gets monotonous but boys fear girls who make decisions. They think such girls would make nagging wives.

I am a natural leader and, when in the company of girls, usually take the lead. That is why I am so active in college activities. But I know that men fear bossy women, and I always have to watch myself on dates not to assume the "executive" role. Once a boy walking to the theater with me took the wrong street. I knew a short cut but kept quiet.⁸¹

Later research has served to substantiate and elaborate Komarovsky's roster of personality traits normatively expected of each sex. The work of McKee and Sherriffs in the 1950's clearly documented that women believe men demand traits of them that are exclusively feminine while restricting them from masculine virtues.⁸² And, McKee and Sherriffs found that men actually do wish to restrict women from such "male-valued" traits as being "aggressive," "courageous," "daring," "deliberate," "dominant," "forceful," "independent," "rugged," and "sharp-witted." On the other hand, women are found to desire more of a combination of both masculine and feminine traits in men than men consider ideal for themselves. That is, women would be more tolerant of a less polarized male, than men would be of a less polarized female.⁸³ This result may well be because in general, the traits chosen as appropriately "feminine" by both sexes are evaluated by both sexes less positively than are the masculine traits.⁸⁴ Although women select the more highly valued feminine traits as being also desirable for men (such as gentleness and sympathy), men apparently wish to avoid the roster of traits listed as feminine since, on the average, these carry relatively low esteem.

More recently, Rosenkrantz and others have also studied college students and found that, even in the late 1960's, both sexes recognize and greatly agree on a clearly defined set of personality traits expected of men and women.⁸⁵ Moreover, men and women agree that a greater number of traits typically associated with

masculinity are socially desirable than those associated with femininity. The list runs as follows:⁸⁶

STEREOTYPIC TRAITS

Male-valued traits

Aggressive	Feelings not easily hurt
Independent	Adventurous
Unemotional	Makes decisions easily
Hides emotions	Never cries
Objective	Acts as a leader
Easily influenced	Self-confident
Dominant	Not uncomfortable about being aggressive
Likes math and science	Ambitious
Not excitable in a minor crisis	Able to separate feelings from ideas
Active	Not dependent
Competitive	Not conceited about appearance
Logical	Thinks men are superior to women
Worldly	Talks freely about sex with men
Skilled in business	
Direct	
Knows the way of the world	

Female-valued traits

Does not use harsh language	Interested in own appearance
Talkative	Neat in habits
Tactful	Quiet
Gentle	Strong need for security
Aware of feelings of others	Appreciates art and literature
Religious	Expresses tender feelings

The authors also examined whether the self-concepts of their subjects correspond to the stereotypes.

... The self-concepts of men and women are very similar to the respective stereotypes. In the case of the self-concepts of women this means, presumably, that women also hold negative values of their worth relative to men. This implication is particularly surprising when it is remembered that the data producing the conclusion were gathered from enlightened, highly selected college girls who typically more than hold their own vis-a-vis boys, at least in terms of college grades. The factors producing the incorporation of the female stereotype along with its negative valuation into the self-concept of the female Ss, then, must be enormously powerful.⁸⁷

Although the results of these studies are not placed by the authors in the context of Komarovsky's older work on dissimulation by women, the data suggest that women find themselves in a situation in which personality traits are expected of them that they do not

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particularly admire, and that they are inhibited from manifesting traits that they do admire. The generally less-admired traits are those that are judged to be congruent with wifehood and motherhood—concern for appearances, concern for the feelings of others, gentleness, quietness, expressivity of succorant and nurturant emotions. The generally more admired traits are those making for success in the outside world, but incompatible with the wife-mother role as defined vis-a-vis the husband-father and the traits his role requires. A more recent study brings out the double standard of evaluation for male and female traits even more clearly.⁸⁸ The subjects in this study were 79 clinically trained psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers, all involved in clinical practice. They were given the questionnaire concerning bi-polar traits previously used on college students and asked to designate which pole would be closest to a mature, healthy, socially competent adult male, adult female, and adult of unspecified sex. The male, female, and adult instructions were given to separate groups of subjects. The traits these clinicians assigned the adult (sex unspecified) agreed closely with the traits deemed socially desirable by college students, and, as might be expected, male-valued traits were more commonly designated for the healthy male and female-valued traits for the healthy female. However, such designations when examined substantively meant that:

... clinicians are more likely to suggest that healthy women differ from healthy men by being more submissive, less independent, less adventurous, more easily influenced, less aggressive, less competitive, more excitable in minor crises, having their feelings more easily hurt, being more emotional, more conceited about their appearance, less objective, and disliking math and science. This constellation seems a most unusual way of describing any mature, healthy individual.⁸⁹

