JOHN M. BARRY

The Great Influenza: The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History

The 1918–19 influenza pandemic killed more than 40 million people worldwide, making it one of the most significant demographic events of the last 200 years (Johnson and Mueller 2002). A notable comparison is that there were on the order of 34 million combat deaths in all the wars of the twentieth century combined (Brzezinski 1993: 9). But the 1918–19 pandemic was more than just a magnified version of the typical year-in/year-out flu season: it killed in a tri-modal W-shaped age-mortality profile, instead of the typical U-shaped profile of the very young and very old. In relation to its magnitude and other interesting traits, study of the 1918 epidemic has been neglected by demographers, though happily this is beginning to change.

Among historians, interest in the 1918–19 pandemic reawakened in the 1970s. Richard Collier’s 1974 book, The Plague of the Spanish Lady, was reissued in paperback in 1996 and remains in print. It is more anecdotal than analytical, being based mostly on hundreds of interviews with survivors, but nonetheless is a useful account of how the epidemic was experienced. Collier’s title alludes to the “Spanish Flu,” as the pandemic used to be called, because Spain, not a party to World War I, did not censor newspapers whereas the belligerent European countries suppressed bad news in the name of patriotism. In fact, the outbreak did not begin in Spain and this usage is less common nowadays. Alfred Crosby’s 1976 book also remains in print, having been reissued in 1989 under the changed title America’s Forgotten Pandemic: The Influenza of 1918. As the title suggests, Crosby deals mostly with the United States, although his is generally regarded as one of the definitive accounts of the epidemic as a whole. Gina Kolata’s 1999 book, Flu: The Story of the Great Influenza Pandemic of 1918 and the Search for the Virus that Caused It, focuses more on current efforts to understand the molecular biology of the pandemic virus (see my review in PDR, March 2001). Pete Davies’s 2000 book The Devil’s Flu (first published in 1999, in Britain, as Catching Cold), has the same emphasis and, like Kolata’s, tells a compelling story, though in a more journalistic and less contemplative tone. A fresh academic perspective from a number of specialties, including demography, is brought to the subject by The Spanish Influenza Pandemic of 1918–19, a collection of papers edited by Howard Phillips and David Killingray (see the review in PDR, June 2004).

The latest volume on this subject is The Great Influenza by John M. Barry, a writer whose résumé includes four previous books on a diversity of subjects. Like its predecessors mentioned above, the book is written for a general audience as well as for academic experts. Nonetheless, it is a serious piece of historical writing, with 61 pages of notes and bibliographic material, and it merits attention from anyone with an interest in historical mortality studies.

After a teaser that introduces the scary days of the onset of the epidemic, the book turns to the history of medicine going back to Hippocrates and Galen. The
development of American medicine and medical education is emphasized, with the founding of Johns Hopkins University used as an example. The opening sections on medical history effectively set the stage for the remainder of the book, but they could be skimmed (or skipped) by readers whose interest lies strictly with the flu epidemic.

The heart of the book interleaves the story of the epidemic, mostly in the United States, with an explanation of the basic biology of influenza. *The Great Influenza* effectively uses World War I as a backdrop. America did not enter the hostilities until 1917, and Barry documents well how the concentration of draftees at army camps around the country and the movement of troops from camp to camp helped to spread the epidemic (and, possibly, how the movement of American troops to Europe helped spread the pandemic). War rallies and Liberty Bond drives also helped spread influenza among the civilian population. A shortage of nurses exacerbated medicine’s inability to cope with the epidemic, which hit city after city like a tidal wave: “On the single day of October 10, the epidemic alone killed 759 people in Philadelphia. Prior to the outbreak, deaths from all causes—all illnesses, all accidents, all suicides, and all murders—averaged 485 a week” (p. 329, emphasis in the original).

The aforementioned W-shaped age-mortality profile is described without using graphs or tables (p. 239), a sure sign that this book is aimed largely at the general nonfiction market. Barry endorses an immune-response theory of the mortality curve, namely that the central mode of the W was due to the fact that young adults have the strongest immune systems. Perversely, stronger immune response led to more fluid in the lungs, which led to death. That is probably not the whole story: the unusual mortality profile is often attributed to a prior epidemic conferring partial immunity to cohorts above a certain age (see Kolata, p. 300).

One of the major strengths of this book is the way in which Barry explains the basic biology and epidemiology of influenza. During the epidemic the cause of influenza was uncertain, and many suspected Pfeiffer’s bacillus (*Hemophilus influenzae*). This bacterium can cause meningitis, but influenza is caused by the influenza A virus. Barry shows how an incorrect hypothesis may become reinforced: failure to find Pfeiffer’s bacillus in pathology samples in 1918 was dismissed as a lack of proper laboratory skill as opposed to evidence against an etiological link. Especially well conveyed is how the state of technology biased investigators toward bacteria, which could be cultured, stained, and examined under the microscope. Viruses were known to be infectious agents capable of passing through bacteria-blocking ceramic filters, but were otherwise shrouded in mystery. Without electron microscopy, genetic analysis, and x-ray crystallography—techniques that would come later—viruses were poorly understood.

Barry is a skilled writer, and his book is easy to read even when he explains technical material or offers historical details. But he is not an especially efficient writer. He often uses repetition to achieve emphasis, resulting in frequent sensations of déjà lu. The ironic use of “this was only influenza” as a leitmotif becomes annoying after a point. Another fault is Barry’s tendency to over-explain things, such as the one-sentence paragraph: “The study of epidemic disease is, of course, a prime focus of public health” (p. 87). This point, if not self-evident, was already made in the book, most recently on the previous page. In my view, however, these weaknesses do not detract from the merit of the book as a whole.
The Great Influenza is richly detailed, and Barry uses detail to good effect, drawing the reader into the story. On the other hand, some anecdotes (for example, one about tension between army regulars and recent draftees at Camp Funston, Kansas, in 1918), though well researched, do not really advance the story of the 1918 flu epidemic. Perhaps this reflects my demographic or epidemiological bias, but I found that the book was strongest when it was most focused on events directly related to the influenza outbreak.

More seriously, not all the anecdotes are documented by sources in the endnotes. This presents a cardinal problem when judging the book as a piece of historical research. For example, the vividly detailed description of the suicide of Colonel Charles Hagadorn, commander of an army camp that suffered many influenza deaths, differs substantively from the Associated Press daily wire account of the same event that was published in the Boston Evening Transcript on 8 October 1918 and in both the New York Times and Los Angeles Times on the following day. Barry, unfortunately, fails to indicate the source of his version of the story.

The 1918–19 influenza pandemic continues to interest many, and emerging diseases such as SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome), in some ways similar to influenza and also caused by a virus, reinforce this interest. For demographers curious to learn more about 1918–19 outbreak, it is a tough choice between Crosby’s book and Barry’s. Barry does a more thorough job of explaining the biology of influenza. Crosby is more succinct, which should be appealing for someone who wants to learn a lot about the epidemic quickly. I think Crosby’s is still the definitive volume, but like all important subjects the 1918–19 pandemic can tolerate more than one book, and The Great Influenza is a welcome and worthy addition to scholarship on one of the most important demographic events of modern times.