As a corollary of this finding, the researchers also discovered that the "adult" and "masculine" concepts of health do not differ significantly, but that a significant difference does exist between the concepts of health for "adults" versus "females." In effect, as they say, "... the general standard of health is actually applied only to men, while healthy women are perceived as significantly less healthy by adult standards."⁹⁰ Why do clinicians hold such double standards of health for the sexes? Broverman *et al.* suggest that:

... the double standard of health for men and women stems from the clinicians' acceptance of an "adjustment" notion of health, for example, health consists of a good adjustment to one's

environment. In our society, men and women are systematically trained, practically from birth on, to fulfill different social roles. An adjustment notion of health, plus the existence of differential norms of male and female behavior in our society, automatically lead to a double standard of health. Thus, for a woman to be healthy, from an adjustment viewpoint, she must adjust to and accept the behavioral norms for her sex, even though these behaviors are generally less socially desirable and considered to be less healthy for the generalized competent, mature adult.⁹¹

We thus see that although the differentiation of sex roles based on parenthood is sociologically complementary and unstratified, the personality traits expected of the people who fill these roles differ greatly, on the average, in social esteem. The lower evaluation of feminine personality traits relative to "adult" traits generally, constrains men to attempt to achieve "masculine" traits at all costs (or to avoid feminine ones).⁹² One might expect women to have the same reaction, and indeed Komarovsky has shown that many really do at some time in their lives; but such a reaction carries severe sanctions, because such women run the risk of not being selected for marriage, or being unsuccessful within it. The absence of alternative sex roles for women forces conformity to the personality traits that are congruent with the parental roles and no other. As a result, most women are not psychologically equipped to seek out alternative sex roles, or to switch gears from motherhood to success in the outside world. By virtue of a trained incapacity, their personalities are geared to failure, or only very marginal achievement, in the world of business and professional competition. Consequently, most women are more permanently attached to motherhood as their primary status than might be expected given the economic opportunities in American society. It is thus simplistic and unrealistic to expect economic and career incentives to affect women in the same way that they affect men. Women's personalities have been "adjusted" to sex-role expectations that assume a lifetime of home-centered priorities.

By what mechanisms do the adult subjects of the research cited above acquire such sex-typed personality traits and the belief that these traits are appropriate to each sex? Such research as has been done on this subject—whether on parent-child socialization, social pressures by peers in high schools, or public treatment of individuals who do not conform to sex-typing of personality traits and behavior—all has a common theme. This is the theme of social coercion—of punishment, withdrawal of affection, ridicule, unpopularity, ostra-

cism. Moreover, these sanctions are brought into play not only for major deviations from sex-typing (such as, for example, overt homosexuality), but for what might seem to be relatively minor variations, such as being a brilliant and achieving, female high-school student (in a coeducational school) instead of a cheerleader and fashionable dresser. One has to appreciate the social pressure leading to "adjustment" to reproductively oriented adult sexual roles in order to understand that fertility behavior in American society is, at present, far from "voluntary."

Let us begin with a brief discussion of sex-typing by parents (and adults with whom a very young child is likely to be in contact). This process is documented widely in books on child development and indeed is tacitly accepted as part of what parents do "for" their children. Mussen, Conger and Kagan say:

... in general, overt physical aggression, dominance, competence at athletics, achievement, competitiveness, and independence are regarded as desirable traits for boys. On the other hand, dependence, passivity, inhibition of physical aggression, competence at language skills, politeness, social poise, and neatness are some of the characteristics deemed more appropriate for girls.

Most parents reward behaviors that they view as appropriate to the sex of their child and punish responses that are considered inappropriate. . . . definite patterns of praise and punishment from both parents and playmates during the preschool and school years put pressure on the child to adopt sex-appropriate behaviors.⁹³

The authors point out that, in personal interviews, both boys and girls at ages as young as four to nine say that they feel their parents prefer them to adopt sex-typed behaviors.⁹⁴ Mussen, Conger, and Kagan go on to state that the learning of "appropriate" sex-role behaviors in early childhood has its results in adulthood. The degree to which the authors accept as "appropriate" that women are socialized into feeling unable to cope with life is well-demonstrated by the following:

... A large group of young adults was presented with a list of adjectives and asked to select those attributes that they felt were most and least characteristic of themselves. In comparison to men, women felt less adequate, more negligent, more fearful, and less mature. These adult attitudes about the self may be traceable, to some degree, to sex-appropriate attitudes and characteristics inculcated in the preschool boy and girl.⁹⁵

More pressure is apparently required to enforce identification by girls with the feminine role than by boys with the masculine one, since studies have shown that children of both sexes regard fathers as more powerful and competent than mothers and are more likely to imitate a man than a woman, and that boys typically identify with the father but that girls identify about equally with the mother and father.⁹⁶

Pressure for sex-typing occurs at a very early age not only through parental channels, but also as the peer group takes over increasing control in the young person's life. Mussen, Conger, and Kagan point out that the child's "acceptance or rejection by his friends is determined in part by the degree to which he has adopted traits that are appropriate for his sex role."⁹⁷ They go on to point out how pervasive and primary in the child's life is the sex-typed assignment by peers to most activities and behaviors.⁹⁸

One of the largest-scale documentations of coercive sex-typing is in Coleman's study of nine highly diversified high schools in northern Illinois.⁹⁹ Coleman found that, among adolescents of both sexes, the effect of high school as a scholastic system was neutralized, and even nullified, by the counter-effect of adolescent control over the operating daily goals and activities of the students. Since all of the high schools were coeducational, one aspect of adolescent control was extreme differentiation of sex roles in the school along the lines of physical (athletic) prowess for males and beauty coupled with "activity" (party giving) for females. To be a bright, scholarly student was the least desired "image" for both sexes; and indeed, students answering to this description were simply ignored. As Coleman points out, the students were actually expressing in the school situation the real values and goals conveyed by most parents, in counter-distinction to the parental lip-service paid to educational achievement and sexually neutral but desirable character traits. For parents (and many teachers), as well as adolescents, the male athlete is the super-hero and the beautiful, popular girl (the athlete's choice) the super-heroine.

Clearly, in paying the enormous bill that it does for high school education, American society is buying, for most students, not intellectual stimulation and the acquisition of valuable cognitive skills, but rather, just the opposite. Being provided are expensive arenas for male athletes and female cheerleaders, together with their hopeful imitators. Compared with the all-important task of competing in the sexual jungle, school work is defined by adolescents as externally imposed and juvenile. Coleman has suggested that scholarly achievement could be stimulated by making inter-scholastic academic competitions as widespread as inter-scholastic

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athletic ones. Then the creative scholar could win for his school (like the athlete) instead of merely for himself (as is currently the case). However, Coleman's own data indicate that the situation will not yield to such a tactic. This is because, perhaps unwittingly, parents tend to regard the practice adolescents receive in activities that are intensely differentiated by sex as "good training" for adult adjustment. These sexual roles, and not the "new math," are typically what parents themselves understand; and it is to these that they can, by and large, relate. After all, it is in these images that they themselves were socialized.

In sum, although we may take it for granted that the process of socialization is a legitimate and necessary constraint on human freedom, research suggests that socialization for sex-typed personalities goes well beyond the constraint on individuals required for social order. It actually represents the enforcement of the society's commitment to a specific goal—reproduction. One may or may not agree with the goal, but it is hard to deny that the process of reaching it constitutes a mammoth feat of social engineering. Individuals, especially women, are channelled in the direction of reproductive activity, and diverted away from other activities, just as inexorably as if they were under orders from a master planning board. Under such circumstances, the notion of reproductive "choice" is an illusion. Indeed, it may always be an illusion; but there is nothing more voluntary about an illusory pronatalist choice than an illusory antinatalist one.

CONCLUSION

The formulation of explicit anti-natalist policies requires an awareness of existing pronatalist ones. Lacking such awareness, action is side-tracked by a spurious controversy as to whether coercion should be instituted or voluntarism maintained. Actually, as this paper has tried to show, our society is already pervaded by time-honored pronatalist constraints. Thus, I have argued, we cannot preserve a choice that does not genuinely exist. And, by the same token, it makes no sense to institute anti-natalist coercions while continuing to support pronatalist ones. Insofar as we wish to move in the direction of zero population growth, the first job for policy would seem to be to eliminate coercive pronatalist influences in a manner that is minimally disruptive of social order.

The scope of this task reminds us that a demographic revolution has more profound implications than might appear from a mere consideration of birth, death, and growth rates. These are only indicators of a society's ability to cope with the survival problem in a particular way. Behind them lie the social organization and control

mechanisms that channel resources into the production and rearing of offspring on the one hand, and the effort to avert death, on the other. Population policy, therefore, inevitably goes to the heart of our way of life. To move from one policy (albeit implicit) to another (perhaps explicit) raises issues that threaten many of our established norms and habits. We are bound to experience anxiety in even thinking about the changes that may lie ahead. On the other hand, to allow a diversion of resources from reproduction may help to resolve social problems that are currently engendered by pronatalist constraints. Certainly, our increased reproductive efficiency does not, of itself, imply the need for greater regimentation, but rather the opposite. It makes possible a fuller expression of human individuality and diversity. After all, each generation provides us with the raw materials for evolutionary adaptation. The problem of adapting to low mortality is, therefore, not one of browbeating biologically specialized individuals out of behavior that is "natural" for all. Rather, it is one of directing cultural and social institutions into the use of human variability for meeting the new functional demands of a modern, low-mortality society. In this endeavor, freedom for the development of individual potential may be greatly enhanced. I seriously doubt that it will be curtailed.