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References

Jacqueline Scott, Judith Treas, and Martin Richards (eds.)
The Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of Families

Few will mistake this volume for easy summer reading: a 600-page, 28-chapter, edited collection of essays and review articles in family sociology. I agreed to review The Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of Families for much the same reason others will read and cite it: to assess one’s grasp of contemporary knowledge and debates in the sociology of the family. This book will interest those in the population field because of the close links between family changes and demographic behavior. Indeed, some indicators of family change are demographic behaviors—for example, age at leaving home, marriage, first birth, and so on. Nevertheless, interest will be largely confined to sociologists or to other readers seeking to understand the sociological approach. Despite some weak prefatory claims to the contrary, the Companion is a parochial discussion of family concepts, research, and theory, with a focus on sociological approaches to research and debates in the United States and Britain.

The book has five sections, each of which contains five or six chapters. The only introduction to these materials is a 12-page preface. Thus, the book is simply a sum of its parts, a loosely connected set of overviews. For instance, the book’s final section is titled “Changing social contexts.” The first chapter describes changes in norms and expectations regarding sexual behavior. The second addresses versions of feminism and their impact on scholarship. The third focuses on the changing world of work, undoubtedly a key feature of changing social contexts. The fourth and fifth chapters deal with public policy and biotechnology, two other elements that contribute to a changed decisionmaking context. The final chapter discusses postmodern ideology and its consequences for family life. What is clearly missing is integrative analysis and assessment at a higher level of abstraction. How do norms, ideology, and changes in the economy, public policy, and technology jointly provide a social context for decisions? Which elements can be thought of as “fundamental causes” and which ones are reactive and adaptive to other changes? What contextual elements are lacking and must be considered in any adequate discussion of changing social contexts and family behavior?

Blackwell has published ten volumes in its Companions to Sociology Series (this book being the ninth; others include volumes on, e.g., social theory, medical sociology, and criminology); two more volumes are listed as forthcoming. I have pondered why these volumes are considered as “companions” to the study of sociological topics (as opposed to a “guide,” “introduction,” or “review”). Perhaps this title designates it as a reference volume intended to aid in study but not offering a paradigm for the field of sociology. This interpretation of the editors’ intentions would undermine my critique above by asking less of the volume as a whole and by focusing attention on the constituent parts. If one accepts this perspective, my assessment of the book is more favorable. As claimed in the prefatory matter, experts in covered sub-areas have ably and succinctly described their research niches. Indeed, such a set of review articles is a useful “companion” for established scholars who seek to review recent work or for newcomers who seek an introduction to key topics in contemporary family sociology.
Indicative of the high quality of the contributions, Martin Richards offers a thoughtful discussion of assisted reproduction, genetic technologies, and family life. Richards perceives the current debates about these issues as only the latest cultural skirmishes in an ongoing cultural war over the appropriate boundary between the "natural sphere of reproduction and the social sphere of family and kinship." He states that "[w]here technologies threaten to shift this boundary and extend the reach of society into the domain of nature, there is unease and resistance" (p. 488). This perspective is sure to illuminate debates about cloning, stem cell research, and genetic testing.

Other chapters of interest to population specialists include a chapter on "Feminism and the family" by Michelle Budig. Anyone who believes the "feminist" perspective requires no definition will be enlightened by distinctions drawn here between liberal feminism, radical feminism, Marxist feminism, and socialist feminism. Jeffrey Weeks, Brian Heaphy, and Catherine Donovan contend that studying lesbian and gay families provides unique windows into the workings of all families. Specifically, they argue that lesbian/gay relationships displace the idea of the family as a "fixed and timeless entity" and view it instead as the locus of "relational interactions" (such as mutual care, household division of labor, looking after dependents, managing relations with kin) (p. 345). Likewise, several chapters focus on immigrant families. Karen Pyke, for instance, argues that studying immigrant families "will expand our theoretical and empirical understanding of the diversity of family types, permit greater comparative analysis, and dramatically transform theoretical paradigms steeped in assumptions about ‘normal’ family life that are derived from a white, middle-class model” (p. 266).

Most likely, these specific examples reflect gaps in my own knowledge and thus attracted my attention. Chapters on demographic change, closer to my own research interest, I found concise and accurate. Kathleen Kiernan reviews family and demographic change in Europe, while Sinikka Elliott and Debra Umberson do the same for the United States. Judith Treas provides an accurate description of changing sexual behavior and its normative context. This high-quality work in areas with which I am familiar bolsters my confidence in the summaries of topics I know less well.

For the first decade of the twenty-first century, I recommend the Companion as a general reference book on contemporary sociological family research and debates. Beyond this time frame, significant updating will be necessary. Moreover, by the time an update is contemplated, let us hope that interdisciplinary work on the family has borne sufficient fruit such that interest in a Sociological Companion will have waned in favor of an integrative social-and-biological-sciences companion to the study of families.
BRÍGIDA GARCÍA, RICHARD ANKER, AND ANTONELLA PINNELLI (EDS.)

Women in the Labour Market in Changing Economies: Demographic Issues

This collection offers papers first presented at a 1999 seminar in Rome organized by the Gender and Population Committee of IUSSP. The 14 chapters include studies of Argentina, Bangladesh, Canada, China, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Russia, Sweden, and the United States, as well as comparative studies. The authors are economists, sociologists, historians, and demographers. All chapters focus on women, their role in the home and the workplace, and how the two spheres interact, but there are no overarching theories or empirical issues.

A paper by Robert Clark, Anne York, and Richard Anker provides a valuable context for the 12 case studies that follow. Anker’s 1998 seminal study for the ILO of occupational segregation around the globe is extended here in an analysis of the correlates and determinants of women’s employment. This comparative study confirms the existence of a U-shaped relationship between female participation rates and economic development (more precisely, national income per capita). However, occupational segregation does not decline with social and economic development, as is so often assumed. It is higher in Scandinavia than in the United States, for example, and lowest of all in China. Cultural factors outweigh economic factors: the sexual division of labor is essentially manmade and malleable. Across countries, higher fertility is correlated with lower employment rates among women of childbearing age (20–49 years). Debate continues over the causal processes involved.

One noteworthy conclusion demonstrated by the book as a whole is the enormous importance of women’s market work, both for families and for the economy, especially in less developed societies, even when it is undervalued and underpaid. Many contemporary texts are written as if female employment is a uniquely modern achievement, the result of feminist demands for equal opportunities in the labor market and family-friendly employer policies. There is little recognition of how economic necessity has generally been the key driving force in women’s employment, or of the fact the “traditional” one-earner family is a very recent phenomenon. Choosing not to work has been a luxury few women could afford.

A fascinating study of the Indonesian financial crisis in 1998 (by Duncan Thomas, Kathleen Beegle, and Elizabeth Frankenber) shows that it did not produce a fall in employment and a rise in unemployment, as would be expected in Western welfare-state economies. Instead, real hourly wages fell by 40 percent on average in one year, there was a small increase in women’s employment, and there was substantial movement between labor market statuses: self-employed, unpaid family worker, government employee, or private-sector employee. This study illustrates how differently various labor markets work and how economic theories based on circumstances prevailing in western Europe can be misleading.

Rita Afsar’s study of garment workers in Bangladesh illustrates how new industries opened up by globalization provide poor women with previously unimaginable financial independence and autonomy. This is so despite the fact that their jobs are low-skilled and segregated from the higher-paying jobs dominated by men in the industry. For women who have been restricted to unpaid domestic work in the home, paid work in female-dominated occupations opens up new horizons,
especially for unmarried young women. These women also have exceptionally high rates of use of modern contraception.

Two chapters look at social change in China. Using Shanghai as a case study, Wang Feng and Shen Anan explain why female labor migrants in Chinese cities earn less than men, and less than female urban workers, after controlling for education and other factors. They reveal new forms of stratification emerging in China’s urban labor markets. Zai Liang and Yiu Por Chen analyze a 1 percent sample from the 1990 China Population Census to study migrants to Shenzhen. They, too, conclude that women fare poorly relative to men.

In their study of working women in Egypt, Andrzej Kulczycki and Lucía Juárez demonstrate a strong association between a wife’s holding a job, modern contraceptive use, and her involvement in decisions on whether to have another child. However, large differences in age between spouses also tend to curtail modern contraceptive use. This chapter gives us a glimpse of the social processes that are usually invisible in routine labor market studies. The mean age difference between spouses in Egypt is seven years (compared to less than two in western Europe), and even today it is considered desirable for husbands to be at least five years older than their wives. Only one in four women had chosen her husband, suggesting that the choices and circumstances related to marital life were usually dictated by others.

Most of the case studies rely on large sample datasets, typically cross-sectional, and on some form of multivariate analysis. Results consist primarily of correlations and associations, and we can only speculate about the underlying causal processes. In particular, few of the case studies have information on the attitudes, aspirations, and life goals of women. These do matter, especially in the context of rapid social change, or migration, or childbearing decisions. Ultimately, regression analysis seems too superficial a method for the complex issues and social changes addressed here.

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SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON
Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity

Samuel P. Huntington sounds the alarm over America’s growing participation in the global market economy and attendant risks: the expansion of transnational institutions and social networks; the resurgence of large-scale immigration; the rising prevalence of multiple citizenship; the spread of multilingualism; and what he sees as the liberalism, internationalism, and secularism of a global cosmopolitan elite. He contrasts this picture with an image of the era preceding World War II, when Americans were united not simply by allegiance to the US Constitution and its guarantees, but also by a dominant racial, ethnic, and cultural identity. With the passage of time, these three pillars of American identity have been delegitimized, leaving only “a set of political principles, the American Creed” (p. 37),
to unite us. Huntington believes the Creed is not enough and calls for a renewal of American identity by returning to the values of English Protestantism and an unabashed economic nationalism (pp. 264–273).

Huntington’s views are part of a rising backlash against globalization that seeks to halt and turn back the social and economic progress of the late twentieth century. Although he characterizes all elements of globalization as threatening, what concerns him most is immigration—specifically that of Latin Americans, and especially Mexicans. He believes the arrival of large numbers of Spanish-speaking peoples threatens the very core of American culture and identity. For Huntington, “There is no Americano dream. There is only the American dream created by an Anglo-Protestant society. Mexican-Americans will share in that dream and in that society only if they dream in English” (p. 256).

As this excerpt suggests, Who Are We? is not a work of objective social science written by a dispassionate scholar. It is an emotional polemic whose author, in order to make his arguments more plausible, magnifies the Anglo-Protestant roots of American culture; caricatures the relationship between culture and society; sentimentalizes and trivializes past immigrant assimilation; grants the deconstructionist movement unwarranted influence; and exaggerates several challenges to assimilation in the twenty-first century while minimizing the many positive indications of ongoing incorporation of new immigrants into American society.

Huntington adopts the postmodern device of asserting the cultural (rather than racial or ethnic) inferiority of the new immigrants. Underlying this approach is an archaic view of culture as a monolithic set of values, beliefs, and institutions that are passed intact from generation to generation to determine human behavior and condition the welfare of societies. Culture is not, as modern anthropologists would have it, a changeable repertoire of patterned thoughts, routinized actions, and flexible social structures that people deploy dynamically to adapt to a variable environment. For Huntington, culture determines human circumstances and not the reverse.

Consequently, Huntington implies, for America there are only good cultures that must be preserved for the well-being of the country and bad cultures to be avoided. He argues that the success of the United States reflects the unique virtues of Anglo-Protestant culture (he informs us in passing that the Huntington family has roots in eighteenth-century New England). Other sources of American culture and identity are unmentioned. No credit is given to the European Enlightenment, and the possibility that Africans might have made some contribution to American culture is dismissed out of hand (e.g., p. 44). The cultural contributions of successive waves of immigrants are deemed inconsequential. According to Huntington, “America’s core culture has been and, at the moment, is still primarily the culture of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century settlers who founded American society” (p. 40). He seems to think that the good settlers of Plymouth Colony would feel right at home in contemporary Boston.

Huntington’s historical survey of immigrant assimilation is simplistic and out of touch with contemporary social science. He believes that in the past assimilation meant Americanization, pure and simple. Immigrants arrived longing to become Americans, and they advanced socially and economically by adopting English Protestant ways. American society reshaped the immigrants; they did not reshape America. Assimilation “enabled America to expand its population, occupy a conti-
nent, and develop its economy with millions of dedicated, energetic, ambitious, and talented people, who become overwhelmingly committed to America’s Anglo-Protestant culture...” (p. 183). Although he cites the recent book by Richard Alba and Victor Nee (2003), he paradoxically glosses over their conclusion, which is implied by its title, *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration*. The current scientific consensus is that assimilation is a two-way street, with immigrants changing societies even as they assimilate into them.

Given the author’s idealized view of past immigrants, their contemporary successors are bound to suffer by comparison. According to Huntington, they possess many bad habits: they circulate instead of settle; they don’t necessarily naturalize and, when they do so, they retain their original citizenship as well; they speak and read in foreign languages; and they participate in politics at places of both origin and destination. Rather than being novel developments of the current age, however, all of these behaviors characterized immigrants during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The fact that return migration, mainly to Europe, ran at a third of the level of immigration to America early in the twentieth century, and reached levels well above 50 percent for most southern and eastern European nationalities (Hatton and Williamson 1998), does not deter him from quoting Oscar Handlin’s sentimental claim about immigrants being on the way toward becoming Americans even before they stepped off the boat (pp. 190–191).

In fact, the only groups that evinced low rates of emigration during the classic period of European immigration were those that faced systematic repression at home, such as Celts from the British Isles and Jews from Russia. For them, America was indeed a godsend. Much the same is true today. Refugee groups such as Cubans and Southeast Asians display low rates of return migration whereas labor migrants, such as Mexicans and Dominicans, evince high rates of circulation.

Whatever the similarities between immigrants past and present (and the scholarly consensus suggests that similarities indeed outweigh the differences), Huntington sees a host of alarming conditions that make present-day Latin Americans, especially Mexicans, more serious threats to American identity: they speak Spanish; they share a common attachment to Spanish Catholic culture; they tend to congregate together within the United States; and they are encouraged not to assimilate by proponents of the deconstructionist movement.

Although it is true that the United States has never before experienced such linguistically concentrated immigration, it does not follow that immigrants do not wish to and will ultimately fail to learn English. Of course, recently arrived working-class immigrants from Latin America generally do not speak English with any facility, but, as data cited by Huntington also confirm (p. 231), the longer they remain in the country the greater their fluency; and immigrant children who grow up in the United States not only become proficient in English, they rapidly come to favor English as their everyday language.

According to US Census data tabulated by Cornell University’s Victor Nee, 98 percent of native-born Mexicans aged 25–44 speak English well; and even among those who live along the Mexico–US border, 96 percent speak English well. Data assembled by Richard Alba and colleagues show that by the third generation, 60 percent of Mexican-origin children speak only English at home. In their comprehensive survey of immigrants in Miami and San Diego, Alejandro Portes and Rubén
Rumbaut (2001: 123) found that although more than 96 percent of all second-generation Latin Americans said they knew Spanish, and 60 percent to 87 percent reported using it with their parents, the vast majority of all second-generation immigrants preferred to speak English: 95 percent of Cubans, 90 percent of Colombians, 89 percent of Nicaraguans, and 72 percent of Mexicans. On standardized language tests, they found that children of Latin American immigrants, including Mexicans, scored higher in their knowledge of English than of Spanish.