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3. See, for example, Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," *Science*, Dec. 13, 1968, Vol. 162, No. 3859, pp. 1243-1248; Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich, *Population, Resources, Environment* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1970), pp. 254-256 and 272-274; and Kenneth Boulding, *The Meaning of the 20th Century* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964).
4. Bumpass and Westoff have calculated a "medium" estimate of the number of "unwanted" births in the United States for the period 1960-1965 as 19.1 percent of all births. Larry Bumpass and Charles F. Westoff, "The 'Perfect Contraceptive' Population," *Science*, September 18, 1970, Vol. 169, pp. 1177-1182. For a demonstration that the current level of "unwanted" births in the United States is much lower than the Bumpass and Westoff estimate, see Judith Blake, "Reproductive Motivation and Population Policy," *BioScience*, March 1, 1971, Vol. XXI, pp. 215-220. This paper also shows that the inoffensiveness of the family planning approach is overrated. "Unwanted" births occur most frequently among politically sensitive subgroups in our population.

5. Frank W. Notestein, "Zero Population Growth," *Population Index*, October-December 1970, Vol. 36, p. 448.
6. Conditional factors affecting birth rates are, for example, involuntary infecundity or the inability to find a mate because of an imbalance in the sex ratio due to migration. Conditional factors are those over which the individual has no control—his efforts cannot affect them, hence, his motives are not relevant to the outcome.
7. Ernest W. Burgess and Paul Wallin, "Idealization, Love, and Self-Esteem," reprinted in *Family Roles and Interaction*, Jerold Heiss, ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), pp. 121-122.
8. Although the primary focus of the typical masculine role might seem to be occupational in modern societies, the structural basis for the man's claim on an occupational role relates very clearly to his family obligations. Indeed, as will be seen later in this paper, a man's prior claim, over a woman, to a job has rested on his role of provider for a family. A married man who is a father has a similar prior claim to a job (or to a promotion) over a bachelor. From the man's subjective point of view, except in a few independently attractive occupations, the economic role is merely instrumental to the private (usually familial) existence.
9. For a cross-cultural analysis (based on almost 50 primitive and modern societies) of sex-role differentiation, see Morris Zelditch, Jr., "Role Differentiation in the Nuclear Family: A Comparative Study," in *Family, Socialization and Interaction Process*, Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales, eds. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955), pp. 309-351. Although of great value, Zelditch's analysis was not designed to bring out some of the variability among societies in the availability of alternative sex roles. For example, one contrast between many European countries and the United States is the existence, in the former but not in the latter, of an established religion having a celibate clergy. Additionally, European countries have suffered from numerous unintended anti-natalist constraints—devastating wars on their own territories, acute housing shortages, and, as compared with overseas European countries, fewer opportunities for upward social mobility and more parental control over the means to marry. It is of some interest that, in the mid-1960's, only 10 percent of American women remained single in the age group 20-29. Among European countries, in the same period and for the same age group, percentages single among women were, on the average, approximately double that of the United States. For a discussion of contrasts between Europe and the United States, see Judith Blake, "Demographic Science and the Redirection of Population Policy," in *Public Health and Population Change*, Mindel C. Sheps and Jeanne Clare Ridley, eds. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1965), pp. 41-69; and "Parental Control, Delayed Marriage, and Population Policy," in *Proceedings*, United Nations, World Population Conference, Belgrade, 1965, Vol. 2, pp. 132-136.
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16. Smuts, *op. cit.*, p. 109.
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18. Mabel Newcomer, *A Century of Higher Education for American Women* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), p. 210.
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literary figures, see, Kate Millett, *op. cit.*, pp. 237-313 and Betty Friedan, *op. cit.*, pp. 174-196, and 247-270.

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92. The lower evaluation of feminine personality traits does not imply a devaluation of motherhood, but rather reflects the necessity of motivating men to make the effort required for the masculine role. As has often been noted, if the feminine role is defined in terms of motherhood, then the social control problem for the society regarding women is simply to ensure that they allow themselves to be chosen and impregnated in a normatively approved fashion. After this, they must patiently and serenely await parturition. Deviance for them is chafing at the bit. The problem is quite different among men. The masculine achievement cannot be childbearing, but its complement. This takes "doing" rather than "being," and it is necessary to motivate men to make this relatively more extraordinary effort. It is worth noting that the recent professionalization of motherhood, the emphasis on gourmet cooking and the resurgence of handicrafts for the home (art needlework, etc.) serve to up-grade housewifery and the talents that are "needed." However, since there is no externally validated mechanism of quality control for housewives and mothers, no separation procedures that most probably result from poor performance, and no extraordinary rewards for excellence, the evaluation of female traits associated with the wife-mother role rests on minimum criteria.

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