So what is the problem Huntington sees? It is the retention of Spanish, rather than the failure to learn English, that he finds threatening. In a globalized economy, of course, speaking a second language is a valuable skill, hence it is puzzling that Huntington expresses concern over the growing number of Spanish speakers in the United States, particularly in a hemisphere where Spanish is spoken by more than 300 million people in 18 countries. Most educated Europeans are bilingual if not trilingual, and the research of Portes and Rumbaut (2001: 132) shows that fluently bilingual immigrant children have the highest educational aspirations, the highest self-esteem, the lowest rates of psychological depression, and score best on standardized reading and math tests.

Huntington attributes undue influence to the deconstructionist movement, a small coterie of leftist intellectuals who advocate multiculturalism, view assimilation as racist, and speak admiringly of the demographic reconquest of the American Southwest through immigration. These self-appointed cultural guardians speak for few people besides themselves, however, and they are far removed from the thoughts of most immigrants. The culture wars are an elite debate carried out in privileged academic settings by affluent Latinos who speak perfect English (and very often limited Spanish): they do not concern the millions of immigrants who come to the United States struggling to get ahead.

Mexicans, in particular, recognize that speaking English carries great social and economic benefits whether or not they leave their country. To the extent they are able, Mexican immigrants seek to master English and want their children to do the same. English is taught (albeit badly) in Mexican public schools, and English-language institutes are commonplace in towns and cities throughout Mexico. Among Mexicans, immigrant or not, the demand for English-language skills has never been higher, and in the global marketplace English has never been more hegemonic. The influence of American English on Mexican Spanish is much greater than the opposite influence. Given the huge global reach of American popular culture, Mexicans have a lot more to lose culturally and linguistically from economic integration than Americans do.

Latin American immigrants, of course, face several very serious barriers to assimilation. One problem highlighted by Huntington is the unprecedented growth of undocumented migration, which has created a large population of people burdened with impediments to socioeconomic mobility and cultural assimilation. But, as I and others have argued (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002), the remarkable growth of the undocumented Mexican population during the 1990s came about because of misplaced US border-control policies, not through any change in the characteristics or aspirations of immigrants themselves. The unilateral “militarization” of the border transformed what had been a circular flow of male workers into a settled population of families. A problem created by US policies can be solved
by US policymakers, however—in this case by implementing one of the several proposed amnesty and temporary-worker programs now pending before Congress.

Another serious problem facing immigrants is the regressive economic structure of the US labor market (pp. 234–239). The children of earlier European immigrants entered an economy offering many well-paying jobs that were accessible to people with modest education and that offered steadily rising wages. In contrast, the children of today's immigrants face a bifurcated hourglass economy with numerous high-paying jobs for the well-educated and many badly paid jobs for poorly educated workers, but with few positions in between. Rather than gradually working their way up the economic ladder and acquiring education across the generations, the children of today's immigrants must make a quantum leap in education, moving in one generation from primary-level schooling to a university degree, using only the meager resources available to the working poor.

This leap is made all the more difficult by the sorry state of American public education. Educational advancement is especially difficult for Mexicans because they come from a country with a poor public school system and low levels of educational attainment. Mexican families generally have limited human capital to help their children achieve success in school. It is a sad irony that at precisely the point when Mexican immigrants began settling in American cities in large numbers, thereby intensifying the demand for public education, a middle-class tax revolt spread throughout the land to reduce funding for public schools, most notably in California.

Huntington also sees the regional concentration of Latin Americans in the United States as a barrier to assimilation and is notably disturbed by the existence of a prosperous, bilingual, and multicultural Miami, not to mention Los Angeles and Houston. He expresses particular concern about Mexican population growth within states that were once part of Mexico and ceded to the United States just 150 years ago, thus taking the bait offered by the deconstructionists.

Settlement patterns, however, reveal little cause for alarm. First, Mexican and Latino segregation within US cities is no higher than that observed for European immigrants early in the twentieth century. Latinos are also far less segregated than African Americans. Indeed, the only really segregated Latinos are Caribbean migrants of African ancestry in such cities as New York and Boston. Second, Mexican migration during the 1990s shifted from a regional phenomenon affecting three states (California, Texas, and Illinois) to a national phenomenon affecting all 50 states. Regional concentration is declining, not increasing. Whereas two-thirds of Mexican immigrants arriving between 1985 and 1990 went to California, only one-third of those arriving between 1995 and 2000 did so. Finally, among Mexicans who settle in the Southwest, it is not at all clear in what sense their children will be Mexicans reconquering lost territories. As already noted, virtually all of the second generation will speak English, and by the third generation the large majority will have lost fluency in Spanish. Third-generation Latin American immigrants display very high rates of marriage to non-Hispanic whites and come to share the attitudes and values of other Americans of the same economic status. In America, class trumps ethnicity.

In my view, Huntington’s diatribe on the challenges to America’s national identity represents deeply flawed scholarship. His theories are outdated, his facts often
inaccurate, his characterization of current and past assimilation misleading, his conceptualization of culture archaic, and his line of reasoning as polemic and tortured as anything the deconstruction movement has ever produced. Although his contribution to scholarly understanding of immigrant assimilation may be slight, I worry that his contribution to public (mis)understanding of immigration will not be so small. The general public will not read this review or any of the scores of other critical reviews that have already appeared and will follow, and few will be asked to consider how misguided a book *Who Are We?* really is. But given the publicity surrounding it, I suspect that many readers will remember that a Harvard professor said that Latin American immigrants were a threat to US national identity and that Mexicans, especially, were ruining the country. With this seed planted in the American mind, people will not ask what policies created such a large and disadvantaged population, or why socioeconomic mobility has become so difficult for anyone outside of the top fifth of the income distribution, or why public services of all sorts, but most particularly education, have deteriorated so appallingly. Instead they will ask politicians how they could have let such an undeserving lot of people into the country. The book lays the foundations for a politics of blaming immigration and immigrants.

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**References**


**Herbert S. Klein**

*A Population History of the United States*

New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xvi + 300 p. $65.00; $23.00 (pbk.).

Overviews of the population history of the United States are scarce. Supply reflects demand: since very few courses are taught on this subject in colleges and universities, there is no market for a textbook. *A Population History of the United States* provides a useful service for its intended audience of non-specialists. The absence of quantitative tables in the text itself points to the intended audience. Instead, the author presents the numerical information in 77 graphs and 11 maps. In addition to nine more graphs and two maps, 17 pages of data tables appear in the appendix.
The level of this survey falls between Robert V. Wells’s *Uncle Sam’s Family* (1985), a short work intended for undergraduates in courses on social history, and a collection of essays, *A Population History of North America* (2000), suitable for a more advanced academic audience and professional demographers. The latter volume, edited by Michael R. Haines and Richard H. Steckel, surveys the literature on different periods and geographic areas, including Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean.

A historian by profession, Herbert Klein is a prolific scholar. He has written mainly on Latin American history, including aspects of its population history, and has contributed importantly as well to the demographic history of slavery and the slave trade. He organizes the chapters chronologically, using the conventional turning points of political history: the American Revolution, the Civil War, and the two world wars; two chapters, dividing at 1980, cover the period since World War II. While acknowledging that shifts in demographic trends do not correspond to political benchmarks, Klein points out that there is no obviously better scheme of periodization.

The earlier chapters will be the most useful to demographers who are not historians. The first two deal with population history before the United States came into existence. Klein reviews the original peopling of the Americas prior to European contact as well as the distinctive features of European societies that led them to emigrate to and colonize the New World. In his discussion of the colonization of the area that later became the United States, he notes the marked regional differences in demographic experience. For example, in the seventeenth century the European-origin population of New England had death rates that were sharply lower than those among settlers in the Chesapeake Bay region.

Despite the chronological structuring of the chapters by political events, economic history provides the principal underlying theme for Klein’s treatment of the history of the American population. He stresses the demand for labor as a key factor that integrates the entire story. This emphasis is certainly appropriate if for no other reason than that immigration, both free and unfree, played an important role in the rapid growth of the population of the British colonies and the United States. The vigorous demand for labor also accounts, as Benjamin Franklin and Malthus both asserted two centuries ago, for rapid natural population increase. Cheap land and high wages made the establishment of independent households feasible, a prerequisite for marriage in the northwest European family model. Thus, early American women married at ages far younger than their western European counterparts.

From the perspective adopted by Klein, mortality trends in American demographic history conflict with the standard pattern of demographic transition. While a sustained decline in death rates did not begin until the last two decades of the nineteenth century, fertility was moving downward from early in that century. Scattered estimates suggest that life expectancy circa 1800 (around 50 years at birth) was as high as was possible in a world without modern public health. (In the introductory chapter that covers definitions of technical terms, Klein erroneously claims that demographers use “life expectancy” to refer to the median rather than the mean number of years expected after a given age (p. 4).) If the death rate could change in the early and middle decades of the nineteenth century, the only direction it could go was up. Moreover, demographic transition models can be
understood as one example of a larger set of homeostatic models in which multiple influences tend toward balance. Assuming all else equal, mortality should decrease first. However, all else was not equal. During the nineteenth century, marriage ages very likely were increasing as the frontier conditions of expensive labor relative to land were waning. Consequently, a crude birth rate of around 50 per 1,000, or a total fertility rate above seven, was not sustained under changed economic conditions.

Klein does a good job of surveying and commenting on the disparate topics and patterns in the demographic history of the twentieth century, including the experience of various racial and ethnic groups. He provides a mass of detail about the demographic basics—fertility, mortality, and migration—and relates these to larger, nondemographic trends in American society.

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References


Jean Elisabeth Pedersen
Legislating the French Family: Feminism, Theater, and Republican Politics, 1870–1920

How did ideation occur in the area of the family before the era of powerful media and international organizations? How were the ideas incorporated into legislation and national policies? Pedersen’s book suggests a particular pathway in the days of France’s Third Republic. Playwrights presented a social drama or thesis play to a rarified public in Paris (130 performances were considered a very successful run), the play was discussed by critics in newspapers and periodicals, and eventually it influenced some project of law that was adopted (or more likely rejected) after lengthy debates reflecting the balance of political forces in Parliament. Feminism, which appears in the title of the book, may have influenced the original thesis, and invariably the play featured a woman caught in some terrible family situation, but none of the lawmakers, the playwrights (with one partial exception), or the most prestigious literary critics were women. There were feminist periodicals, women’s associations, and international meetings, but they had little impact on the political discourse. A well-received theatrical performance at the Comédie Française could have more influence on the legislative process than the repressed demands of the female half of the population. Influential writers were invited to sit on various commissions on the reform of the Civil Code, but no women.
The sequence play–debate–legislation is the organizing principle of the book. The author, a historian, reviews the performances, the critiques, and the related propositions of law. The theses involved divorce most of all, but eventually also paternity suits and abortion were featured. A play by Emile Augier, *Madame Cavarlet*, set the tone in 1876. French law at that time did not permit divorce. The convoluted plot of the drama showed some of the implications for a French woman remarried in Switzerland (where divorce was legal) and her child. Divorce under conditions of equality between the sexes had long been a feminist cause. A law passed in 1884 allowed divorce only for specific causes that varied according to sex, after lengthy and complex procedures. Although Augier’s contribution to the debate may have been minor, additional plays argued for or against divorce by mutual consent. It would not become legal until 1975.

Feminism was only one of the forces moving public opinion, and not a very powerful one: many women also opposed divorce and changes in traditional family values. The polar opposites of French political life were the Catholic Right and the radical Left, the former defending family ideals, the latter social change. (Pedersen calls these poles “patriarchal patriotism” and “solidarism.” She has little to say on the doctrinal position of the Church as a factor in the discussion of family issues and birth control.) There was a strong shared feeling of the unique nature of French values and a suspicion of everything foreign, including foreign plays such as Ibsen’s *A Doll’s House* and foreign Protestant values. (Unaccountably, Pedersen calls Belgium a Protestant country!)

The last chapter of the book tackles truly demographic topics: motherhood, reproductive rights, birth control. In 1903, Eugène Brioux, who was a member of an extra-parliamentary Commission on Depopulation, presented a play called *Maternité* (motherhood) in which he featured society’s response to an illegitimate birth, including the trial of an abortionist. The play was identified with neo-Malthusian ideas. The context was a widely shared perception of the German peril in a time of declining French natural increase. At about the same time a feminist activist named Nelly Roussel started performing *Par la révolte*, a pantomime rather than a play, where she incarnated Eve, a woman enslaved by Church and Society, claiming ownership of her own body, and eventually rescued by Revolt. This must have been a shocking spectacle in the great tradition of popular theater, but hardly an element in the parliamentary debate about the birth rate. From 1902 on, various parliamentary commissions led to a number of proposed measures combining the carrot and the stick—maternal protection and the repression of abortion—none of which carried. The deadlock was finally broken after the war, in 1920, when a very short text, reduced to six articles focusing on the repression of birth control, was voted into law by a large majority.

It is an interesting characteristic of the Western fertility transition that fierce legal opposition accompanied the almost universal adoption of birth control. Some very regressive pieces of legislation were passed, such as the Comstock laws in the United States. France was no exception. The paradox of this conflict between private behavior and public morality has not been satisfactorily explained. Pedersen belongs to the school of judgmental historians who are eager to indict by injecting their twenty-first-century perspective. She does not do a very good job in explain-
ing how presumably honest men (men it is true, but there is no evidence that women would have voted differently) could have been so wrong in condemning a perfectly logical behavior in order to ensure what they assumed was the social good of the country. She is right in noting the influence of medical men in the debate. Physicians have usually led the fight against birth control, perhaps because of their natural hostility to self-medication. The propaganda in favor of rubber implements (excepting condoms, which protected men from venereal infection) and spermicides was held to be obscene and of foreign origin, a product of Anglo-Saxon Malthusianism. Although contraception was fully domesticated in France by 1900, couples were using coitus interruptus, a natural technique that was hard to discuss in a legislative body, and beyond medical control. The Senate was strongly polarized on social issues, but condemning abortion was something that all parties could agree on. There was no serious lobby in favor of birth control, no constituency. The bloodbath of World War I seemed to call for emergency measures; there is no need to invoke male oppression to explain the “infamous” 1920 law. However shocking it seems to us now, the absence of women in political life was taken for granted in most of the world at that time. The consensus view agreed with Kipling: motherhood was the power that made the woman great and “woman must command but may not govern.” Feminism and birth control were two unpopular causes at the time, and both would eventually triumph; but they were by no means coterminous.

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One World: The Ethics of Globalization

International society, to the extent there is such a thing, is the society of states. Its membership organization is the United Nations General Assembly, in which Tuvalu (population 10,000) is the sovereign equal of China (130,000 Tuvaluans). From the standpoint of any design of world democracy it would be hard to conceive of a more spectacular gerrymandering, and in part because of such disparities the Assembly is a fairly toothless entity. Actual authority in the international arena, where not wholly unilateral, derives from formal and informal agreements among states—notably among the great, near-great, and once-great powers, in the Security Council and elsewhere. Both the conceit of national sovereignty and the reality of national power preclude any emergence of a popularly elected “World Assembly” on the model, say, of the envisaged role of the European Parliament. Thankfully so, many would think, especially if it prevented the parallel emergence of a Brussels-type bureaucracy on a global scale.

The society of states nevertheless has rules, lots of them. They are implied in the body of international law and set down in the multifarious international treaties, declarations, plans of action, and other such instruments that most states have
formally agreed to. In a few domains there are even means of enforcement—nearly the explicit authority to use force conceded to the Security Council in Article 24 of the UN Charter, but also the economic sanctions available to the World Trade Organization and even the sanctions prescribed under the Kyoto Protocol, if that agreement comes into force. The aggregate of such rules, along with the ethical principles they embody, can be seen as the framework of a kind of virtual world society, limiting the otherwise anarchic qualities of the society of states. Part of the process of globalization involves the elaboration of these rules and principles and the extension of their geographic reach.

But the global society thus derived is shaped—and its ethical principles in a sense contaminated—by its concessions to state sovereignty. Peter Singer’s premise, in One World: The Ethics of Globalization, is that “national sovereignty has no intrinsic moral weight” (p. 148). States and national borders, as geopolitical artifacts, are impediments to ethical clarity. Indeed, Singer would go beyond the downplaying of national borders to a more radical impartialist position. To the question: who is my neighbor? he would answer: everyone. Compatriots are not more worthy of moral consideration than distant and unrelated persons. Even family and friends warrant no automatic preference: “Neither the biological nor the cultural basis of our intuitive responses provides us with a sound reason for taking them as the basis of morality” (p. 164). So much for J. B. S. Haldane’s half-serious equating of his own (genetic) worth to that of two brothers or eight cousins, and E. M. Forster’s willingness to betray his country for his friends.

Singer is of course quite aware of the likelihood that too demanding an ethical stance could be counterproductive: that its effect may be, as another philosopher, Bernard Williams (1985: 212n), has remarked, “to increase a sense of indeterminate guilt” in readers, leading not to greater altruism but to “a defensive and resentful contraction of concern.” Ethical purity may have to be sacrificed for practicality of result. Thus Singer asks simply: “What policy will produce the best consequences?” (p. 192).

The policy discussion in the book is concerned with four topics: the global environment (mainly the atmospheric greenhouse problem), income inequality, the protection of human rights, and international law. In each of them Singer’s utilitarian philosophy is applied to an appraisal of the performance of governments and international institutions and to the conduct of rich-country citizens. Much and many are found wanting. The United States is castigated for its stand on Kyoto. The UN is weak on humanitarian interventions that need to override state sovereignty. The WTO is seen as neglecting environmental protection, worker safety, union rights, and animal welfare. Foreign aid from most of the developed world is derisory—far below the levels required to meet the Millennium Summit target of halving world poverty by 2015. Linking these substantive issues is the underlying theme of how to move from the existing world of national haves and have-nots toward “one world” in which people acknowledge their increasing interdependence and strive for a greater level of fairness across societies.

The treatment of fairness inevitably draws on Rawls’s Theory of Justice, in particular, Rawls’s thought experiment of an observer having to select the best among alternative societal designs without knowing where in the chosen design he or
she would be placed—the famous “veil of ignorance.” Under a moderate degree of risk aversion, the procedure would likely favor designs without extremes of inequality on dimensions such as income and opportunity. Singer applies this Rawlsian perspective to the world population as a whole, as if it were a single society. Not surprisingly, he derives a case for strongly redistributionist policies among countries. On the greenhouse issue, for example, he favors a rule (incorporating a cunning demographic incentive) of “equal per capita future entitlements to a share of the capacity of the atmospheric sink, tied to the current United Nations projections of population growth per country in 2050” (p. 43). Even if softened through emissions trading, this would have effects on most of the industrialized countries far more drastic than the Kyoto targets. And such a requirement might still be seen as modest, Singer claims, since it deals only with flows—not exacting recompense for the century of past emissions that have built up the present stock of atmospheric CO₂. (That there might have been compensating benefits transferred as well is a matter not pursued.) To Singer—as to many others—equal shares are self-evidently “fair.”

Of course, the Theory of Justice dealt only with justice within a state, not in the world as a whole. Moreover, when late in life Rawls did write about relations among states, in The Law of Peoples, he did not invoke the veil of ignorance to appraise justice at a global level but retreated to a much more conventional stance that assigned responsibility to states for the consequences of their actions. (Singer appears to see this retreat as a failure of nerve on Rawls’s part and takes him to task for it [p. 176].) An assumption of state responsibility might suggest an analogy at the international level to the entitlement theory set out in Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia. To take a demographic example, one might question why economic inequality resulting from differential population growth should not be acceptable without creating a case for transfers. We don’t question the tacit choice a country makes of wealth over population—at the considerable initial cost that economic development entails in the disruption of old ways. Nor do we object to that country passing on its resulting achievements to future generations. Why should another country not be free to choose to retain its old ways without being continually compared to the economic leaders or deemed an international mendicant? Even with the necessary, often large, allowances for historical injustice and a rigged international system, some residue of an entitlement perspective remains to counter a blithe one-world altruism. There may be large practical gains to be had from lessened international inequality, but that does not require an ethical argument.

How ethical calculation should take account of boundaries dividing up a population is a general problem. Boundaries beget identities, which are social realities. They provide necessary leverage or purchase for measures to control negative spillovers—and, in some cases, to delineate entities within which to mobilize positive spillovers. International migration—a globalization issue not tackled by Singer—could provide an endless source of illustrations. Singer recognizes such complications, but they don’t seem to enter his arithmetic. To him, people are simply individuals. Admirable as that is in some respects, the loss of definition matters. In Singer’s calculus, the well-being of the poor can be secured by flooding them with
foreign aid; with a comparable abstraction from social structure and history, Garrett Hardin’s “lifeboat ethics” arrives at a diametrically opposite recipe: well-being is to be achieved by a stern rationing of assistance.

A boundary of great importance is the one delimiting the moral community itself: the population whose interests are to be considered. Despite Singer’s renown as the author of the classic *Animal Liberation* (1975, 1990), the moral community of *One World* is a resolutely human one. In that earlier work Singer argued for moral consideration to extend to other species with enough neural complexity to be likely to experience pain and pleasure. By this criterion moral considerability of members of nonhuman species (entailing a respect for their imputed interests—at a minimum, not to have pain inflicted on them by humans) not only covers the apes and other higher mammals but reaches well down the evolutionary ladder, perhaps, he suggests, as far as the mollusks. Animal welfare is touched on in *One World*—for example, with reference to the movement in support of humane farming practices or to the WTO’s role in safeguarding dolphins, turtles, and albatrosses from fishing nets and long-lines. Singer identifies the need for a “democratically controlled system of regulation” to promote minimum standards on such matters (p. 95). But the democratic process would be a poor guide for this purpose: whatever it might become in the distant future, current majority world opinion, were it solicited, would likely place the humane treatment of animals far down on a list of concerns. Elsewhere in the book (pp. 140–141) Singer decries cultural relativism: “Some aspects of ethics can fairly be claimed to be universal, or very nearly so”—among them, certainly, the usual array of human rights. The author in a less cautious mode would surely have done more to protect himself against a charge of speciesism.


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**References**


SHORT REVIEWS

by John Bongaarts, Susan Greenhalgh, Geoffrey McNicoll, Mark R. Montgomery

JAGDISH BHAGWATI

In Defense of Globalization

As a renowned expert on international trade, Jagdish Bhagwati predictably has no truck with antiglobalists. In a series of breezily written but trenchantly argued chapters, he disposes of the claims that globalization—particularly as manifested in the aims and practices of the World Trade Organization—is harmful for women, children (through child labor), poverty, democracy, wages, the environment, and culture (from Hollywood films to GM foods). Free capital flows are the somewhat massive exception proving the rule: “gung-ho international financial capitalism” as promoted by the “Wall Street–[US] Treasury complex” led to the 1997 Asian financial crisis—but also to a chastened IMF. The problems trade liberalization poses for poor countries, the author argues, come not from opening their markets but from “extraneous and harmful demands aimed at appeasing the domestic lobbies in the rich countries on trade-unrelated issues such as intellectual property protection and labor issues.”

In a chapter on “international flows of humanity,” Bhagwati identifies migration as a missing dimension of globalization. Skilled migration is to be supported, preferably with the countries of origin compensated by a “Bhagwati tax” on migrant earnings. Supported too, in effect, is unskilled migration, given that it will take place anyway in response to labor demands and given also the unwillingness of recipient countries to take strong action against illegal movement. “Accommodation, rather than impossible curtailment, must be the goal.” Bhagwati calls for “new institutional architecture” in the form of a World Migration Organization that would “oversee and monitor each nation’s policies toward migrants, whether inward- or outward bound.” Index.—G.McN.

VANESSA L. FONG

Only Hope: Coming of Age Under China’s One-Child Policy

China’s one-child policy was designed not just to reduce population quantity, but also to produce a generation of “quality” Chinese to lead the nation in its quest to become a wealthy, powerful force on the world stage. Did the quality project succeed? This ethnographic study suggests that it did, but at great cost. Focusing on the northern city of Dalian, this well-written book examines the effects of single childhood on the subjectivities, experiences, and aspirations of a group of junior
and senior high school students born during the first five years of the policy’s enforcement, 1979–84. Following Immanuel Wallerstein, the author, now assistant professor in Harvard University’s Graduate School of Education, sees fertility transition as part of a cultural model of modernization in which third world residents aspire to emulate and eventually join the modernized, affluent first world. Interweaving data from a survey and participant observation, Fong unveils a child-centered, consumption-oriented, upward-mobility-focused world whose little denizens fully merit their label “little emperors and empresses.” As their parents sacrifice everything, including their own dreams, to give their only child every educational advantage, the children take it all for granted and become self-centered to the point that they are unable to cope with changes in their environments. In one shocking incident, a boy whose father struck him for refusing to pay attention to the author’s English lessons retorted, “Beat me now and ... when you’re old and weak, I’ll beat you till you can’t move” (p. 147). Excessive though it may seem, the spoiling has a purpose: the children are being groomed to become major sources of economic and personal support for their parents in old age. Overall, the author finds that the children’s sky-high aspirations for “first world” schooling and jobs cannot be met. As one informant put it, in their search for elite education and employment there is only one road that everyone is trying to squeeze onto. The results are personal frustration, strained family relations, and societal stress. This largely descriptive book fills a conspicuous gap in the literature on China and on single childhood more generally. Although media accounts over the last 25 years have brought out many of the points the author makes, this fine-grained academic study provides a depth of insight into the social and emotional world of China’s urban singletons unavailable elsewhere. Fong’s rich ethnographic material leaves no doubt that China’s urban society has been profoundly altered by the one-child policy—in ways its makers did and did not intend. One hopes a study of China’s rural singletons will follow. References, index.—S.G.

ARIANNE M. GAETANO AND TAMARA JACKA (EDS.)

On the Move: Women in Rural-to-Urban Migration in Contemporary China

New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. vi + 355 p. $69.50; $29.50 (pbk.).

China is awash with migrants, most hoping to escape rural poverty and make a better life in that country’s globalizing cities. This new collection underscores the importance of the female part of that “floating population”—one-third to one-half the roughly 100-million total—to China’s contemporary social, cultural, and economic transformations. These young women are in great demand in China’s booming marketplace, taking the low-wage jobs, often in poor, unsafe work environments, that urbanites shun. This multidisciplinary volume forms a nice complement to the demographic research on Chinese migration. It draws on largely qualitative field research to explore the impact of this massive human movement on the migrants themselves—their experiences, social relations, identities, and gender ideologies—while connecting individual trajectories to broader structures, institutions, and sociopolitical discourses of China as a whole. The book follows its subjects from the villages to the cities and back again, providing a geographic breadth not
often achieved in migration research. Deftly edited and introduced by Arianne M. Gaetano and Tamara Jacka, the volume’s ten chapters are arranged in four sections. The first, “Negotiating identities,” examines how various groups of dagongmei (“working sisters”) negotiate dominant discourses and images of modernity, gender, and sexuality to fashion identities for themselves. The second, “Seeking a future,” traces the consequences of migration for rural women’s search for a better future through marriage. “Changing village life” accompanies the migrants back to the villages to see how women’s outmigration and, for some, return affect them and other women in the rural setting. The last, “Writing lives,” presents a series of stories written by migrant women themselves for a competition on the topic “my life as a migrant worker.” These personal testimonies illustrate the contradictory experiences of many migrant women who enjoy personal empowerment but also encounter bitter suffering from discrimination, sexual harassment, and exploitation as a cheap and flexible labor force. This exceptionally well-composed, empirically rich, and accessible collection brings to life the varied experiences encountered by this large and vital new sector of the Chinese and global labor forces. It is highly recommended to specialists in migration, China, and gender studies. Glossary of Chinese terms, references, index.—S.G.

PETER S. HELLER
Who Will Pay? Coping with Aging Societies, Climate Change, and Other Long-Term Fiscal Challenges
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2003. xiv + 314 p. $28.00 (pbk.).

Governments face a growing need to address long-range demographic, environmental, and economic developments that impose costs on future generations. For example, rapid population aging will lead to large increases in the future costs of public pensions and health care. Today’s consumption of fossil fuels causes global warming with a host of adverse effects. Increasing integration of the global economy limits the fiscal options of individual governments such as the ability to raise taxes. This study argues persuasively that these issues have been given too little attention and that action is urgently needed.

After an overview of the most challenging future developments, the volume discusses how countries currently take account of these long-term issues in the preparation of their short-term budgets. The present situation is considered highly unsatisfactory, despite a host of reports calling for reform. Many obstacles prevent appropriate policies from being implemented: uncertainty inherent in long-range projections, uncertainty regarding the tradeoff between the welfare of current and future (and richer) generations, and, perhaps most important, the short-term horizon of political calculation. The concluding section offers a number of concrete ways to strengthen countries’ current budget processes and procedures. In general, no single policy option will suffice and multi-pronged strategies will be required. Scaling back commitments for future expenditures and avoiding new ones will be essential. For example, to bring about a balance between expenditures and contributions in public pensions systems in most countries will require, at a minimum, increases in tax rates, reductions in benefits, and rises in age at retirement.
As deputy director of the International Monetary Fund’s Fiscal Affairs Department, the author is thoroughly familiar with these issues in countries around the world. He succeeds well in presenting sometimes highly technical material in a stimulating and accessible form to its intended audience of policymakers and economists.—J.B.

**PHILLIP LONGMAN**

_The Empty Cradle: How Falling Birthrates Threaten World Prosperity and What to Do About It_


Recent demographic projections predict that high-income countries will soon experience unprecedented population aging. The proximate causes are rapid fertility decline to below replacement and increasing longevity. The socioeconomic consequences of aging include reduced growth in standards of living and an unprecedented escalation of pension and health care costs. Of particular concern is the sustainability of widely implemented pay-as-you-go public support programs, which rely on increasingly burdensome transfers from younger to older generations. This volume summarizes these adverse developments and argues that much more aggressive intervention is needed to correct them. Conventional policy responses such as increases in taxes, cuts in benefits, and delays in retirement age are seen as inadequate in most countries. Very low fertility is considered the central problem that needs to be addressed, even though most governments have been reluctant to adopt pronatalist measures or to interfere in the private decisionmaking of families. The central cause of low fertility is that modern economies, despite their requirements for large amounts of human capital, provide too few individual incentives to invest in children. Many producers of human capital—in particular parents and caregivers—are not adequately compensated for their efforts and they therefore choose more rewarding uses of their time and income. The author estimates the cost of a child in the United States (including opportunity costs) at over $1 million. The main proposed policy options are to reduce taxes on parents and to raise old-age benefits for parents with children who finish high school. Although one can quibble with some of the arguments and recommendations, this volume offers a stimulating discussion of an important and controversial issue.—J.B.

**WILLIAM PETERSEN**

_From Persons to People: Further Studies in the Politics of Population_


_Against the Stream: Reflections of an Unconventional Demographer_


William Petersen's _The Politics of Population_ (1964) was a stimulating collection of essays on topics in family and migration policy and the history of population thought. It is still well worth reading. _From Persons to People_ collects an assortment
of the author’s later writings in the same areas, plus some on ethnicity. They also make good reading, if on average lighter in weight than the 1964 vintage. Many have been previously published in some form, two of them in PDR: “Marxism and the population question,” 14 (Suppl.), and “Surnames in US population records,” 27 (2). All have been updated but also, whether in the interests of space or pace, shorn of bibliographies. (In part compensation, an index is supplied.) Further testament to Petersen’s activity as Lazarus Professor Emeritus is another, much slimmer volume: Against the Stream: Reflections of an Unconventional Demographer. Here the items, more snippets than essays, are connected mainly by their curmudgeonly tone. The scattering of topics and targets include utopian town planners, Canadian identity, split infinitives, the dating of Christmas, and “revolting Berkeley students.” William Petersen died on June 9, 2004.—G.McN.

LEO SURYADINATA, EVI NURVIDYA ARIFIN, AND ARIS ANANTA
Indonesia’s Population: Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003. xxv + 193 p. $49.90; $32.00 (pbk.).

Ethnicity was seen as a potentially divisive issue in post-independence Indonesian politics, at odds with the nationalist rhetoric of the time that rejected federalism and sought to downplay the evident fact of Javanese political dominance. Ethnic groups were recorded in intricate detail in the colonial census of 1930, but the topic was not treated again until 2000. Religious affiliation, perhaps because of the overwhelming prevalence of Islam, had been deemed less sensitive and was a more routine census item. This monograph mines the published data from the 2000 census on both topics. It is very much a preliminary exercise—and a purely statistical one—but valuable nonetheless. An initial table lists the sizes of ethnic groups in 2000, 101 of them by name, based on self-identification. Javanese (84 million), Sundanese (31 million), and Madurese (7 million) make up 60 percent of the population; another nine groups bring the cumulative proportion to 81 percent, with the remaining groups each below 1 percent (2 million). The Central Statistical Board coded no fewer than 1,072 ethnicities on the census returns. A residual category of “others” (14 million) contains many of these, though presumably it mostly comprises “not stated” and respondents insisting on simply being Indonesian. The authors discuss the regional distributions of the largest groups and the similarities and changes in the ethnic picture since 1930. Particular interest attaches to the ethnic Chinese population, which is the subject of a chapter of its own: the authors estimate the Chinese to number between 2.9 and 4 million (1.4 and 2 percent), probably at the low end of this range. They speculate on the effects of official assimilationist pressures and on the numbers choosing to hide their identity. On religion, the comparison is made with the 1971 census and the picture is relatively static: 88 percent of the population are Muslim, 9 percent Christian, the latter concentrated in the eastern provinces. While for the most part rigorously avoiding any commentary beyond simple demography, a final chapter briefly investigates political behavior linked to ethnicity and religion.—G.McN.
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME

The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements
London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan Publications, 2003. 340 p. $110.00; $40.00 (pbk.).

For readers seeking an introduction to the literature on urban poverty in developing countries, The Challenge of Slums provides an excellent point of entry. Much attention will be given to the report’s main finding—that 870 million slum dwellers reside in the cities of the developing world, accounting for 43 percent of its urban population. Many readers, however, will be intrigued by the story lying behind these numbers.

This report marks a new direction in the work of the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), which is seeking to establish a firmer scientific foundation for its influential estimates. Beginning with first principles, the report reassesses the core concepts embedded in the catch-all term “slum” and provides new empirical measures that, for the first time in any systematic fashion, exploit the possibilities of household-level survey data (mainly from the Demographic and Health Surveys and the Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys). Previous Global Reports relied on city-level statistics supplied by local consultants, which could not be sufficiently standardized to ensure comparability across countries. Although the new estimates of slum population are better justified, the authors present them cautiously and refrain from making any estimates of trends on the grounds that the available data do not yet support such estimates. All this is a welcome departure from the rhetoric (“exploding slums” and the like) that mars so much of the urban poverty literature.

The basis for the new estimates is explained in detail in the text and in an instructive Methodological Notes annex. A given household is classified as residing in a slum if it exhibits deficiencies in any of five dimensions of living standards: access to safe drinking water; access to sanitary waste disposal; the structural quality of housing; available living space; and security of housing tenure. Interestingly, the spatial concentration of poverty, which would seem to be the defining feature of slums, is not made explicit in this household-level definition. The Challenge of Slums carefully avoids suggesting that the urban poor are always spatially concentrated, and draws attention to the socioeconomic diversity that marks many slum populations: “[S]lum dwellers are not a homogeneous population, and some people of reasonable incomes live within or on the edges of slum communities…. [I]n many cities, there are more poor people outside the slum areas than within them” (page xxvi). Although the report does not develop this point further, it places the issue of slum heterogeneity squarely on the research agenda. Viewed in this light, the figure of 870 million slum dwellers is perhaps more correctly seen as an estimate of the total number of urban poor rather than of the poor who live in slums as such.

The Challenge of Slums is wider-ranging in its concerns than these remarks on measurement alone would suggest. It devotes considerable attention to civil society and the potentially valuable roles of urban social capital (especially associations of the urban poor), and it assembles an argument stressing the benefits of slums, both as sites of low-cost housing and as communities that lend social support to new migrants. The final sections are enlivened by a diverse set of case studies, covering 29 cities in the developing and developed world. There is much material here for all students of urban poverty.—M.R.M.